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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
By Cathal Doyle
International human rights law (IHRL) recognizes that indigenous peoples are equal to all other 
peoples and therefore vested with the right to self-determination. This right is the foundation for 
their collective rights, by virtue of which they are free to determine their social, economic and 
cultural development. The decision to give or withhold free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) 
is a self-determination choice about the form of social, cultural, and economic development a 
people wishes to pursue. 
This recognition of the duty to consult in order to obtain FPIC has been hard fought for by 
indigenous peoples. Experience with its implementation has, however, been disappointing. The 
concept has largely been divorced from indigenous peoples’ self-governance, territorial and cul-
tural rights, as control over its definition and operationalization has remained predominantly in 
the hands of States, corporations and other third-party actors. Rather than afford protection to 
rights, in many cases forms of false consultation and “FPIC” have become a means to coercively 
or forcefully legitimize projects in indigenous peoples’ territories. 
A growing response of indigenous peoples has been to codify their own laws and governance rules 
by developing their own autonomous rights-based consultation and consent protocols and polices 
(henceforth FPIC protocols), defining how they are to be consulted and their FPIC sought. This 
report probes the strengths and potential limitations and challenges of these self-determination 
instruments. It does so by drawing on the concrete experiences and realities of indigenous peo-
ples who have developed, or are in the process of developing, them. The terms “FPIC protocol” 
or “autonomous FPIC protocol” - among others such as regulatory or normative frameworks, 
policies, guidelines or manifestos - are used by indigenous peoples as shorthand to describe doc-
uments that formalize their engagement rules and procedures in relation to consultations aimed 
at obtaining their FPIC.
The protocols from these 20 countries are available in the project protocol database which will be 
made publicly accessible in a subsequent stage of the project. For further information contact the 
report editors.1
 
The common features addressed include: the attention protocols accord to activities with a 
potentially significant impact on indigenous peoples’ rights; the preconditions they establish 
for good faith consultations; the consultation timeframes and stages they outline; the legal bases 
they affirm for the duty to obtain FPIC; concepts, practices and principles which the concerned 
indigenous peoples regard as non-negotiable, and guidance on representation and how decisions 
are taken.
The significant variance across FPIC protocols in terms of their focus, format, and the nature of 
the processes they prescribe, highlights the absence of a one size fits all approach to FPIC. It also 
demonstrates the important role for FPIC protocols to ensure that consultation processes address 
the context specific actions needed to guarantee respect for indigenous peoples’ rights.
Section two consists of three case studies addressing four emblematic FPIC protocols: the pro-
tocol of Juruna in Brazil, the protocols of the Embera Chamí and of the Afro-Colombian Com-
munities of northern Cauca in Colombia and the draft protocol of the Wampis in Peru. All four 
protocols have distinct features that reflect these peoples’ experience and realities and the national 
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context within which they operate. The experience of each of these peoples offers unique insights 
into the development, content and potential contribution of FPIC protocols to rights realization 
in specific contexts.
The Juruna, one of the peoples of the Xingu river in the state of Para in Brazil, finalized their 
protocol in 2017 when faced with the commencement of the Belo Sun mining project in the 
absence of prior consultation or FPIC. A notable feature of the Juruna Protocol, arising from their 
negative experience with the Belo Monte Dam, is its emphasis on their role in designing partic-
ipatory environmental impact assessments.  In 2018, the Juruna won an important legal case in 
the Federal Court suspending the Belo Sun mining project and affirming the need to respect their 
FPIC Protocol. Its subsequent application led to an environmental approval for the Belo Sun 
mine being declared invalid.
The Embera Chamí people of the Resguardo Indígena Cañamomo Lomaprieta, in Caldas, Colom-
bia developed a regulatory framework in 2012, including an FPIC protocol, governing all forms 
of mining in their territory in response to attempts to impose external mining concessions.  The 
FPIC protocol has had a deterrent effect, and no company has managed to commence mining 
activities in the Resguardo since it was adopted. In 2016, the Colombian Constitutional Court 
affirmed the need to respect the Embera Chamí protocols and procedures in relation to FPIC 
(Case T-530/2016). 
Since 2009, the Embera Chamí have worked in close cooperation with the Afro-Descendant 
communities of the Alto Cauca who have also developed an FPIC protocol and implemented 
it in the context of the Salvajina hydroelectric project. The protocol enabled the communities 
to negotiate the terms and conditions of impact assessments as required by a decision of the 
Colombian Constitutional Court. Widespread intimidation, death threats, attacks and killings of 
community leaders is a central challenge to the implementation of these and other FPIC protocols 
in Colombia. 
 
In November 2015, the Wampis became the first indigenous peoples in Peru to declare an indig-
enous Autonomous Territorial Government and in doing so issued their governing Statute. One 
aspect of the Statute is that it establishes the requirement for consultation and FPIC in relation 
to externally proposed activities. A 2017 landmark court ruling affirmed the requirement for con-
sultation and FPIC with the Wampis in relation to oil exploitation, while suspending a specific 
project impacting on their territory. In preparation for State initiated consultation processes, the 
Wampis are developing an FPIC protocol grounded on their Statute and IHRL.
These and other initial experiences with autonomous FPIC Protocols demonstrate their potential 
to contribute to tackling critical shortcomings in existing law and practice around consultation 
and consent. They have acted as tools for resistance, challenging the absence of, or flaws in, con-
sultation processes and establishing standards and procedures with which future consultation 
processes must comply. Their legitimacy in this regard has been recognized by national courts as 
well as local, national and international oversight and administrative bodies. The autonomous 
development of FPIC protocols has opened spaces for reflection and dialogue among and between 
indigenous peoples. These spaces are generally free from the external and internal pressures that 
inevitably accompany consultation processes. This has allowed indigenous peoples to address how 
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they wish to take decisions when confronted with powerful external actors seeking to operate in 
their territories, and has contributed to addressing the significant power imbalances that generally 
occur between indigenous peoples and external actors proposing projects of economic interest to 
the State. It has provided them the time and freedom necessary to articulate what consultation 
and FPIC mean in their own terms. 
Developed in specific local contexts FPIC protocols are more than the sum of their parts. As a 
growing number of indigenous peoples develop them, their impact is being magnified. The emer-
gence of a body of practice in this area by indigenous peoples could establish a de-facto regulation 
of consultation processes and FPIC in accordance with indigenous customary law, that States, 
corporations and international organizations cannot ignore. 
The report closes with recommendations to States, project proponents, financers and investors, and 
international organizations. Among these recommendations are that: 
States in which indigenous peoples reside should:
 
• acknowledge the self-determination-based right of indigenous peoples to 
define their own development paths and the associated duty to obtain FPIC; 
• recognize and commit to respecting FPIC protocols as a pro-active exercise of 
the right to self-determination and as living self-government instruments that 
form an integral part of the law governing State actions in relation to indige-
nous peoples; 
• afford indigenous peoples the necessary time and space to formulate FPIC 
protocols, free from external pressure, and refrain from holding consultations 
processes while FPIC protocols are being developed; and
• recognize the consultation and FPIC, including the development of FPIC pro-
tocols, are rights that indigenous peoples are free to exercise, not obligations 
with which they must comply.
 
Home States of companies should: 
• establish mandatory human rights due diligence legislation;
• ensure that international investment agreements are consistent with indigenous 
peoples’ right to give or withhold FPIC;
• enact extraterritorial legislation to hold their companies to account for viola-
tions of indigenous peoples’ rights overseas; and 
• support the development of improved multilateral standards. 
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Financiers and investors should: 
• develop policies that commit to dealing exclusively with clients who respect indig-
enous peoples’ rights under IHRL;
• ensure that clients’ due diligence processes assess potential impacts on indigenous peo-
ples through participatory consent-based processes that respect FPIC protocols; and 
• provide access to independent, transparent and credible complaint mechanisms to 
address allegations of violations of indigenous rights.
 
Project proponents should: 
 
• respect FPIC protocols, follow their guidance and ensure that they are fully 
addressed as part of human rights due diligence, impact assessments, agreements 
and monitoring;
• develop a public policy commitment to respect international standards on indige-
nous peoples’ rights, including the right to consultation and FPIC;
• recognize that FPIC is a process to be defined and managed by indigenous peoples; 
and
• acknowledge that FPIC protocols reduce long-term investment risk exposure and 
encourage States and other corporate actors to respect FPIC protocol implementation.  
 
International Organizations should:
• share and examine of experiences with other indigenous peoples of FPIC protocol 
development and implementation;
• consider a range of topics outlined in the report as part of protocol development, 
including whether FPIC protocols should be used in place of, or in conjunction 
with, national regulation;
• collaborate nationally and internationally to amplify the collective impact of their 
FPIC protocols; and 
• insist that as rights-based normative self-governance tools, FPIC protocols must 
serve as educational instruments for all actors engaging with indigenous peoples. 
Indigenous peoples have shown good faith in developing FPIC protocols. States, corporations, 
financers and international organizations now need to show good faith by respecting them. Until 
this happens, and the necessary preconditions are in place for rights-based consultations to take 
place, FPIC protocols will continue to act as tools for resistance, education and strengthening 
self-governance.
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INTRODUCTION: A GLOBAL OVERVIEW OF THE 
CONTEXT AND CONTENT OF FPIC PROTOCOLS 
By Cathal Doyle
“From the outset the State starts consultation in 
bad faith as it issues decrees on how to 
consult without consultation on those decrees.” 
Representative of Sarayaku People, Ecuador.
“We need a concept, such as FPIC Protocols, 
that connects indigenous peoples, States and companies” 
Representative of Embera Chami People, Colombia.
“It is important for us to have a consultation and FPIC protocol 
instrument that is specific to the Wajapi people. The Government 
is trying to make a general protocol, but that cannot work when 
there are 200 peoples, almost all with their own languages 
and ways of engaging with outsiders and taking decisions.” 
Representative of Wajapi People, Brazil.
“Time is determined by the moon, not by capital”
 Representative of Putomayo communities, Colombia.
International human rights law (IHRL) recog-
nizes that indigenous peoples are equal to all 
other peoples and therefore are vested with the 
right to self-determination. This right is the 
foundation for their collective rights, by vir-
tue of which they are free to determine their 
social, economic and cultural development. 
The decision to give or withhold free, prior and 
informed consent (FPIC) is a decision about 
the form of social, cultural, and economic 
development a people wishes to pursue. The 
relationship between FPIC and self-determi-
nation is therefore a reciprocal one. Self-deter-
mination implies a requirement for FPIC, and 
the exercise of FPIC facilitates the pursuit of 
self-determination.
Over the past three decades, and in particular 
since the adoption of the UN Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) 
in 2007, there has been a growing understand-
ing of this relationship. There is now wide-
spread acknowledgement among informed 
actors that FPIC is necessary to guarantee the 
realization of indigenous peoples’ rights and 
to ensure their survival as self-determining 
peoples. This is reflected in a series of devel-
opments including international, regional and 
national judicial and quasi-judicial decisions, 
legislative and administrative measures, lending 
requirements of international finance institu-
tions, multi-stakeholder standard setting ini-
tiatives, and in specific policies of companies, 
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non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and 
international organizations. 
The International Finance Corporation’s inclu-
sion of the requirement for FPIC in its 2011 
performance standards, and by extension in 
the policies of the Equator Banks, was a major 
development for the private sector. It marked a 
tipping point in the recognition of FPIC as a 
standard with which companies must comply in 
order to ensure respect for indigenous peoples’ 
rights. The World Bank’s inclusion of FPIC in 
its 2017 Environmental and Social policy was a 
reaffirmation of the international community’s 
expectation that States will require and enforce 
FPIC whenever development projects poten-
tially impact on indigenous peoples’ rights. 
This recognition of consultation and FPIC has 
been hard fought for by indigenous peoples. 
Experience with its implementation has, how-
ever, been disappointing. The concept has been 
divorced from indigenous peoples’ self-govern-
ance, territorial and cultural rights, as control 
over its operationalization has remained in the 
hands of State and corporations. Rather than 
afford protection to rights, in many cases forms 
of false consultation and “FPIC” have become 
a means to forcefully legitimize projects in 
indigenous peoples’ territories.
A response of indigenous peoples has been to 
develop their own autonomous rights-based 
consultation and consent protocols (henceforth 
FPIC protocols), defining how they are to be 
consulted and their FPIC sought. This research 
seeks to probe the strengths and potential lim-
itations of these instruments based on the con-
crete experiences and realities of indigenous 
peoples who have developed, or are in the pro-
cess of developing, them. 
The research project, which was funded 
through the GIZ sector programme on ‘Real-
ising human rights in development coopera-
tion’, ran from October 2018 to April 2019. 
Existing FPIC protocols were consolidated into 
a database, and emblematic cases in Colombia, 
Brazil and Peru were selected for analysis. A 
workshop was held in November, prior to the 
UN Forum on Business and Human Rights, 
involving participation of indigenous repre-
sentatives from the three case study communi-
ties, and indigenous representatives from Asia 
with experience of FPIC protocols. Over the 
course of the project, the authors participated 
in additional international workshops address-
ing FPIC protocols and conducted on-site 
research in the case study countries2.  The pri-
mary target audience of the research is indige-
nous and tribal peoples, and the organizations 
that support them. This includes peoples who 
wish to implement FPIC protocols, those who 
are developing them, and those who are consid-
ering their potential utility. States, companies, 
investors, financial institutions, certification 
bodies and multi-stakeholder initiatives, as well 
as international and regional human rights and 
development bodies are all secondary targets.
The project has three primary outcomes. The 
first is this research document. It synthesizes 
insights from experiences with existing FPIC 
protocols and consists of three main sections. 
Section one provides a general overview of the 
context in which FPIC protocols have emerged 
and outlines their typical contents. It concludes 
with a brief introductory overview of the case 
study protocols. Section two consists of three 
case studies, each addressing specific protocols. 
The first two case studies address the FPIC 
protocols of the Juruna people in Brazil and of 
the Embera Chamí people and Afro Descend-
ant communities in Colombia. The third case 
study addresses the Wampis nation in Peru who 
are currently developing their FPIC protocol. 
Each case study examines the background to 
the development of the protocol, its scope and 
key provisions, and the role which it has played 
in the concerned indigenous peoples’ struggle. 
Section three concludes by considering the con-
tribution of FPIC protocols to the realization of 
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indigenous and tribal peoples’ rights and offers 
some recommendations to States, corporations, 
civil society and indigenous peoples in relation 
to their development and implementation. 
The second outcome consists of two strands, 
both of which were created as subprojects and 
were developed to provide concrete and direct 
assistance to the peoples contributing their 
experiences with protocols. The first is the 
strengthening of the Embera Chamí internal 
regulation of ancestral mining and the devel-
opment of a position on the delineation of 
their ancestral territory. These activities help to 
implement their landmark 2016 Constitutional 
Court ruling and are a precondition for the 
effective implementation of their FPIC proto-
col. The second strand is the development of a 
draft legal and political framework that forms 
the basis for the Wampis FPIC protocol. This 
contributes towards the implementation of 
their 2018 Court decision affirming the State 
duty to obtain their FPIC. 
The third project outcome is a pilot database. 
This is a proof of concept for the consolida-
tion and indexing of FPIC protocols according 
to issues and themes they commonly address. 
A potential second phase of the project would 
develop the database and could involve assist-
ing two or more indigenous peoples who are 
embarking on the development, or are com-
mencing implementation, of their FPIC pro-
tocols. It would also examine the possibility of 
extending the project beyond the Latin Ameri-
can region. 
CONTEXT
State approaches to consultation and FPIC
Good faith consultation and FPIC imply a shift 
in power and a change in the decision-making 
modus operandi of States and corporate actors. 
Current models of decision-making around 
resource exploitation are based almost exclu-
sively on State and corporate timeframes, con-
straints and perspectives. These decision-making 
processes for large scale projects can take years 
or decades and involve significant investment. 
When it comes to engaging indigenous peo-
ples, however, the focus inevitability switches to 
minimizing the time and costs involved. Their 
opinions are considered incidental, and often 
inconvenient, and they are expected to conform 
to processes that are designed without taking 
their rights, interests, or even existence, into 
consideration. 
From this State and corporate centric perspec-
tive, consultations with indigenous peoples are 
mere procedural tasks, necessary to legitimize 
access to resources. They are viewed in terms of 
their economic implications, the key barome-
ter of their effectiveness being how quickly they 
facilitate resource access. Indigenous peoples’ 
rights are rendered invisible, their perspectives 
on development ignored and their autonomy 
dismissed; They are peoples who live subsist-
ence lifestyles characterized as poor or back-
ward, in need of external development for their 
own good. Those who attempt to assert their 
rights are portrayed as subversive, anti-develop-
ment, and conflictive and the use of violence 
against them is sanctioned as a result. This is 
compounded by pervasive corruption in the 
extractive industry sector, the presence of armed 
groups, intimidation and killings of indigenous 
leaders, ineffective State institutions and deeply 
entrenched and long-standing structural dis-
crimination.
Structural discrimination towards indigenous 
peoples is generally reflected in the way their 
“From the outset the State starts 
consultation in bad faith as it issues 
decrees on how to consult without 
consultation on those decrees.” 
Sarayaku representative
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rights are interpreted and implemented by 
the State. Indigenous territories are frequently 
delineated in a limited and fragmented manner, 
inconsistent with the customary laws, practices, 
uses and needs of the concerned peoples. Their 
governance structures are, at best, afforded par-
tial recognition and their cultural practices and 
worldviews are given minimal, if any, consider-
ation in State designed processes. This limited 
recognition of rights is compounded by wide-
spread ignorance of what those rights entail, 
and the standards and safeguards necessary 
to guarantee their protection. Unsurprisingly 
in such contexts, State designed mechanisms 
to implement consultation and FPIC fail to 
deliver on their purpose of protecting rights, as 
those rights are not adequately recognized from 
the outset. This raises the question as to why an 
indigenous people who is aware of their rights 
would ever willingly engage in such consulta-
tion processes.
States rarely, if ever, ask indigenous peoples 
what they need or the type of development they 
want. In many contexts, they are completely 
absent from indigenous peoples’ territories 
until there is a corporate interest in exploiting 
resources they contain. At this point the State 
generally adopts the role of facilitating access 
to those resources and protecting investment 
rights granted to corporations3.  Consultations 
are consequently a unique opportunity for 
indigenous peoples to raise their issues with the 
State. A starting point for genuine good-faith 
engagement would ask why indigenous peoples 
come to the consultation table. This involves 
consideration of their priorities and develop-
mental aspirations, the extent to which their 
rights are recognized in law and practice, the 
degree to which they have they suffered, or con-
tinue to suffer, from human rights abuses, how 
they wish to engage with external actors and the 
processes through which they take decisions.
Indigenous peoples’ approaches to FPIC
The State duty to consult in order to obtain 
FPIC emerged in the context of indigenous 
peoples’ struggles for rights recognition. For 
indigenous peoples, FPIC is an assertion of 
their collective right to self-determination. 
Developing FPIC protocols is seen as an exer-
cise of that right4.  Indigenous peoples’ right 
to self-determination implies that they must 
be free to decide how they wish to be con-
sulted, on what they will be consulted, and 
how they will give or withhold their consent. 
It also implies that consultation processes must 
respect their governance structures, custom-
ary laws and decision-making processes. This 
means that there can be no single, one-size fits 
all, rights-based FPIC process and that self-de-
termination-based models of FPIC are defined 
by, and operationalized under the control of, 
the concerned indigenous peoples.
As an assertion of autonomy, FPIC protocols 
reject the historical paternal approach of States 
which viewed indigenous peoples primarily 
through the lens of vulnerability and dismissed 
their capacity for self-governance. Jurispru-
dential developments in many Latin American 
countries reflect the transition to a self-deter-
mination-based approach, with regional and 
national Courts ordering consultation and 
FPIC in accordance with IHRL standards 
and jurisprudence. However, for institutional 
and ideological reasons, States seem incapa-
ble of implementing this jurisprudence and 
IHRL standards. Legislative and regulatory 
approaches deliberately decouple FPIC from 
its basis in rights, self-determined development 
and cultural and physical survival. This allows 
it to be dismissed as an unacceptable “veto 
power”. The emergence of oppressive political 
regimes that are hostile to indigenous peoples’ 
rights has compounded this issue. Across Latin 
America, and in other jurisdictions where con-
sultation has been recognized, the same indig-
enous peoples who demanded that their right 
to consultation be regulated through legislation 
are now opposed to State initiatives to develop 
such legislation. 
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A vacuum exists between the international 
rights framework and the ability of States to 
implement it. FPIC protocols have the potential 
to help fill this void by grounding the interna-
tional rights framework in local realities. They 
expose the unjust stigmatization of indigenous 
peoples as obstacles to development and the 
national interest, an image often amplified by 
misrepresentation of their views in the media5. 
As proactive self-government instruments aimed 
at realizing self-determined development, they 
constitute an expression of good faith on the 
part of indigenous peoples, formally establish-
ing what meaningful consultations and FPIC 
imply for the concerned peoples and how they 
wish to be engaged.
Indigenous peoples have also demanded that the 
private sector recognize its agency and ensure 
that it is not complicit in the violation of their 
rights, including their right to give or withhold 
FPIC. This independent corporate responsibil-
ity to respect indigenous peoples’ rights is rec-
ognized in the 2011 UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights and in subsequent 
jurisprudence and recommendations of regional 
and international human rights bodies6.  Initia-
tives have been taken by private sector actors to 
develop standards and guidance on FPIC, but 
many of these are inadequate from an IHRL 
perspective. As with State-centric approaches, 
they fail to cater to the diversity of indigenous 
peoples’ decision-making process and the com-
plex, oppressive, and at times violent, realities in 
which they must seek to assert their rights.
Rather than be perceived as a threat, FPIC pro-
tocols should be embraced by all actors as an 
opportunity to hear and respect indigenous 
peoples’ voices and build meaningful relation-
ships. Autonomous protocols can answer fun-
damental questions that national legislation and 
regulation cannot. These include, what consent 
means for a certain people, and what are the 
processes and structures through which it must 
be sought for it to be legitimate. Experience 
demonstrates that these protocols can serve to 
address deficiencies in State legislation and reg-
ulation, and in some contexts play an important 
role in regulating corporate interaction with 
indigenous peoples7.  
Subanon FPIC protocol contributions 
to reform of the FPIC Regulation 
in the Philippines
“The negative experiences of the Subanon 
of Mt Canatuan, and other Subanon 
communities, with NCIP [National 
Commission on Indigenous Peoples] 
regulated and controlled FPIC processes 
promoted the Subanon to assert their own 
conception of FPIC and their right to 
control its implementation. The Suba-
non “Manifesto” on FPIC came about 
after Subanon traditional leaders from 
different parts of Zamboanga Peninsula 
gathered in 2007 to protest against the 
NCIP 2006 FPIC Guidelines for facil-
itating the entry of extractive projects 
into their ancestral domains. This was 
followed in 2009 by a series of commu-
nity consultations and a conference of 
Subanon traditional leaders [including 
Subanon women leaders] to consolidate 
the views of the different communities and 
to formulate FPIC guidelines that they 
considered to be culturally appropriate, 
consistent with their customary law and 
sensitive to their indigenous worldview 
and beliefs. … The result of this broad-
based community consultation process 
was a manifesto expressing the aspirations 
of the Subanon people for an acceptable 
consent process before the introduction 
of development projects in the ancestral 
domains. … Among the conditions for the 
conduct of FPIC were: … participation 
of all affected communities in the FPIC 
process; respect for traditional territories 
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The emergence of FPIC protocols
Having struggled to obtain recognition of their 
consultation and consent rights, only to observe 
the enactment of consultation legislation or 
issuance of decrees that fail to protect their 
self-governance and territorial rights, many 
indigenous peoples are now questioning the 
desirability of such an approach. An underly-
ing concern is that States have appropriated the 
interpretation of indigenous peoples’ rights, and 
in the process are distorting them, and funda-
mentally restricting indigenous peoples’ exercise 
of autonomy and self-determination. 
Faced with this situation, indigenous peoples 
have developed a range of responses. Some have 
refused to engage in consultations and have 
instead focused on resisting State encroachment 
into their territories. Others have organized 
their own consultation processes based on their 
interpretation of their rights under international 
law standards and their own customary prac-
tices and realities9.  Others still have focused on 
strengthening their autonomy and self-govern-
ance capacity10.  As part of this mix of strategies, 
a growing number of indigenous peoples have 
developed, or are in the process of developing, 
what are frequently referred to as autonomous 
FPIC protocols. These protocols, policies, and 
normative frameworks are externally facing 
self-governance instruments that formalize the 
concerned indigenous peoples’ own laws, prac-
tices and procedures for regulating consultation 
and FPIC processes with third parties. 
As living self-government instruments, FPIC 
protocols vary in terms of their specificity 
and technicality. They provide actors seek-
ing to operate in or near the territories of 
indigenous peoples with context specific 
indigenous-rights-based principles, rules and 
frameworks within which they should oper-
ate when consulting with indigenous peoples 
and seeking their FPIC. They also elaborate on 
related principles, concepts and rights pertain-
ing to self-government, autonomy, territory, 
identity and spiritual and cultural values and 
worldviews. In so doing, they provide indige-
nous peoples’ own interpretation of their rights. 
They also establish the conditions under which 
consultation and consent seeking processes are 
considered legitimate by the concerned peoples. 
Failure to guarantee these conditions places the 
enjoyment of their rights at risk and according 
to these FPIC protocols renders the consulta-
tion processes and consent invalid. Such cir-
cumstances include, for example, consultation 
processes that may result in activities of armed 
actors in or near their territories or which cause 
division in their communities11. 
These FPIC protocols have a long lineage. 
Indigenous peoples have always had their own 
protocols governing engagement with third par-
ties through which they permitted or refused 
access to their territories. Such protocols tended 
to be part of the oral traditions embedded in 
the customs and laws of indigenous communi-
ties. For many communities, engagement with 
third parties continues to be regulated through 
non-documented systems based on customary 
and boundaries; respect for traditional 
leadership and decision-making processes; 
performance of traditional sacred ritu-
als; written agreements with terms and 
conditions; respect for decisions to reject 
projects and the absence of military and 
police forces in the community.…Pressured 
by demands of [the Subanon and other] 
indigenous peoples throughout the country, 
the NCIP suspended all FPIC processes in 
late 2011, pending the review of the 2006 
FPIC guidelines and the determination 
of appropriate guidelines for implementa-
tion. The review process led to the issuance 
by the NCIP of the Revised Guidelines on 
FPIC and Related Processes of 2012 [the 
provisions of which are closely aligned with 
the demands of the Subanon Manifesto].”8 
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law. These customary laws and oral traditions 
have survived despite centuries of colonializa-
tion and efforts by States to eradicate them. 
Their flexibility to address evolving threats and 
the inability of external actors to easily appro-
priate them are arguably part of the reason for 
their durability.
Documentation of these rules governing 
engagement with third parties is also something 
in which some indigenous peoples have histor-
ically engaged. Some continue to do so as part 
of treaties and agreements with States and other 
actors. Historically, these agreements were often 
developed under conditions of duress and were 
uninformed by, or incompatible with, indige-
nous peoples’ customary processes and laws. 
However, during certain period of history, and 
in certain contexts, indigenous peoples were 
able to formalize their engagement with exter-
nal actors under conditions where power imbal-
ances were less pronounced. Such treaties and 
agreements, or at least the indigenous interpre-
tation of them, reflected aspects of their cus-
tomary decision-making processes and laws.12
  
Documenting formalized engagement protocols 
is not necessarily the optimum approach in all 
contexts. Neither are FPIC protocols the only 
approach to autonomous regulation of consul-
tations and consent. Many indigenous peoples 
conduct their own community consultation 
processes, based on their interpretation of their 
right to consultation under international law. 
They insist on the validity of these processes and 
their outcomes as exercises of self-determination 
and autonomy, despite State refusal to recognize 
them.13 The absence of a formally documented 
FPIC protocol must, therefore, never be inter-
preted as implying that indigenous peoples do 
not have rules of engagement that govern con-
sultations and FPIC. Similarly, the develop-
ment of an FPIC protocol should not constrain 
the future exercise of the right to self-determi-
nation. Protocols are living documents and do 
not freeze customary law or the communities’ 
interpretation of their rights. Instead, they are a 
means of reaching consensus within their com-
munities on their own interpretation of those 
rights and related concepts, as well as on pro-
cesses and methodologies to be publicly shared 
and followed when engaging with the State and 
other third parties. 
Three waves of consultation protocol develop-
ment can be identified since the early 2000s. The 
first emerged in the context of extensive experi-
ence of indigenous peoples, in particular Cana-
dian First Nations, in negotiating directly with 
mining companies. Development of a number 
of these protocols, policies and guidelines com-
menced in the early to mid-2000’s. They vary 
significantly in their content and approach. 
Some provide general principles governing 
engagement with all external actors,14  while oth-
ers offer detailed rules that regulate the life-cycle 
of mining activities.15  Others consist of a series 
of templates and guidelines that establish rules 
governing exploration and conditions for activi-
ties which could follow it.16  These protocols and 
negotiating approaches inspired indigenous and 
tribal peoples in countries such as Suriname to 
develop similar instruments and to invoke them 
in their engagement with corporations.17
  
The second category are referred to as com-
munity bio-cultural protocols. These emerged 
in the late 2000’s in the context of the imple-
mentation of access and benefit sharing agree-
ments under Article 8j of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD). Numerous indig-
enous and tribal peoples in Guatemala, Hon-
duras, India, Kenya, Malaysia, Panama, Peru, 
and South Africa have developed, or are devel-
oping, such protocols.18 These bio-cultural pro-
tocols address consultation and FPIC to varying 
degrees. Some of them are more akin to land use 
plans than frameworks, primarily aimed at reg-
ulating consultation and consent. Many, such 
as the 2009 Lingayats Bio-cultural in India, 
only briefly touch on the topic of consultation 
in the context of access to genetic resources or 
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traditional knowledge.19 Others, such as the 
2012 protocol of the Miskito people, offer more 
expansive guidance, affirming that communities 
cannot be approached individually and outlin-
ing certain decision-making procedures.20
While these protocols articulate the principles 
underpinning good faith consultations, they 
provide little detail on interfaces with different 
State institutions and procedures which those 
actors must follow in order to obtain FPIC. 
Their focus tends to be on engagement with 
third parties in general, rather than the role of 
the State and its duty under IHRL. The fact 
that they emerged from the CBD, rather than 
the human rights law framework, may explain 
this. Similar consultation protocols, such as that 
of the Toledo Alcaldes Association in Belize, 
have also been developed in the context of 
implementing projects involving forest carbon 
stocks (Reducing Emissions from Deforesta-
tion and Forest Degradation, or REDD+), and 
make little reference to IHRL or the role of the 
State. Another body of protocols addresses the 
responsibility of researchers and educators to 
seek indigenous peoples’ FPIC for research on, 
or use of, traditional cultural knowledge.21 In 
some cases the same protocols addressing devel-
opment projects also cover research activities.22
The third main category of FPIC protocols, and 
the core focus of this report, are more recent 
self-governance instruments that are grounded 
in IHRL. While relevant for all actors seeking to 
engage with indigenous peoples, they primarily 
address the State’s obligations and indigenous 
peoples’ rights under IHRL, national law and 
indigenous customary law. Most of these pro-
tocols have been developed in Latin America, 
primarily by indigenous peoples in Colombia 
and Brazil.23
 
This development is one of several factors 
that makes the Latin American region par-
ticularly interesting in terms of assessing the 
potential role of FPIC protocols in protecting 
rights. Latin America is the continent with 
the strongest legal recognition of indigenous 
peoples’ rights. This includes jurisprudence of 
the Inter-American Court on Human Rights, 
which elaborates on the free prior and informed 
aspects of consultation and affirms the duty of 
States to obtain FPIC.24 There is widespread rat-
ification of International Labour Organisation 
(ILO) Convention 169 throughout the region, 
and provisions of several national Constitutions 
recognize indigenous peoples’ collective rights.
 
Indigenous peoples in Latin America also tend 
to be more organized and networked than in 
other regions. At the same time, violations of 
their rights - including consultation and con-
sent rights - are prevalent across the region. 
Latin America is also known for an extensive 
regulatory approach combined with “wide 
discretionary power for officials”, something 
reflected in a high level of corruption in the 
natural resource sector and corporate control 
over politics.25 On a per-capita basis it is the 
most violent continent. An alarming number of 
indigenous leaders have been killed, and some 
indigenous peoples in countries such as Brazil 
and Colombia face existential threats due to 
violent conflict and repressive regimes opposed 
to their interests.26 
Confronted with this reality, indigenous peo-
ples in Latin America successfully mobilized to 
demand that States fulfil their duty to conduct 
prior consultations in order to obtain their FPIC 
as a means for protecting their rights. They were 
bitterly disappointed with how this duty was 
interpreted and implemented. In response they 
are asserting autonomy over their territories and 
developing FPIC protocols, along with other 
self-government instruments. These trends 
are particularly notable in the three case study 
countries, Colombia, Brazil and Peru. 
Recognition of FPIC protocols
The development of FPIC protocols by indig-
enous peoples is consistent with the advice of 
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successive UN Special Rapporteurs on the 
rights of indigenous peoples. During his man-
date, professor James Anaya focused on the 
right to consultation in the context of extractive 
industry activities. His reports to the Human 
Rights Council between 2009 and 2013 repeat-
edly encouraged indigenous peoples to organize 
themselves institutionally, so that they are pre-
pared for consultations and FPIC seeking pro-
cesses.27 By doing so, he explained to States that 
indigenous peoples would be demonstrating 
their willingness to engage in good faith.
The Special Rapporteur also elaborated on the 
pre-conditions for good faith consultations. In 
addition to formalized recognition of indigenous 
peoples’ rights, the conditions included the need 
for consultations on how indigenous peoples 
should be consulted (“consulta sobre la consulta” 
or “consultation on consultations”). FPIC pro-
tocols directly address many of these precondi-
tions for good faith consultations. Furthermore, 
through their development each indigenous 
people can establish their own specific pre-con-
ditions for good faith consultations. The subse-
quent Special Rapporteur, Vicky Tauli-Corpuz, 
identified FPIC protocols as examples of good 
practice during her 2016 mission to Brazil and 
encouraged the Brazilian Government to ensure 
that they are respected.28 These recommenda-
tions have been echoed by the UN Expert Mech-
anism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in its 
2018 report on FPIC, which identified respect 
for FPIC protocols as central to the conduct of 
good faith consultations.29
Recognition of FPIC protocols has also come 
from a range of other actors. The Office of 
the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (OHCHR) in Colombia, with 
support from the Spanish development agency 
AECID, provided extensive technical assistance 
to four indigenous peoples in the development 
of protocols between 2015 and 2017. Together 
with the OHCHR in Geneva, it organized 
a regional workshop on FPIC protocols in 
Colombia in December 2018. The workshop 
sought to share lessons from the development 
of the protocols and increase their visibility, 
highlighting the important role they can play in 
regulating consultations.30
In 2011, the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) collaborated with the 
Federation for Self-Determination of Indige-
nous Peoples in Paraguay in the development 
of a national FPIC protocol which was formally 
recognized by a presidential decree in December 
2018.31 The decree recognizes the protocol as an 
important opportunity for the Paraguayan State 
to address the vacuum that exists in the State’s 
regulation of indigenous peoples’ rights as rec-
ognized under IHRL.32 International environ-
mental organizations have also offered support 
to protocol development. The Nagoya Protocol 
to the CBD on Access and Benefit Sharing refers 
to the role of community protocols and the need 
for awareness raising in relation to them.33 The 
International Union for the Conservation of 
Nature (IUCN), in conjunction with the Ger-
man ministry for international cooperation and 
development (BMZ), has also supported the 
development of bio-cultural protocols.34 Indus-
try bodies, such as the International Council for 
Mining and Metals (ICMM) and its members, 
have also expressed an interest in the growing 
development of FPIC protocols as a basis for 
engagement with indigenous peoples.35
At the national level there has also been impor-
tant recognition of FPIC protocols. In 2016, 
the Argentinian National Ombudsman issued 
a resolution, recognizing the FPIC protocol 
of 33 communities of the Kollo and Atacama 
people of the Salinas Grandes y Laguna de 
Guayatayoc.36 The resolution called on all rel-
evant government ministries and agencies to 
recognize and respect the protocol. There have 
also been several important court rulings at the 
national level recognizing the validity of FPIC 
protocols. These include the 2006 decision of 
the Superior Court of Ontario addressing the 
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Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug (KI) proto-
col, the 2016 ruling of the Constitutional Court 
of Colombia calling for consultation to respect 
the Embera Chamí’s protocol and the 2018 
ruling of the Federal Court in Brazil requiring 
that any future consultations with the Juruna 
respect their FPIC protocol.37 Finally, pro-
tocol development is supported by a range of 
non-governmental organizations and networks 
which have documented experiences with their 
development in numerous contexts, in particu-
lar addressing bio-cultural protocols.38  
Terminology 
Before delving further into the content of FPIC 
protocols, a brief discussion on terminology 
is important. As mentioned above, the term 
“FPIC protocol” or “autonomous FPIC pro-
tocol” is used by indigenous peoples as short-
hand to describe documents that formalize their 
engagement rules and procedures in relation to 
consultations aimed at obtaining their FPIC. 
This terminology is used by the four peoples in 
the case studies in this report. Other terms, such 
as regulatory or normative frameworks, policies, 
templates, guidelines and manifestos, are also 
used by indigenous peoples, or are used inter-
changeably, to describe such instruments, and 
some peoples have their terms in their own lan-
guages which they deem culturally appropriate. 
Some legitimate concerns have been raised in 
relation to the term “protocol”. One is its tech-
nical and procedural connotations, which may 
obscure the self-determination, customary law 
and rights assertion dimension of these instru-
ments. Terms which highlight the right of 
indigenous peoples to legislate in their own ter-
ritories, such as normative or regulatory frame-
works, may better reflect these features, as well 
as their legal import. Another concern is that 
the term “protocol” may be used by States to 
describe instruments which the State has devel-
oped to regulate consultations, thereby leading 
to confusion with indigenous peoples autono-
mous FPIC protocols. 
Despite these potential drawbacks, indige-
nous peoples’ representatives attach impor-
tance to the concept of “FPIC protocols” being 
increasingly globally recognized as embodying 
indigenous peoples’ autonomously developed, 
rights-based, rules governing consultations and 
FPIC. This is significant for two reasons. Firstly, 
the purpose of these instruments is to facilitate 
rights-based engagement with external actors. 
Widespread awareness among these actors of 
the term “FPIC protocols” and its meaning is 
therefore essential. The term “protocol” might 
not capture their full import. However, the eas-
ily understandable concept of an “engagement 
protocol”, that acts as the basis for consulta-
tion and seeking FPIC, is something that the 
State and other risk-adverse actors might be 
more open to than the more legalistic sounding 
“regulatory framework”. 
Indigenous peoples have therefore adopted this 
terminology even if the word “protocol” does 
not necessarily exist in their own language. 
Secondly, in order to collectively promote the 
implementation of their internationally recog-
nized rights, indigenous peoples need shared 
concepts that can be invoked by their com-
munities around the world. As one indigenous 
representative put it “we need a concept that 
connects indigenous peoples, States and com-
panies”.39 The growing practice by indigenous 
peoples to develop FPIC protocols, and their 
increased recognition by a range of actors, rein-
forces their importance in consultation pro-
cesses and the need for all States to respect them. 
Rather than feel threatened by them, States and 
companies should see them as an opportunity 
to understand and ensure respect for indigenous 
peoples’ rights in practice, while providing clar-
ity and certainty for all parties. 
Content of FPIC Protocols
The research examined in excess of 30 proto-
cols across 15 countries, all produced between 
the mid-2000s and 2018, with more protocol 
development and implementation on-going in 
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2019. As discussed earlier, these protocols can 
be broadly categorized into one of three types 
– those that primarily address corporations, 
most often mining companies; those that focus 
on biocultural resources and tend to address all 
actors in a generic fashion; and those that focus 
primarily on States and their obligations under 
international human rights law. Across these 
three categories there is a significant degree of 
overlap in protocol content, particularly as all of 
them tell States and other actors the culturally 
adequate way of holding consultation processes. 
This section addresses features of protocols in all 
three categories, with a primarily focus on those 
in the latter category. 
Diversity of protocols
The absence of a one size fits all for FPIC pro-
cesses means that there is significant variance 
across FPIC protocols in terms of their focus, 
format, and the nature of the processes they 
prescribe. They range from those that provide 
general guidance and principles governing con-
sultation and FPIC, to those that take the form 
of laws and regulation. The former have tended 
to emerge in contexts where there is limited 
national level recognition of indigenous peo-
ples rights,  and on some occasions have been 
developed as the basis for legal agreements with 
companies based on indigenous peoples’ rights 
recognized under IHRL.41 The latter are often 
grounded on indigenous peoples’ constitutional 
recognized regulatory powers.42
In many cases, they were developed in contexts 
where concessions had been issued, or projects 
proceeded, without prior consultation.43 A 
number of protocols focus primarily, though not 
exclusively, on particular activities that are per-
ceived as posing imminent and serious threats to 
their enjoyment of rights.44 These threats include 
mining, oil and gas, hydroelectric and tourism 
projects, roads, transmission and railway lines, 
oil pipelines, soya and corn plantations, and 
agrarian reform programmes. Some protocols are 
broader in scope, encompassing administrative 
or legislative measures, as well as projects, that 
may impact on the concerned peoples.45
Protocols also differ radically in terms of their 
format. Some, such as those produced by indige-
nous peoples in Brazil, are beautifully presented, 
including colour photos of the people and their 
territories, maps, and process flowcharts. They 
are published in hardcopy, sometimes con-
taining both the indigenous language and the 
national language.46 Others are purely text doc-
uments containing no graphics or images and 
are only made available electronically.47 
The length of protocols also varies significantly. 
Those that focus on broader land and resource 
management issues tend to include sections on 
consultation and FPIC that range from a cou-
ple of paragraphs to multiple pages. Those that 
focus primarily on consultation and FPIC pro-
cesses also vary significantly in length, ranging 
from five48 to 150 pages long, with the more 
recently developed FPIC protocols in Colombia 
being among the longest.49 
General contextual features
Many protocols provide some background 
on the indigenous or tribal people and on the 
context in which they decided to develop their 
protocol. The introductory sections in protocols 
often provide a degree of historical context, both 
in terms of the peoples’ history of resistance and 
their experience with previous consultations, 
or the absence thereof. Where addressed, the 
reason for the protocol development is usually 
explained in sections addressing the worldviews 
and philosophies of the peoples concerned.50 In 
other cases a more legalistic format is used, with 
a preamble providing the contextual informa-
tion for the protocol’s development.51 In some 
cases the process through which the protocols 
were created and how they will be maintained, 
updated or revised is addressed.52 
Very often the description the people provide of 
themselves focuses on their unique relationship 
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with their territories as central to their iden-
tity, for example as people of the river53 or their 
identity as Afro-Descendant communities.54 
Importantly, a number of protocols reject the 
notion of a static conception of “indigenous”, 
noting that indigenous cultures, like all cul-
tures, adapt and change overtime.55 In addition 
to indigenous and tribal peoples, protocols have 
also been developed by traditional communi-
ties, such as river based communities in Brazil.56 
In many cases, the protocols explain that they 
were developed as a result of the people’s past 
negative experiences with development projects 
that had been imposed without adequate con-
sultation or consent, and that the people are 
facing pending threats from projects in or near 
their territories.57 In a number of cases, they 
explain that a driver behind the protocol was to 
ensure that decisions are made collectively and 
that individual leaders and communities are not 
isolated and manipulated.58
Attention to activities with significant 
or potentially profound impacts
In many protocols FPIC is deemed necessary 
for all activities within the territory irrespective 
of the scale of the impact.60 However, some pro-
tocols differentiate between consultation pro-
cesses based on the significance of an activity’s 
impact.61 Some protocols establish rules that 
regulate the entire consultation and negotiation 
process in all contexts.62 Others provide high-
level processes that regulate the initial stages of 
consultation and FPIC processes. These pro-
cesses cover consultations in relation to projects 
with a low degree of potential impact or where all 
the necessary information for decision-making 
Peru Block 192
Oil Block 192 in the Peruvian Amazon 
is one of the emblematic cases of flawed 
consultation processes in a country with a 
dedicated law on prior Consultation since 
2011. In 2015, after almost 45 years of 
oil exploitation and extensive environ-
mental and social harms, the Block 192 
oil contract was due to be renewed. The 
indigenous Federations in whose territories 
the Block is located succeeded in getting 
the State to agree that the Federations, and 
not just individual communities, should 
be consulted and that the contract, and 
not just the resolution approving it, should 
be the object of consultation. However, 
despite this, two of the affected indigenous 
peoples and their Federations, represent-
ing the majority of directly impacted 
communities, were excluded from the 
final agreement. A new consultation pro-
cess commenced in 2018/2019. To avoid 
a repetition of the previous experience the 
Federation developed a consultation plan 
which they demanded the State agrees to. 
The plan requires: a) respect the majority 
of the communities and their federations 
b) interculturality, by respecting their deci-
sion-making time and spaces e) due regard 
to the specific needs of women to guarantee 
their effective participation f ) trustworthy 
interpreters g) dialogue stages to be held 
in their territories h) fair compensation 
for the use of their lands and fair contracts 
with community enterprises j) protection 
and recovery of areas of vital importance 
to them k) participatory design of a 
new environmental plan l) health study 
to prevent exposure to toxic substances 
m) a clause in the contract holding the 
new operator responsible for maintenance 
and renewal of pipelines.59 The initial 
response of the government agencies was 
that the law prevents them from complying 
with some of these demands. For the Fed-
erations this amounts to the State using its 
laws, that supposedly exist to protect their 
rights, to deny those very rights.
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is available. For projects with potentially sig-
nificant impacts, where more information is 
required, these protocols establish a process 
whereby the concerned indigenous peoples ini-
tiate the development of consultation plans that 
are then agreed and implemented in conjunc-
tion with the State.63 
A number of protocols deem certain pre-iden-
tified activities, which the people regard as hav-
ing profound impacts on their rights and way 
of life, to be impermissible.64 Examples include 
medium or large-scale mining and large-scale 
hydroelectric projects.65 In these cases, the devel-
opment of FPIC protocols provides a space for 
advance autonomous decision-making on these 
specific activities, and the protocols go beyond 
regulating future consultation processes.66 
In some of these cases where protocols forbid 
certain activities, the indigenous peoples do not 
reject consultation, but insist on adherence with 
their FPIC protocols. This implies that their 
decision is predetermined until such a time as 
they decide to revise the protocol.67 In other 
cases, they may refuse to even initiate dialogue in 
such contexts, on the grounds that their decision 
to withhold FPIC has already been taken. This 
latter position is consistent with the articulation 
in many protocols of consultation as a right of, 
and not obligation on, indigenous peoples.68 
Relationship with other self-governance 
instruments and mechanisms
Several FPIC protocols are framed as compo-
nents of a broader strategy and framework of 
self-governance. They clarify that they comple-
ment and reinforce other instruments in the 
pursuit of autonomy and self-determined devel-
opment. For example, in Brazil, the people of 
the Xingu river refer to their Management Plan 
for the Xingu Territory in which they define 
guidelines for culture, territory, economic alter-
natives, food sovereignty, education and health 
of their peoples.69 The Wampis protocol is being 
developed as a means to implement their Statute. 
In Colombia, most protocols refer to the wider 
framework of community plans and regulatory 
instruments, including life plans, self-deter-
mined development plans, land and resource 
management plans and the peoples’ overar-
ching Creation law (“Ley de Origen”).70 The 
interface of these instruments with equivalent 
State instruments is aimed at facilitating inter-
cultural governance. This is reflected in protocol 
demands that governments work with indige-
nous peoples to address illegal activities (min-
ing, logging, fishing) in their territories and 
to assist them to realize the development they 
want.71 
These protocols, which regulate relationships 
with all levels of government (local, regional 
and national), address scenarios that extend 
beyond contexts were FPIC is being sought. 
They are applicable in all situations where 
decisions relate to lands, natural resources, 
territories and self-determined development. 
Implementation of protocols consequently 
requires respect for indigenous peoples’ right 
to develop their own territorial management 
plans, to establish indigenous guards and mon-
itors, to strengthen autonomous governance 
structures, to assert ancestral conceptions of 
territories and to delimit them based on cus-
tomary land tenure. 
Preconditions
One of the most significant aspects of FPIC 
protocols is the preconditions they establish 
for meaningful consultation processes and the 
measures, in addition to those addressed above, 
that are deemed to be non-negotiable. In most 
cases the protocols assert the peoples’ rights over 
their lands, territories and natural resources, 
and call on the State to respect and protect 
them and their customary laws, as a pre-requi-
site to engagement. This includes demands for 
the state to recognize the integral and unified 
nature of their territories, especially where 
titling regimes have failed to do so. 
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Most protocols provide information on the 
extent to which the peoples’ lands have been 
recognized by the State and formal titles issued. 
In cases where titling is incomplete or is inad-
equate from the perspective of customary land 
tenure, protocols often outline the outstanding 
territorial claims. In some cases, the communi-
ties have explicitly asserted their claims to sub-
soil resources, while in other cases it is implicit 
under claims to natural resources.72 Almost all 
protocols call for respect for the peoples’ own 
governance institutions and structures, with 
most detailing what these structures are. In 
many cases, specific preconditions arise from 
the negative past experiences of indigenous peo-
ples due to the lack of good faith consultations 
and FPIC.73 
Timeframes, timing and consultation stages
The timing of, and timeframe for, decisions 
is an important issue addressed in all proto-
cols. Many protocols describe past experiences 
of indigenous peoples with consultation that 
are only held in relation to compensation and 
failed to address the planning and implemen-
tation stages.74 To address this, the requirement 
that consultations be held prior to any deci-
sion being made that impacts on the peoples’ 
rights and interests is almost universal in proto-
cols. As some note, unless this occurs, consul-
tations “just serve to validate prior agreements 
between the government and companies” and 
serve to cause conflict.75 Impact assessments 
are also identified as triggers for consultation 
and FPIC. While most protocols cover all deci-
sions impacting on rights, their primary focus is 
often on the initial consultation at the planning 
and/or implementation stage of projects, and 
prior to licence or concession issuance, which 
determine if the project will proceed. 
The protocols also address the timeframes for 
consultations. A general principle is that time-
frames and when consultations are to be held 
will be defined based on the community activ-
ities and calendars, and then agreed with the 
State. In some cases, more detailed guidance on 
what needs to be included in the consultation 
timeframe is provided. Timeframes are contin-
gent on the level of information available. Trips 
to other communities may be required, and time 
may also be allocated to conduct participatory 
impact assessments and for consideration of 
alternative options or project configurations.76
Most protocols identify specific stages in the 
consultation process.77 Depending on the target 
of the protocol these steps may involve either 
the State or the project proponent.78 These typ-
ically, though by no means always, include: a) 
request for consultation (given the remoteness 
of some Amazonian communities some proto-
cols provide significant details regarding how 
the request is to be communicated)79 b) initial 
internal discussions on whether to engage in 
consultations with the State and/or other exter-
nal actors, c) giving or withholding consent to 
proceed with consultations; d) development of 
a consultation plan; e) information gathering 
meetings (premised on the conduct of approved 
participatory impact assessments and respect 
for traditional knowledge); f ) internal discus-
sions/consultations at community and peo-
ple levels; g) follow-up information gathering 
meetings; h) internal decision-making meet-
ings; i) communication of a decision to give or 
withhold FPIC. Several protocols address the 
negotiation of agreements in cases where FPIC 
is granted. Some stipulate that the requirement 
for consultations in subsequent stages is to be 
included in agreements.80 Many also address 
monitoring of subsequent steps and any agree-
ments reached as well as conditions leading to 
their annulment.81 Some protocols establish 
specific rituals to be conducted at various stages 
of these processes.82 
“Time is determined by 
the moon, not by capital” 
Putomayo community representative
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Legal bases affirmed in protocols
The authority of FPIC protocols lies both in their 
bases in ancestral practices and customary laws 
and in the contemporary recognition of indig-
enous peoples’ self-governance and autonomy 
rights. As ancestral practices they have always 
been used, albeit under different terminology, 
to regulate interactions with outsiders and to 
defend and protect territories and ways of life. In 
their current form they are manifestations of the 
right to regulate, which flows from self-determi-
nation, self-governance and autonomy. A range 
of legal frameworks - including international 
and regional instruments and jurisprudence; 
national constitutions, legislation, regulation 
and jurisprudence; indigenous law frameworks; 
and even colonial laws - are invoked in protocols. 
These frameworks and instruments are addressed 
in the preambles, annexes, and core provisions of 
protocols.83 In some cases, references are made 
to flaws in national law and regulation on FPIC, 
as well as how the protocol seeks to address these 
deficiencies.84 
This reference to national and international law 
goes hand in hand with affirmations of the role 
that State, civil society, indigenous and interna-
tional actors play in the consultation and con-
sent seeking processes. In some cases, specific 
government institutions (including bodies such 
as national human rights institutions, federal 
prosecutors and ombudsman) are identified 
as mandatory participants in FPIC processes, 
often for oversight purposes, as are specific min-
istries and individuals with decision-making 
authority. 
International bodies such as the OHCHR and 
the European Union are addressed in some 
protocols. A general principle affirmed in most 
protocols is that the relevant indigenous peo-
ple have the right to decide who they wish to 
involve in the process for advice and oversight 
purposes, be this international organizations, 
civil society, other indigenous organization or 
networks, or other allies they deem appropriate.
Definition of concepts, principles 
and non-negotiables 
Another important feature of many protocols is 
that they define key concepts and principles that 
are distinct to each people and are fundamen-
tal to understanding their rights and realities. 
Concepts such as territory, identity, autonomy, 
self-government, self-determined development, 
consultation, free, prior, informed, consent, 
patrimony, sacred sites are frequently defined.85 
Core principles that are elaborated typically 
include respect for land rights and indigenous 
governance, good faith, respect for indigenous 
knowledge, customary laws and practices, and 
intercultural dialogue. 
These definitions and principles ground con-
cepts that are used in IHRL standards in the 
lived reality and customary laws of indigenous 
peoples. They translate the international nor-
mative framework into something that can be 
implemented in a culturally appropriate man-
ner and give meaning and content to rights in 
specific contexts. 
A common characteristic of protocols is that 
they frequently establish a series of non-nego-
tiable rules for consultation and FPIC.86 Among 
these are affirmations that relocation is always 
unacceptable; the rejection of certain types of 
activities or impacts that are regarded as incom-
patible with the way of life and survival of a peo-
ple; the affirmation of the right to decide what 
happens in their territories, at times clarifying 
that the supporting rationale for a decision will 
be provided. 
While the majority of protocols affirm the right 
to give or withhold FPIC, in very few cases 
is the language of “veto” used to describe this 
decision-making right.87 Where it is used, it is 
grounded on the fact that such development pro-
jects would have a profound impacts on rights and 
pose a threat to survival as a people, something 
which all protocols affirm is non-negotiable. 
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Other non-negotiables are the requirements 
that protocols be accepted as a basis for consul-
tations and the rejection of putting indigenous 
peoples in a position where they effectively have 
to trade consent to projects for recognition of 
land rights. In addition, many protocols estab-
lish circumstances that render consultations or 
consent void. Such conditions include the fail-
ure to meet the “free”, “prior”, or “informed” 
criteria, the creation of division within commu-
nities as a result of consultation processes, the 
presence of armed groups during consultations, 
and any offers of money, threats or attempts to 
unduly influence decision outcomes. 
Representation, who is to be consulted 
and how decisions are taken
A core component of all protocols is the section 
addressing who is to be consulted and the roles 
of various actors in the decision-making pro-
cess. A focus on inclusivity tends to be a com-
mon feature of most protocols, with inter alia 
elders, youth, persons with disabilities, indige-
nous guards and warriors, community leaders 
and monitors identified as actors in the consul-
tation processes. In a significant number of pro-
tocols, the importance of ensuring the effective 
participation of women is highlighted, as is the 
risk that they face as a result of non-consensual 
projects.88 Rights-based protocols offer a cul-
turally appropriate means for communities to 
address this issue themselves, rather than have 
external modalities of participation imposed 
upon them. In some cases, specific roles are 
assigned to teachers and health workers.89 
Another important issue which receives special 
attention in some protocols is the right of the 
people to select reliable translators.90 
Some protocols also address the question of 
whether those who no longer reside in the com-
munity should be able to participate in consul-
tation processes. Among the Brazilian protocols, 
the Xingu Protocol states that relatives who live 
in the city cannot speak on their behalf, while 
the protocols of the Munduruku and the river 
people of Pimental e São Francisco state that 
students who are studying in cities must be able 
to participate.91 Many protocols highlight that 
the peoples’ organizations must be consulted, 
but that they cannot be the only ones to be con-
sulted as the decisions are taken collectively by 
the people.92 How this is implemented in prac-
tice varies depending on the peoples’ govern-
ance structures and decision-making processes.
The question of who represents the community, 
the role of leaders or chiefs and of community 
members in the process of decision-making, 
the modalities of consultations, and the form 
in which decisions are taken, occupies a cen-
tral part of FPIC protocols. Issues addressed 
include: where meetings are to be held (most 
protocols affirming it must be within the indig-
enous peoples’ territory); who is to be involved 
in (including the freedom to invite third parties 
and decisions over corporate actor involvement) 
and who will coordinate the meetings; who 
covers the costs of meeting (either the State or 
the project proponent, depending on who the 
protocol is primarily directed to); how and by 
whom meetings are documented and recorded 
and who owns the information generated. 
The distinction between information sharing 
meetings and decision-making meetings is made 
clear in most protocols. The former involves the 
State, the corporation and those actors deemed 
necessary by the indigenous people, while the 
latter are internal meetings to which attendance 
is limited to those invited by the people. The 
requirement to ensure that indigenous knowl-
edge is given the same weight as non-indige-
nous knowledge is also a common theme.93 In 
the context of internal decision-making, proto-
cols address issues such as how matters are dis-
cussed, and how consensus is sought. What is 
meant by consensus is also addressed in several 
protocols.94  
Most protocols insist on decisions being taken 
at the level of the people and not at individual 
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community level, and in all cases not exclu-
sively by an individual leader. Those protocols 
that recognize community level decision-mak-
ing require that all impacted communities be 
involved, and often maintain some degree of 
oversight and support at the level of the peo-
ple.95 Protocols clarify that this focus on ensur-
ing that communities and individuals are not 
isolated in the context of consultation processes, 
and preventing a divide and conquer approach 
used to fabricate consent, emerges from past 
experiences in which their governance struc-
tures were undermined.96 
In some cases, protocols address multiple peo-
ples and provide an overview of how these peo-
ples organize themselves to address and make 
decisions on matters of collective concern.97 
Often these peoples share a common landscape, 
be it a mountain range or river basin, and what 
impacts one impacts all.98 They also address rela-
tionships of indigenous peoples with tribal, tra-
ditional and non-indigenous communities.99 In 
this regard, they act as instruments for address-
ing divisions between or within communities or 
peoples, and for formalizing modalities of coop-
eration.100 Some protocols address the rights of 
peoples in voluntary isolation living in or near 
the lands of those developing the protocol. They 
stress the need to respect the fact that these peo-
ples have, by definition, withheld their consent 
to any activities impacting on their rights.101
OVERVIEW OF THE 
CONTEXT, CONTENT 
AND CONTRIBUTION 
OF THE CASE STUDY 
PROTOCOLS
Many of the features outlined in the previous 
section are addressed in the Juruna, Embera 
Chamí and Palenke protocols and are being con-
sidered as part of the on-going protocol devel-
opment by the Wampis. These four emblematic 
cases were selected because of the contexts which 
gave rise to the protocol development, the con-
tent of the protocols and their contribution to 
protecting the rights of the concerned peoples. 
All four protocols also have distinct features that 
reflect each peoples’ experience and realities and 
the national context within which they operate. 
The Juruna Protocol
The Juruna are one of the peoples of the Xingu 
river in the state of Para in Brazil. Since 2015 
they experienced profound impacts on their 
rights due to the damming of the Xingu by the 
Belo Monte dam, the third largest hydroelec-
tric project in the world. The dam had been 
mired in controversy from the mid-1970s when 
it was first proposed. Its construction in the 
2000s was characterized by allegations of cor-
ruption, a series of flawed impact assessments, 
and inadequate consultation with the Juruna, as 
recognized by the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights in 2011. In 2012, an envi-
ronmental license was issued to the Canadian 
Belo Sun mining company, again in the absence 
of any meaningful consultation. The planned 
large-scale gold mine is located within 10km of 
the Juruna territory and 50km from the Belo 
Monte dam. It compounds the dam’s impacts 
and further threatens the Juruna’s rights and 
survival as a people. 
The Juruna completed the development of 
their FPIC protocol in 2017. Among the many 
interesting features of the protocol is its strong 
emphasis on the role of the communities in 
designing environmental impact assessments. 
In cases where the Juruna agree to proceed with 
a consultation and require further information 
in order to make their final decision, the pro-
tocol envisages a two-tire consultation process 
involving the creation of a consultation plan 
together with the Government. The protocol 
also requires the active involvement of gov-
ernmental bodies, such as the Federal Prosecu-
tors Office (MPF) and the Indigenous Peoples 
Agency FUNAI, in consultation processes. The 
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role of these oversight and advisory bodies is 
of particular importance in the Brazilian con-
text, given the remoteness and small population 
numbers of many Brazilian indigenous peoples. 
This, together with their lack of political power, 
renders them particularly vulnerable to abuse 
by powerful third parties with interests in their 
lands prior to, during and following consulta-
tion processes. 
The development of the Juruna Protocol played 
an important role in uniting the people, after 
years of divisive external influence in the context 
of the dam and mining projects. An interest-
ing feature of their protocol is that it addresses 
how decisions are to be made in the absence of 
consensus. In such exceptional circumstances a 
vote can be called. However, in that scenario the 
Protocol ensures that all communities have an 
equal say in decision-making, independent of 
their respective population sizes.102 In 2018, the 
Juruna won an important legal case in the Fed-
eral Court suspending the mining project and 
affirming the need for a consultation process 
that respects their FPIC Protocol. Their subse-
quent application of their FPIC Protocol led to 
the previously granted environmental approval 
process for the Belo Sun mine being declared 
invalid. 
The Embera Chamí Protocol
In 2008 the Embera Chamí people of the Res-
guardo Indígena Cañamomo Lomaprieta - an 
Indigenous Reserve in the mountainous region 
of the Department of Caldas, Colombia - real-
ized that mining companies were conducting 
fly-over exploration activities in their territo-
ries. In 2011 they discovered that the entire 
Resguardo territory (4,826 hectares) was under 
application for large-scale mining concessions, 
some of which had already been issued without 
any consultation. This existential threat to their 
territory and way of life, which involves small 
scale ancestral mining, arose in the context of 
on-going violent armed conflict in Colombia 
as well as frequent killings of Embera Chamí 
leaders who attempted to protect their lands 
and resources from outside interests. 
In response, the Resguardo authorities devel-
oped a regulatory framework in 2012 governing 
all forms of mining in their territory. The frame-
work is grounded on their constitutional right 
to regulate, as well as their rights under IHRL, 
the jurisprudence of the Colombian Constitu-
tional Court and their own indigenous law. It 
consists of three interrelated legal resolutions. 
One is the FPIC protocol with which all exter-
nal actors must comply if seeking to implement 
any activities impacting on the Resguardo. This 
includes legislative and administrative meas-
ures, concession issuance and project activities. 
Another resolution regulates ancestral mining, 
including who can conduct it and how it is to 
be conducted, and establishes a body to oversee 
its implementation. The third resolution pro-
hibits medium and large-scale mining in the 
Resguardo territory. This regulatory framework 
is part of a broader strategy addressing terri-
torial defence and self-government. These are 
reinforced through a range of activities, includ-
ing the development of a life or development 
plan (plan de vida), efforts to secure territorial 
boundaries, and the establishment of indigenous 
guards and environmental monitors. Among 
the many interesting features of the Resguardo 
protocol, is its focus on ensuring that consulta-
tions do not generate any risks to the Embera 
Chamí people or their territory, deeming it void 
if they do. Consultations which, for example, 
could result in the entry of armed actors into 
the Resguardo would fall into this category. 
The existence of the FPIC protocol has had a 
deterrent effect on mining companies and no 
company has managed to commence mining 
activities in the Resguardo since the resolutions 
were issued. In 2016, the Colombian Consti-
tutional Court affirmed the need to respect 
the Embera Chamí’s protocols and procedures 
in relation to FPIC (Case T-530/2016). It also 
ordered the demarcation of the Resguardo 
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territory and reaffirmed their right to regulate 
mining practices therein. In order to strengthen 
the implementation of their protocol the Res-
guardo has initiated projects to implement 
these aspects of the Court decision. 
Since 2009, the Embera Chamí have worked 
in close cooperation with the Afro-Descendant 
communities of the Palenke Alto Cauca. These 
communities have also developed an FPIC pro-
tocol and implemented it in the context of the 
Salvajina hydroelectric project. The dam was 
constructed in their territory without prior con-
sultation and the protocol enabled these com-
munities to negotiate the terms and conditions 
of impact assessments as required by a decision 
of the Colombian Constitutional Court.103 
A central concern for these Palenke commu-
nities and the Embera Chamí is the continued 
killings of their leaders. Instead of reducing 
this threat, the Colombian peace process has 
potentially compounded it. It failed to ensure 
that their rights and their leaders are adequately 
protected, that on-going violent conflicts are 
stopped, and the presence of illegal actors elim-
inated, before promoting controversial develop-
ment projects in their territories. 
The Wampis Protocol
The Wampis nation’s territory is in the depart-
ment of Loreto in the north west of the Peru-
vian Amazon. In November 2015 the Wampis 
declared their nation’s Autonomous Territorial 
Government and issued their collective govern-
ing Statute. They were the first indigenous peo-
ple in Peru to do this and have inspired other 
indigenous peoples throughout the region to 
consider similar approaches. The Statute and 
Government are an exercise of their right to 
autonomy and are grounded in international, 
constitutional and Wampis law. They are prem-
ised on the recognition of the Wampis ancestral 
integral territory and establish the governance 
structures through which the Wampis will 
administer and maintain this territory as a sin-
gle integral entity. The Statute addresses both 
the administration of internal affairs, as well as 
external governance, and establishes the require-
ment for consultation and FPIC in relation to 
externally proposed activities.
The Wampis have a long history of projects 
being imposed in their territory without prior 
consultation. An example is Oil Block 116, 
where in 2014 - together with their Awajun 
neighbour - the Wampis mounted a legal chal-
lenge to the project. A landmark ruling, issued 
in 2017, affirmed the requirement for consul-
tation and FPIC in relation to oil exploitation 
and suspended the project. The Wampis have 
witnessed how indigenous peoples in Peru, 
including the Federations in whose territory 
Oil Block 192 (see box on page 23) is located, 
were denied their rights in the implementation 
of the State’s 2011 prior consultation law. In 
preparation for State initiated consultation 
processes, they are developing an FPIC proto-
col grounded on their governing Statute. It will 
serve to govern the State’s implementation of 
its prior consultation law and ensure that pro-
cesses aimed at obtaining the Wampis’ FPIC 
proceed in accordance with IHRL standards 
and the Wampis Statute. 
The Wampis FPIC Protocol is being developed 
as part of a broader strategy of self-determined 
development based on their assertion of auton-
omy and their vision of an integral territory. 
It will establish pre-conditions for good faith 
consultations, including the formalization of 
their rights to their integral territories and to 
self-government. It will also provide the basis 
for negotiations with the State and the iden-
tification of areas where consultations are of 
mutual benefit. In keeping with the Court rul-
ing and their rights under IHRL, the protocol 
will address situations where Wampis FPIC is 
required, including for projects that pose sig-
nificant risks or threaten cultural or physical 
survival, and will address the bases upon which 
FPIC can be granted or withheld. 
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The experience of each of these peoples offers 
unique insights into the development, content 
and potential contribution of FPIC protocols 
in specific contexts. These experiences and the 
lessons they offer will be probed in detail in the 
three case study chapters. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The concluding chapter of the report will focus 
on the broader question of the potential contri-
bution of FPIC protocols to the realization of 
indigenous peoples’ rights.
 
© Marcio Seligmann
31
THE JURUNA (YUDJÁ) PEOPLE’S PROTOCOL: 
A RESPONSE TO A HARD-LEARNED LESSON
By Biviane Rojas Garzon
“We are not prepared to allow the Government to 
once again walk all over our rights. (…) The decisions 
that determine our present and our future can no 
longer be made exclusively by the Government.
 
We know we have a right to be consulted, to defend 
our land and our traditions, to fight for decent living 
conditions and to choose our own development priorities. 
Neither the Government nor any company can deny us 
these rights. That is why we developed our protocol and we 
hope that everybody will be aware of it and respect it.” 
Juruna Protocol
 Terra Indígena Arara
da Volta Grande do Xingu
 Terra Indígena
Paquiçamba
32
BACKGROUND
The Juruna, or Yudjá, people describe them-
selves as the owners of the Xingu river. The 
Xingu river is the largest clear water tributary 
of the Amazon river and its waters are rich in 
biodiversity and endemic species. It is located 
in the agricultural and energy frontier of the 
Brazilian Amazon. Since November 2015 it has 
been dammed by the Belo Monte hydroelectric 
power plant, the third largest hydroelectric pro-
ject in the world. As a result, the Juruna people’s 
territory – which essentially comprises of their 
river - faces a serious threat of extinction. Their 
fight against the destruction of the Xingu river, 
and by extension their own disappearance as a 
people, is the primary struggle of the Juruna.  It 
is the most important contextual consideration 
for understanding the development and imple-
mentation of their autonomous consultation 
and consent protocol.
The Juruna know the Xingu river better than 
anyone. They have lived with it, and from it, for 
generations. They are experienced sailors and 
fishermen, renowned for ‘having canoes instead 
of having feet’.104 The Juruna have a deep under-
standing of the seasonal behaviour of the river 
and employ a variety of fishing techniques to 
catch fish for consumption and for ornaments. 
For many years this has guaranteed them a 
secure food source and sufficient income to pro-
vide dignified livelihoods for their families.
For decades, the Juruna married members of 
other indigenous peoples and traditional river 
communities known as “ribereños”.105 They 
have endured numerous extractive activities in 
their territory and have survived huge influxes 
of Brazilian immigrants and foreigners into 
their territory in search of rubber, fur and gold. 
Despite this they have not become “less indige-
nous” or lost their traditional knowledge of the 
river and the forest. However, as part of their 
survival strategy during the second half of the 
20th Century the Juruna stopped speaking 
their language. This was to render themselves 
invisible among the mestizo population of the 
region, and thereby avoid the risk of being 
exterminated. The Juruna of the Volta Grande 
do Xingu (the Big Bend of the Xingu) are now 
attempting to restore their language through 
exchanges with a group of Juruna who live in 
the Xingu Indigenous Land (TIX)106 located in 
the state of Mato Grosso who managed to keep 
the Yudjá language and traditions alive.107
It is important to highlight this because the Bra-
zilian Government and corporations have chal-
lenged the indigenous identity of the Juruna 
given that they do not speak their language, 
and this, in turn, has been used to challenge the 
legitimacy of their land and political rights. 
The Brazilian state recognizes the territorial 
rights of indigenous peoples through the iden-
tification, demarcation and titling of indige-
nous lands. These lands that are traditionally 
occupied by indigenous peoples remain the 
property of the State and are inalienable, 
imprescriptible and non-transferable. They are 
destined for indigenous peoples’ permanent 
possession and they have exclusive use rights 
over the soil, rivers and lakes therein (Federal 
Constitution 1988, Art. 231). This recognition 
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prevents the removal of indigenous peoples 
from their customary lands, guaranteeing them 
rights over their lands that pre-date the creation 
of the Brazilian State.
At present, it is not possible to conduct mining 
operations within indigenous lands. Existing 
large mines that have an impact on indige-
nous lands are all located outside demarcated 
indigenous territories. The 1988 Federal Con-
stitution states that the exploration of mineral 
resources on indigenous lands depends on the 
authorization of the National Congress and 
on the enactment of a specific law that defines 
their participation in the benefits generated by 
the exploitation. Congressional authorisation is 
contingent on consultations with the directly 
affected indigenous peoples prior to approval 
of exploration of areas within indigenous lands 
(Art. 231).
In 1996, Bill no 1.610/96 was tabled before 
Congress with a view to regulating mining 
within indigenous lands, but it was never 
approved. However, the current Federal Gov-
ernment, elected in 2018, has promoted the 
authorization of mining activities within indig-
enous lands as a priority since its first days in 
office.108 The need to advance the implementa-
tion of the indigenous peoples’ right to consul-
tation and consent is more pressing than ever 
given this context.
The Juruna of the Volta Grande do Xingu live 
in the Tierra Indígena Paquiçamba (Paquiçamba 
Indigenous Land), which was finally recognized 
and approved as indigenous land by the Brazil-
ian State in 1991. This followed a long process 
of identification that lasted more than 20 years 
and resulted in the recognition of a territory 
that was far smaller than their traditional lands, 
and too small for their needs.
In 2000, the Fundação Nacional do Índio 
(National Indian Foundation, or FUNAI), 
the Brazilian Governmental body responsible 
for protecting indigenous interests, carried 
out new demarcation studies, including the 
portion of the islands in the Xingu river that 
had been excluded from the first demarcation. 
The expansion of the Paquiçamba Indigenous 
Land was approved in November 2012, some 
12 years later. 
The new demarcation expanded the traditional 
land area from 4,348 hectares to 15,733, con-
stituting a threefold increase of the area initially 
recognized in 1991.
It is important to emphasize that 89% of the 
Juruna territory is composed of small islands 
and canals that run along the Volta Grande do 
Xingu. In other words, the Paquiçamba tra-
ditional land consists primarily of the Xingu 
river. Any change to the Xingu river has a direct 
impact on the territorial rights of the Juruna.
Despite the challenges the Juruna face in their 
struggle to guarantee recognition of their rights 
over the Xingu river, they continue to assert 
their authority over decisions that affect the 
river. They have demonstrated this in their 
intense struggle against the construction of the 
Belo Monte hydroelectric power plant and the 
development of the Belo Sun gold mine, which 
are the primary threats to their territory.
The Belo Monte hydroelectric power plant is 
located within the Juruna traditional territory. 
It required the diversion of the Xingu River 
from the entire Volta Grande do Xingu region, 
a stretch of more than 100 km in which there 
are two indigenous territories and hundreds 
of traditional river community (ribereños) set-
tlements. Following the construction of the 
Belo Monte dam, only a small volume of water 
remains in the Volta Grande do Xingu region. 
This water volume is artificially controlled by 
the hydroelectric company that holds the con-
cession at the levels it needs for power genera-
tion.109 
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For many years the indigenous peoples of the 
Xingu, in particular the Juruna, fought against 
the construction of the Belo Monte dam. 
Despite this the Federal Government succeeded 
in imposing it. In so doing, the Government 
disregarded both national and international 
court decisions denouncing the social and envi-
ronmental impacts and violations of human 
rights caused by the construction and operation 
of the dam. At the root of many of the problems 
related to the Belo Monte dam was the total 
absence of a process of free, prior and informed 
consultation with all the affected indigenous 
communities. The Government never denied 
its obligation to consult the affected indigenous 
peoples, however it limited the dialogue pro-
cesses with them to mere information sharing 
meetings that took place only after the con-
struction of the hydroelectric power plant had 
been approved.
In 2011, the lack of consultation for the Belo 
Monte hydroelectric power plant led the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
(IACHR) to call for its construction to be sus-
pended until a proper consultation process was 
completed.110 However, the Brazilian Gov-
ernment ignored the recommendation of the 
IACHR and continued with the construction, 
with no intention of establishing a dialogue 
with the directly affected peoples, including the 
Juruna.
The construction of the reservoir’s dikes com-
menced in June 2011. By November 2015, 
the Xingu River was completely dammed and 
permanently diverted from the Volta Grande 
do Xingu Paquiçamba and Arara indigenous 
lands. Since then, the Juruna have consistently 
denounced the serious social and environmental 
impacts caused by the construction and oper-
ation of the Belo Monte dam. These impacts 
seriously threaten their prospects to remain in 
their territory and, as a result, their survival as 
an indigenous people.111 
This catalogue of human rights violations and 
direct threats to the physical and cultural sur-
vival of the indigenous peoples affected by 
the Belo Monte dam prompted the Ministério 
Público Federal (Federal Prosecution Service, or 
MPF) to take legal action. The MPF accused 
the Brazilian State and the holder of the hydro-
power concession of committing ethnocide 
as “evidenced by the destruction of the social 
organization, customs, languages and traditions 
of the impacted indigenous peoples”.112 
To compound this situation, in 2012 the Secre-
tary of State for the Environment and Sustain-
ability of the state of Pará (SEMAS) issued an 
environmental license for what would be the 
largest open-pit gold mining project in Brazil, 
the “Volta Grande” project. The project was to 
be developed in the same Volta Grande do Xingu 
region, less than 10 km from Juruna lands. 
9,5
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The mining project, led by the Canadian min-
ing company Belo Sun (which is a subsidiary 
of Forbes & Manhattan Inc., a private mer-
chant bank), is within the constituency of Sen-
ator José Porfirio (PA), less than 50 km from 
the main dam of the Belo Monte hydroelectric 
power plant and 9.5 km from the Paquiçamba 
Indigenous Land.
The mining project is expected to remove almost 
40 million tons of rock over the course of 17 
years. Through the use of cyanide it expects to 
extract 32.63 tonnes of gold.113  According to 
the risk assessments submitted by the mining 
company to SEMAS the risk of a breach in the 
tailing pond is high.114
The first environmental license for the mine was 
issued in 2012. It was granted in the absence 
of any study of potential environmental or 
other impacts on the indigenous peoples of the 
region, and without involving them in a pro-
cess of free, prior and informed consultation. 
In addition, the environmental permit did not 
mention the cumulative impacts nor how the 
existing impacts from the hydroelectric power 
plant would be compounded by the anticipated 
impacts from the mine. Nevertheless, environ-
mental authorization to commence construc-
tion was issued in January 2017 when Belo Sun 
obtained its installation licence.
In 2014, the Brazilian MPF had obtained a 
decision in the Local Federal Court of Altamira 
ordering the suspension of the environmental 
licence due to the absence of social and environ-
mental assessments addressing the impacts on 
the indigenous peoples in the area affected by 
the mine. However, this decision has never been 
implemented.115
Between 2014 and 2017, Belo Sun and the 
Government of the state of Pará appealed this 
decision of the court of first instance in the 
Regional Federal Court of Justice in Brasilia. 
They suffered a resounding defeat in December 
2017, when the Court reaffirmed the obligation 
to carry out studies on the potential environ-
mental impacts on the concerned indigenous 
peoples. It also affirmed the obligation to con-
sult with the directly affected peoples and to 
recognize, respect and follow their autonomous 
consultation and FPIC protocol.116 As outlined 
below this ruling remains the most significant 
judicial victory in terms of its recognition of the 
value of autonomous consultation and FPIC 
protocols in Brazil.
It is significant that the Protocol was developed 
precisely during the period when the Juruna 
were under intense pressures and facing major 
threats to their rights from these two mega 
enterprises. The Protocol was completed after 
Belo Monte dam’s first year of operations and 
following the issuance of the mining license for 
the Belo Sun mine. This explains the swiftness 
of the Juruna in the drafting and publication 
of their protocol which they achieved over the 
course of a few months in 2017.
The Juruna had started discussing the develop-
ment of a consultation and FPIC Protocol in 
2014, but due to the profound impacts of the 
dam those discussions were set aside until 2017. 
Their initial 2014 discussion was inspired by 
other indigenous peoples, such as the Wajampi 
and the Munduruku, who were the first ones to 
publish their protocols in Brazil that year.
The Juruna had closely followed the Mundu-
ruku people’s struggle to resist hydropower com-
panies’ operations in the Tapajós river basin and 
had supported the Munduruku’s publication 
of their FPIC protocol. That Munduruku Pro-
tocol, which played a major role in the Juruna 
decision to develop their Protocol, was pro-
duced in a context where the Government was 
putting pressure on the Munduruku to agree 
to a consultation process that merely addressed 
compensation and mitigation arrangements.117 
The Munduruku were demanding to be con-
sulted on the very feasibility of the hydroelectric 
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power plants, and not only on compensation 
arrangements for the damage their construc-
tion would cause in the Tapajós river basin.118 
In the case of the Munduruku, the Government 
insisted that the decision to construct the dams 
was already taken, and this was something on 
which the Munduruku could not express a view. 
The Government further insisted that it was 
under no obligation to consult them on that 
decision.119
In the second half of 2014 the Juruna invited the 
MFP of Santarém (who had helped the Mun-
duruku to develop their Protocol),  FUNAI of 
Altamira, and the Instituto Socio-Ambiental 
(the Social and Environmental Institute, or 
ISA) a non-governmental organisation that 
is a local ally of the Juruna, to hold an initial 
workshop on consultation and FPIC Proto-
cols. From the first meeting, the Juruna were 
very clear about the importance of, and content 
that they wanted to include in, their protocol. 
This objectivity and good faith on behalf of the 
Juruna throughout the Protocol development 
was impressive given the imposition of the 
Belo Monte hydroelectric power plant and the 
profound consequences which the lack of con-
sultation had for their rights and existence as a 
people. At the same time, the Juruna demon-
strated a clear intent to prevent any repetition 
of flawed consultation and impact assessment 
processes, such as those conducted for the Belo 
Monte project, in the context of the Belo Sun 
project or with any other proposed major pro-
jects impacting on their territories.
Despite their determination to advance with 
developing the Protocol, it was impossible to 
do so between the end of 2014 and 2016. This 
was due to the serious social and environmental 
impacts caused by the diversion of the Xingu 
river at the end of 2015, and the commence-
ment of the hydroelectric power plant opera-
tions in April 2016.” 
Because of this, it was only in 2017 that the 
Juruna resumed their internal discussions to 
develop their consultation and FPIC Protocol. 
The urgency to complete the discussions to 
agree and develop the text to be published arose 
from the fact that the Government had granted 
a license for the development of the Belo Sun 
mine without consulting the Juruna, despite its 
profound impacts on their rights. 
The Juruna reinitiated their work on the Pro-
tocol determined to prevent the development 
of the Belo Sun mine in their territory in same 
way the Belo Monte hydroelectric was imposed 
on them. This explains why the Juruna Proto-
col repeatedly refers to the need to prevent the 
repetition of past mistakes. A key point that is 
stressed in the Protocol is that it is useless to 
consult indigenous peoples after the damage is 
done and is irreversible.
“The years 2015 and 2016 were very 
difficult for us in the region of Volta 
Grande do Xingu. (…) The year 
2016 was one of the worst years of 
our lives, we no longer knew what 
was happening with the river, it 
filled up and emptied overnight as if 
[changing] from winter to summer. 
My brother died swimming in wells 
of unknown depths, the fish and 
turtles died of hunger because ripe 
fruit began to fall on the dry beaches 
instead of falling into the river, and 
the animals were not able to reach the 
fruit to eat it. We, the Juruna, call the 
year 2016 the year the world ended. 
The world as we knew it ceased to exist 
after the Xingu river was diverted.” 120
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To resume the talks about the Protocol, the 
Juruna again requested technical support 
from ISA. ISA maintains a close and perma-
nent alliance with the Juruna on other issues, 
mainly with the village of Muratu, which it has 
been helping since 2013 to develop a process 
for independent monitoring of the impacts of 
Belo Monte dam.121 Coincidentally, ISA is part 
of the Amazon Cooperation Network (RCA), 
the main association of Brazilian indigenous 
and indigenous support organizations that pro-
motes the development of autonomous consul-
tation and FPIC Protocols. This meant that the 
Juruna could easily reach an agreement with 
ISA to help them finish the development and 
publication of their Protocol. Having accepted 
the invitation, ISA requested resources and 
technical support from RCA and agreed a work 
plan that involved meetings at the villages as 
well as general assemblies to define and ratify 
the final text.
These meetings were organized in all the villages 
with the participation of leaders, women, pub-
lic servants (teachers, health workers, etc.) and 
three technical advisers from ISA (two lawyers 
and an anthropologist). The aim of the meet-
ings was to reactivate the last internal agree-
ments concerning decision-making processes 
involving the different villages, and the cur-
rently operational rules of political representa-
tion of the Juruna people and the Paquiçamba 
Indigenous Land.
The lessons the Juruna learnt in the context of 
the Belo Monte dam about the dangers of frag-
mented negotiation processes involving only 
some leaders, and conducted without publicity 
or transparency, were clearly and objectively 
presented at the meetings.
Most of the Juruna were very clear on how they 
wanted to be heard and participate effectively 
in decisions that affected them. The importance 
of remaining united, avoiding more internal 
divisions and, above all, describing the types of 
things they did not want to re-occur in a dia-
logue process with the Government, or with 
other companies, was repeatedly stressed during 
the meetings. That clear and objective experi-
ence of the Juruna inspired a very significant 
part of the Juruna Protocol that deals with the 
definition of the principles that should guide 
the entire consultation process. These principles 
are also translated into specific rules within the 
Protocol. Thus, for the Juruna, all consultation 
processes must at minimum comply with these 
principles: 
“Respect. Observing our rules, 
our customs and our time. (…) 
Transparency. So that we all know 
what is happening. (…) Good 
faith and honesty. So that we have 
confidence in the dialogue process 
and the development of agreements. 
(…) Free from physical or moral 
pressure. We will not accept the 
presence of private security guards or 
police forces who want to intimidate 
our people. Nor do we accept attempts 
at agreements with leaders or individ-
uals in return for favours or goods.”122
© Biviany Rojas Garzón
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The observance of these principles is translated 
into very specific rules within the Protocol, such 
as respect for the timing of traditional activities 
when it comes to scheduling meeting dates, the 
obligation to record and publish all consulta-
tion meetings, the need to have meetings that 
are exclusively informative, and the importance 
of independent technical advice.
From the first meeting, most of the participants 
expressed support for most of the rules described 
in the Protocol. The Protocol development con-
sisted of a process in which existing and regularly 
used community rules were updated, and rules 
which had been abandoned in contexts of high 
political or economic pressure, but that they 
considered important enough, were restored or 
updated. In general terms, the discussions dur-
ing the Protocol development meetings focused 
on updating existing internal rules and struc-
tures rather than defining new organizational or 
political representation rules.
It was only during the last meeting, attended 
by leaders of all the villages, that a brand-new 
rule was established for cases where a decision 
needed to be made in the absence of consensus. 
In such cases the Juruna decided that the deci-
sion would be put it to a vote. However, mak-
ing decisions based on individual voting is not 
a common practice among the Juruna. Despite 
this, they decided that in the absence of consen-
sus, voting was the best way to make decisions 
that represent them all and thereby avoid inter-
nal divisions. The discussion about this rule was 
very difficult. Although there are three villages, 
one of them has a larger population than the 
other two. A voting system based purely on the 
number of individual votes would always give 
its population an exclusive final say in the most 
controversial decisions.
The discussion around how to frame this rule 
in the Protocol focused on the need for each 
village to have the same political weight in 
decision-making, irrespective of its population. 
After much discussion, a voting rule was agreed 
that limits each village to 10 adult representa-
tives. 
That rule, while obviously novel, was the only 
one that was created during the development of 
the Protocol. It is important to note that, since 
the Protocol entered into force in September 
2017, no decisions have been made by voting, 
because the Juruna have made all decisions 
based on consensus. This demonstrates that, in 
practice, the absence of consensus among the 
Juruna signifies the absence of a decision.
On the other hand, the rule which received 
the strongest support and emphasis was the 
rule that chiefs or leaders cannot make deci-
sions individually. Previous examples of where a 
“How do we make decisions?
We talk until we reach a decision 
agreed by all. We will seek consensus 
in the internal deliberative meetings. 
If consensus is not possible, ten adult 
representatives from each village, 
chosen by us, will vote.”123 
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chief had individually entered into agreements 
with the Government or with companies that 
affected the entire indigenous land were raised 
in every meeting.
The lack of transparency in the negotiations 
held outside the indigenous land was also highly 
criticized and identified as a practice that the 
Protocol should reject. For this reason, the Pro-
tocol includes a rule which requires that Juruna 
decisions are always made with the joint partici-
pation of the three villages. That rule has forced 
all village chiefs to take decisions in public meet-
ings before those decisions can be legitimately 
communicated externally. Without doubt, the 
Protocol has so far proven its worth as an instru-
ment for strengthening Juruna political unity. 
Since its publication the chiefs of each of the 
three villages have all striven to avoid unilateral 
decision-making.
CONTENT
The Juruna Protocol is divided mainly into three 
parts. The first part describes who the Juruna 
are, their territory, the current socio-political 
context and the reasons why they decided to dis-
cuss, agree and publish their own consultation 
and FPIC Protocol. The second part describes 
the actual rules of the Protocol in the form of 
answers to the following questions: what should 
be subjected to consultation, when, how, with 
whom and for what. The third and final part con-
sists of a reproduction of the articles of the Fed-
eral Constitution of Brazil, which recognizes the 
land, cultural and political rights of indigenous 
peoples, and the articles of the ILO Convention 
169 and the United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples that refer to the 
right to consultation and consent.
The Juruna Protocol is clearly addressed to the 
Brazilian State, primarily to the different levels 
of government. From the introduction it is pos-
sible to see that the Protocol was developed to 
inform the federal, state and local governments 
that they have the obligation to consult the 
Juruna about decisions involving their land and 
their rights. The references to other actors, such 
as companies or non-governmental organiza-
tions, are marginal. The engagement of these 
actors in the consultation process will always 
depend on an explicit invitation from the 
Juruna. In certain asides it is made clear that the 
Government is regarded as the only legitimate 
negotiating partner in the consultation process. 
The fact that the Juruna have addressed their 
consultation and FPIC Protocol primarily to 
the Government has to do with the way in 
which they were subjected to fragmented nego-
tiations with many private companies over 
programs for monitoring and mitigating the 
impacts of the Belo Monte dam. To give an idea 
of the extent to which the Juruna were under 
siege in 2013 there were more than 200 com-
panies present in the territory, subcontracted to 
finish studies, define monitoring programs and 
implement mitigation actions. This was with-
out any consultation having been conducted on 
“Government representatives with 
authority to make decisions and 
with technical knowledge to answer 
our questions shall take part in the 
consultation. (…) Private companies 
may be invited, if necessary, to 
provide clarifications. Public bodies 
and allies. The FUNAI and the 
Ministério Público Federal must be 
involved throughout the consultation 
process, but no institution shall be able 
to make decisions on our behalf. We 
may invite independent specialists and 
legal advisers not linked to companies 
or Government bodies (…).”124 
40
the feasibility of the hydroelectric power plant, 
the conditions under which it was to be built, 
and the prevention, mitigation and damage 
compensation obligations.
The aim of the Juruna Protocol rule that rec-
ognizes the Government as the only negotiat-
ing partner is to focus the negotiation on the 
one actor competent to make decisions and 
coordinate third party actions. The Protocol 
also requires the Government to be represented 
by decision-makers. This reflects the Juruna’s 
previous experience of frustrated negotiations 
because the people who claim to represent the 
Government had no authority and no deci-
sion-making powers.
It is worth mentioning one particular rule of 
the Juruna Protocol that defines the require-
ments that Government representatives must 
meet to take part in a consultation process with 
them, considering that the ultimate purpose of 
the consultation is to reach agreements that are 
binding on all parties: 
The Protocol makes it clear that only those 
meetings that follow the rules described therein 
can be recognized as free, prior and informed 
consultations by the Juruna.
It is worth emphasising the reference in the Pro-
tocol to the Juruna’s right to not participate in 
consultation processes they are not interested 
in, or which do not observe their Protocol. In 
other words, a fundamental rule of the Juruna 
Protocol is the voluntary nature of their partic-
ipation in a consultation process. This means 
that the Juruna do not recognize any obligation 
to take part in any consultation that is solely in 
the interest of the Government.
The Juruna Protocol reiterates the importance 
and usefulness of holding consultations before 
decisions are made, and not after they have been 
implemented in order to legitimize them. Dur-
ing the discussion about this rule the Juruna 
mentioned several times the feeling that they 
were being forced to waste time, or that the 
decision-making meetings are useless because at 
the end of the process they will change nothing.
Clearly, the Juruna are worn out after tak-
ing part in meetings with the Government in 
which their views or thoughts are not consid-
ered when it comes to making decisions. In this 
case, they referred to meetings related to indig-
enous health, which is a context where there 
are formal consultation mechanisms for public 
policies, but where the results never reflect the 
indigenous participation. The Protocol makes it 
clear that they do not want to waste more time. 
“On the part of the Government 
interested in the consultation. 
Government representatives with 
authority to make decisions and 
with technical knowledge to answer 
our questions shall take part in 
the consultation. The Government 
must avoid changing the negotiat-
ing partners in mid-process. 
Private entrepreneurs may be 
invited, if necessary, to provide 
clarifications.” 125 
“Consultations can only concern 
proposals or ideas, never decisions 
already made. Consultations on 
new enterprises must occur from 
their inception or planning stage. 
A consultation needs to take place in 
advance for it to be useful. In other 
words, the result of the consultation 
must serve to influence the decision 
and not just to legitimize it.” 126 
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This rule is also rooted in the experience of the 
Juruna with the many meetings focused on the 
Belo Monte dam where the Government never 
showed any interest in listening to what the 
Juruna had to say, let alone incorporate indig-
enous considerations into its decision. For this 
reason, the Juruna do not recognize any of the 
meetings held in the context of the Belo Monte 
dam as consultations, at best they refer to such 
meetings as informative presentations that do 
not constitute a true dialogue with the aim of 
reaching a joint agreement.
The differentiation that the Juruna make 
between purely information gathering meet-
ings and consultation processes is reflected in 
the Protocol paragraph where the former are 
described as meetings whose only purpose is to 
gather information from the Government and 
receive answers in order to understand the con-
sequences of the any proposal for their rights, 
territory and way of life. The Juruna make 
it clear in the Protocol that they cannot be 
required to make decisions during information 
gathering meetings.
The Juruna Protocol pays special attention to 
the preparation and understanding of infor-
mation prior to making any decision. Again, 
this reflects the experience of the Juruna with 
the Belo Monte dam process. The Protocol’s 
detailed focus on the production of environ-
mental impact studies and the engagement of 
independent experts reflect the lessons learned 
by the Juruna with the licensing of the hydroe-
lectric power dam: 
“To carry out studies, jointly or 
with third parties, is an essential 
part of the informative stage of the 
consultation process, as set out in the 
ILO Convention 169, Article 7.3. 
For that, we need the presence of 
the FUNAI and technical and legal 
advisers we can trust. The informa-
tive stage of the consultation process 
must include the joint development 
of terms of reference for environmen-
tal impact studies and an assessment 
of their outcomes. All decisions made 
in the context of the implementation 
and assessment of the studies must 
serve to inform the consultation process 
decisions. The approval of the terms of 
reference and impact studies is not to 
be confused with the approval of the 
proposal under consultation. There 
can be as many informative meetings 
as necessary. Informative meetings 
shall be attended by Government and 
private company experts capable of 
answering questions and clearing up 
any doubts. (…)
 Depending on the consultation, 
in the informative stage of the process, 
we might make exchange visits to learn 
about similar experiences and gather 
information that can help us make 
decisions.” 127 
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The importance that the Juruna attribute to 
the possibility of directly experiencing situa-
tions that are similar to those being proposed, 
through trips where they have the possibility of 
exchanging information with people in specific 
situations, is noteworthy. The idea to include 
the possibility of sharing experiences as a source 
of information arose in relation to the need to 
be consulted about the Belo Sun project. The 
Juruna do not trust the technical information 
submitted by the Government and the company. 
They want to go to a region where a mine like 
the one proposed for the Volta Grande do Xingu 
already exists and experience it for themselves.
Another feature of the Juruna Protocol that is 
worth highlighting is the definition of who are 
the legitimate Juruna representatives that can 
take part in the consultation process, given that 
the Protocol establishes that leaders and chiefs 
cannot make decisions on their own. Instead 
the Protocol reinforces the importance of the 
involvement of communities in decision-mak-
ing, as well as the lack of authority of associa-
tions or other type of organisations to replace 
the communities in consultation processes.
Finally, the Juruna Protocol briefly describes 
the “Consultation Plan” as the instrument that 
should help in each concrete case to interpret 
the guidelines and principles of the Protocol 
in accordance with the specifics of the deci-
sion under discussion. The Protocol establishes 
a set of general rules that must be interpreted 
and applied depending on the needs of each 
consultation. For this reason, the Consulta-
tion Plan is more specific and defines timelines, 
actors, information requirements and resources 
required for each specific case.
An important element of the Consultation Plan, 
as defined in the Juruna Protocol, is that the ini-
tiative to develop it must arise from the Juruna 
themselves. They are the ones that establish the 
basis for negotiations with the Government. In 
other words, the eventual joint approval of a 
Consultation Plan, by the Juruna and the Gov-
ernment, has its origins in an initial proposal 
by the Juruna. The idea that the initiative must 
arise from the Juruna is meant to help them 
retain control of the process from the outset. 
However, this first step is hampered by a lack 
of resources, as the budget for the consultation 
process is decided precisely during the nego-
tiation of the Consultation Plan. Therefore, 
the cost of the development of an initial draft 
Consultation Plan, as described in the Protocol, 
must be borne solely by the Juruna.
“On the part of the Juruna. 
Consultations must be undertaken 
with the engagement of as many 
people from the three villages of the 
Paquiçamba Indigenous Land as 
possible. Villages cannot be consulted 
separately, and the villagers cannot 
be consulted individually. The 
consultation meetings must always 
be attended by leaders of all the 
villages, including women, men, the 
elders and children.” 128
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This limitation can be overcome by calling on 
allies like the MPF, FUNAI or NGOs at the 
outset of the process. In the case of the Belo 
Sun mine, for example, the company offered to 
hire anthropologists to help the Juruna propose 
a Consultation Plan. The Juruna rejected the 
technical advice because they did not consider 
it to be independent or trustworthy.
Finally, it is important to conclude that, when 
compared with other consultation and FPIC 
Protocols that exist in Brazil, the Juruna Pro-
tocol is particularly detailed in terms of infor-
mation regarding the procedures, actors and 
instruments required for its implementation. 
However, it does not include a section about 
following up on agreements in a post-consul-
tation stage. This omission is reflective of the 
fact that before drawing up their Protocol, the 
Juruna have never been involved in a remotely 
adequate consultation process. Their lack of 
experience in following up on agreements 
explains the absence of references to that stage 
and its subsequent inclusion in the Protocol. 
The main objective of the Juruna Protocol, 
therefore, is to get the Government to recognize 
its obligation to conduct consultations, primar-
ily the federal and the state Governments which 
continue authorizing projects that have signifi-
cant impacts on their territory without consult-
ing them.
CONTRIBUTIONS
The development of the Juruna Protocol has 
been very important for the internal consolida-
tion of the social organization and the political 
representation of the Juruna of the Paquiçamba 
Indigenous Land. Its publication has united 
them after years of intense internal divisions 
during the environmental authorization and 
construction of the Belo Monte hydroelectric 
power plant. The main challenge the Juruna cur-
rently face is to rebuild and maintain their unity 
and political control over the territory.
The recent traumatic experience caused by 
the intense social and environmental impacts 
involved in the construction of the Belo Monte 
plant is something that the Juruna refuse to 
relive. Because of this, they are determined to 
be better organized to defend their rights. The 
Juruna see the Protocol as an opportunity to 
stop history from repeating itself.
The case which most clearly demonstrates this 
new approach is regarding Belo Sun. The mere 
threat of the proposed mine was without doubt 
the main driver that sped up the process of dis-
cussion and adoption of the Protocol. The level 
of detail and safeguards described in the Juruna 
Protocol clearly illustrate the extent to which 
they have learnt about the principles and rules 
that must guide dialogue with all levels of gov-
ernment. 
The Protocol emphasises the Juruna people’s 
demand for consultations to be conducted in 
line with their own rules, customs, traditions 
and representative institutions, and explains 
what exactly that means. This level of detail on 
the right to consultation increased the faith in it 
of the judges who decided the legal case in rela-
tion to the Belo Sun project. It also reinforced its 
credibility in eyes of allies, such as the Ministério 
Público Federal, which felt more empowered to 
demand fulfilment of the obligation to consult 
when they had the Protocol in hand.
In the legal case, the Regional Federal Court of 
Justice in Brasilia recognized that the Govern-
ment of the state of Pará had the duty to con-
sult the Juruna people before issuing the Belo 
Sun mining license. The Court affirmed that the 
law requires carrying out studies of the environ-
mental impacts of the mine on the indigenous 
peoples of the region and requires following a 
process of free, prior and informed consultation 
with these peoples, respecting the rules of con-
sultation established in existing protocols, such 
as the Juruna Protocol.129 
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This decision, issued in December 2017, repre-
sented an important achievement not only for 
the Juruna people, but for all indigenous peoples 
and traditional communities in Brazil who have 
been developing their own protocols since 2014 
but who have not yet had them recognized in a 
court decision.
The judicial recognition of the binding nature 
of the Juruna protocol made it possible to 
reconsider to an earlier inadequately completed 
administrative stage in the project authorization 
process.  In practice this meant that FUNAI 
could continue developing the terms of refer-
ence for the environmental impact studies in 
cooperation with the Juruna, as established in 
their protocol.
This change in the administrative stage of the 
project is very significant. It underlines the 
importance of indigenous peoples’ participation 
in the determination of the type of information 
that must be provided in the consultation pro-
cess from the outset.  Rather than being merely 
passive recipients of information produced by 
others, without even knowing its relevance to 
the impacts that concern them, they must be 
active participants in its definition and produc-
tion.
The court decision in the case of Belo Sun sets an 
important precedent for determining the oppor-
tune timing to conduct consultations within the 
sequencing of administrative decisions on envi-
ronmental licensing of projects and activities 
that impact indigenous peoples. Following the 
court decision, Belo Sun attempted to initiate 
a consultation process directly with the indige-
nous people, without involving any public body. 
It did this so that could inform the judge that 
the obligation to consult was being complied 
with. 
The company’s attempt to expedite the consul-
tation was completely at odds with the rules 
established in the Juruna Protocol. The Protocol 
is explicit in stating that private companies are 
not legitimate negotiating partners to discuss the 
environmental authorization of any enterprise 
given that, under the Juruna Protocol, the pres-
ence of the company in a consultation process 
is totally dependent on it being invited by the 
indigenous people, or by the Government, to 
support the process in a technical capacity.
Because of this, the Juruna sent a formal notice 
to the Regional Federal Court of Justice in Bra-
silia, FUNAI and the Government of the state 
of Pará expressing their disagreement with the 
company’s initiative and demanding compliance 
with their consultation and FPIC Protocol. They 
also requested the presence of public officials to 
discuss the development of environmental stud-
ies and the initiation of the consultation process 
by discussing a consultation plan that respects 
and implements their Protocol.
The fact that the Juruna Protocol explicitly 
requires the terms of reference for environmen-
tal impact studies to be considered is clearly a 
result of the lessons the Juruna learnt from the 
Belo Monte dam environmental licensing pro-
cess. The Juruna had the opportunity to see 
how lengthy and expensive studies often failed 
to provide them with accurate and appropriate 
answers to their most urgent questions about 
the impacts and consequences of the project. 
This experience with Belo Monte made clear to 
them the importance of engaging in the process 
of developing environmental studies from the 
outset.
For this reason, the Juruna Protocol states 
that engaging in the definition of questions 
about what must be studied, and how it must 
be studied, is as important as engaging in the 
implementation of impact studies. Therefore, 
by applying their Protocol, the Juruna forced 
FUNAI to revoke the authorization it had given 
to Belo Sun to carry out studies on the basis of 
questions that had been developed without con-
sulting the Juruna.
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Currently the mining license of the Belo Sun 
project remains suspended and the develop-
ment of the environmental impact studies has 
not started yet. It is not possible to say that the 
Protocol is being fully implemented, because 
it is still only being used as a tool to demand 
respect for the Juruna’s right to consultation. 
For now, the Government of the state of Pará 
continues to refuse to carry out the consulta-
tion on the environmental authorization for the 
Belo Sun project. At best, in order to obey the 
court order that requires the consultation to be 
carried out and the Protocol to be respected, the 
Government will ask FUNAI to follow the nec-
essary procedures, but the Government has no 
intention to take part in them.
The Government of the state of Pará believes 
that the consultation must be carried out by 
the body responsible for protecting indigenous 
rights (FUNAI), and afterwards it should inform 
them of the outcome. It is highly unlikely that 
the Government bodies that make decisions 
about extractive activities such as mining will 
assume the obligation to conduct consultations 
themselves, let alone the obligation to incorpo-
rate consultation processes into the procedures 
of administrative decision-making.
The main obstacles to implementing the Juruna 
Protocol arise from the fact that the right to consul-
tation is not institutionalized in the Government 
of Brazil. The courts must order the consultations 
on a case by case basis because the Government 
does not spontaneously conduct them. Even 
worse, no Government body understands that 
it must consult on its own decisions. At best the 
various Government bodies understand that only 
FUNAI is obliged to conduct a consultation, even 
though in practice it does not have the power to 
influence the final planning decisions of the Gov-
ernment, nor the power to oppose decisions of the 
federal, state or local governments. 
The Juruna Protocol clearly states that FUNAI 
should just be a facilitator of consultation 
processes, helping with the logistics of the 
process and its organization, but not a negoti-
ating partner, in the sense of being the entity 
or public body that makes the decision under 
consultation. Nevertheless, FUNAI is still the 
only public negotiating partner offered to indig-
enous peoples, although it hardly ever has the 
control or the authority to take the decisions 
that are under consultation.
Finally, we must recognize as an obstacle to the 
implementation of the Juruna Protocol, and all 
protocols in general, the fact that indigenous 
peoples lack resources of their own to inde-
pendently develop the proposed consultation 
plans at the initial stage of each consultation. 
Relying on public resources, private company 
resources, or even allies such as NGOs, severely 
limits their control over the consultation pro-
cess from the outset. It is difficult for them 
to retain leadership of the process without 
resources of their own. Mobilizing people and 
devoting time, without resources to pay those 
costs, remains an Achilles heel for the imple-
mentation of FPIC Protocols.
One of the main lessons learned for future 
protocols is the need to engage public bodies 
responsible for protecting indigenous rights, 
such as ombudsmen or public prosecutors, in 
the development of protocols from the begin-
ning of the process. This is not only because the 
engagement of these bodies implies an official 
recognition of the process, but also because 
together with them it is possible to identify 
sources of public resources to support the mobi-
lization of the population and the development 
of proposals for consultation plans.
In the case of Brazil, in the current political 
context, where civil society is questioned and 
persecuted, it is essential that the process of 
developing and implementing protocols be sup-
ported by bodies such as the Ministério Público 
Federal, the Defensoría del Pueblo (Ombuds-
man’s Office) and FUNAI.
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Undoubtedly, the publication of the Juruna 
Protocol empowered this indigenous people in 
its relationship with the State and with private 
companies that have an interest in the natural 
resources in its territory. The Protocol helped 
establish clear and objective rules for all actors, 
it removed the ambiguity of the roles of the pri-
vate companies and the Governments during 
dialogues with them, and most importantly, it 
strengthened the Juruna’s internal unity to deal 
with threats to the integrity of its territory and 
its future as an indigenous people.
The implementation of the Protocol as a dia-
logue instrument did not start smoothly. Never-
theless, the Juruna achieved judicial recognition 
of the binding nature of their protocol, and 
thereby set an important precedent for all indig-
enous peoples, quilombolas (Afro-Brazilian) 
and traditional communities that have been 
publishing protocols and fighting for their 
rights in Brazil. Undoubtedly, the implementa-
tion of the Juruna Protocol will continue to be a 
ground-breaking and emblematic case in Brazil.
© Marcelo Salazar
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UNINVITED ‘GUESTS’: HARNESSING FREE, 
PRIOR AND INFORMED CONSENT IN COLOMBIA
By Viviane Weitzner
“It isn’t consultation, it’s not prior, it’s not free—it’s 
forced. We haven’t experienced prior consultation. It’s 
always after, and it’s not free. The state is far more a 
friend with the company, than with communities.” 
Carlos Eduardo Gómez Restrepo 
Former Chief Governor, Resguardo Indígena Cañamomo Lomaprieta 
“Now we have to take a step forward from consultation to 
consent. That is, we have to move forward on the road to 
consent, because that is the new international standard that 
is already recognized. Here in Colombia they [the state & 
companies] are terrified to speak about consent… fear, it’s fear.” 
Luis Arias 
Chief Counsellor, National Indigenous Organization of Colombia (ONIC)
“We know now that with ‘post-conflict’ will come an avalanche 
of projects and we need to be prepared. For that we need to 
strengthen the internal regulations of our Community Councils 
and disseminate the contents of our community Protocol, as 
it will be a fundamental tool to defend our living space” 
Armando Caracas
Afro-Descendant Leader, Palenke Alto Cauca-Proceso de Comunidades Negras
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INTRODUCTION: 
AN UNINVITED ‘GUEST’
In March 2008, members of the 32 Embera 
Chamí communities who make up the 
Resguardo Indígena Cañamomo Lomaprieta, an 
Indigenous Reserve located high up in Colom-
bia’s coffee lands in the Department of Caldas, 
looked up into the sky, with fear: hovering over 
one of their revered sacred mountains—which 
houses their guardian spirits—the Embera 
Chamí saw a helicopter with a big ball dangling 
under it. The people panicked, and ran in fear; 
some hid, thinking they would be shot down at 
any moment. This was Colombia, during a time 
of internal armed conflict, and people thought 
the helicopter was a lethal war machine. This 
helicopter came back day after day for close to 
a month, flying low over the sacred mountain, 
generating zozobra, anxiety, among the people.
 
Only later, following its own investigations, 
did the Cabildo, the Traditional Authority of 
the Resguardo, discover that the helicopter 
was prospecting for gold from the skies. It was 
flown by Colombian Goldfields, a junior Cana-
dian mining company commissioned by South 
Africa’s Anglo-Gold Ashanti. This uninvited 
‘guest’ arrived unannounced, the Colombian 
State having failed to ensure that the company 
first consult with and obtain the free, prior 
and informed consent (FPIC) of the Embera 
Chamí. The effect was to generate fear, distrust 
and anger among the people, while upsetting 
and unbalancing the sacred protector spirits liv-
ing in the mountain.130
As the then Chief Governor of the Resguardo, 
Héctor Jaime Vinasco, explained: 
Colombian Goldfields was only one of several 
companies with interests in the gold-rich ter-
ritory of the Resguardo. Following the global 
financial downturn, gold prices skyrocketed 
in the late 2000s and even war-torn Colom-
bia came on the radar of gold investors, with 
mining companies being wooed by the Govern-
ment. The Resguardo is located on one of the 
richest gold belts in Colombia. Its operational 
ancestral gold mines pre-exist the formation 
of the Colombian State and triggered a rush 
of interest from national and multinational 
“My reaction to the company was 
one of immediate opposition, of 
rejection, because they had violated 
the tranquility of the community, they 
had disrespected us in our own house, 
but also because we felt it was a direct 
challenge to us and a threat. The 
traditional authorities’ attitude and 
response was to denounce the situation 
and file a complaint. But that wasn’t 
the same attitude of many community 
members who wished they had an 
armed weapon to shoot…  What we 
lived was chaotic.” 131
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companies and speculators. In 2011, the Res-
guardo authorities learned that almost every 
square inch of its territory, spanning some 4826 
hectares, was being claimed by mining compa-
nies, with several mining concessions already 
issued, all without any prior consultation or con-
sent processes. At the same time, hydro-electric 
companies with an interest in harnessing power 
from the Resguardo’s rivers appeared. One even 
began construction of a small hydro-electricity 
plant, again without respecting the rights of 
the Embera Chamí and following due process 
around consultation and consent. 
These mounting territorial pressures and 
human rights violations spurred the Resguardo 
authorities into action. Internally, to protect 
and organize its own ancestral mining prac-
tices and livelihoods, the Cabildo established 
the Association of Ancestral Miners, ASOMI-
CARS. Exercising its ‘special jurisdiction’ and 
right to law-make in its ancestral territory (a 
right enshrined in article 246 of Colombia’s 
Constitution), the Cabildo also issued a series 
of laws aimed at protecting ancestral mining, 
defending its territory from outside develop-
ments, and upholding the rights of its people. 
These include Resolution 031, setting out the 
rules and regulations around ancestral mining, 
including in relation to who can mine, accept-
able mining techniques and technology and 
prohibited substances such as cyanide and mer-
cury; Resolution 046, declaring the Resguardo 
a no-go zone for medium and large-scale min-
ing; and Resolution 048, formalizing the Res-
guardo’s Protocol for prior consultation and 
free, prior and informed consent with which all 
external actors must comply.
The Resguardo authorities sought the assis-
tance of national and international allies in 
their struggle to defend their rights. To this end, 
they undertook a range of capacity-strength-
ening workshops around indigenous rights, 
with a focus on free, prior and informed con-
sent, developing their own videos and training 
manuals. In 2009, they joined forces with the 
Black Communities of the Palenke Alto Cauca, 
to weave joint strategies around territorial 
defence and collective rights of ethnic peo-
ples.132 The Cabildo also initiated a series of legal 
actions culminating in the precedent-setting 
Constitutional Court decision T-530 of Sep-
tember 2016. Among other things, T-530/16 
suspended the issuing of mining concessions 
over Resguardo territory and ordered its delim-
itation and demarcation and required that free 
prior and informed consent be obtained in 
accordance with Resguardo’s own protocols.
This chapter outlines the content and scope 
of the Resguardo’s Protocol on free, prior and 
informed consent, and offers a brief discussion 
on how it has been used to date. It then reflects 
on the context of lethal violence in which con-
sultation and consent processes are initiated 
and conducted in Colombia. This reflection is 
informed by the experience, perspectives and 
consultation and FPIC Protocol of the Black 
Communities of the Palenke Alto Cauca, with 
whom the Resguardo has forged a close alliance. 
The chapter closes by teasing out challenges 
around attempting to uphold and implement 
FPIC in the context of Colombia’s internal 
armed conflict and the implications of this for 
the realization of the rights of Indigenous and 
Tribal peoples. It draws on research and field-
work from collaborative projects spanning from 
2009 to the present.
CONTENT OF THE 
PROTOCOL: 
INNOVATIONS, SCOPE 
AND NATURE
The Resguardo’s rules and regulations around 
FPIC harness this self-determination deci-
sion-making right and appropriate its procedural 
mechanisms as a means to counter state-de-
fined ‘consultas exprés’ (express consultations). 
Colombia has ratified ILO Convention 169, 
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the American Convention on Human Rights, 
the International Convention for the Elimina-
tion of all forms Racial Discrimination and it 
supports the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples. However, successive gov-
ernments have whittled down guarantees to 
participation, consultation and consent time-
frames and processes to such a degree that 
the latest Ministry of Interior guidelines have 
earned the moniker of ‘consultas exprés’ or even 
‘super exprés’.133 Compounding this, in Septem-
ber 2018, the conservative Duque government 
developed a proposal for a law that, if it passes 
in Congress, would further diminish hard-won 
rights.134 Given this reality, a growing number 
of Indigenous leaders and organizations main-
tain that there should be no national regulations 
or law on consultation or consent. Instead they 
argue that the necessary legal framework already 
exists through international conventions that 
form part of Colombia’s Constitutional frame-
work. In keeping with international norms, they 
maintain that FPIC processes regarding specific 
projects should be driven and articulated by 
the potentially affected Indigenous Authori-
ties in their own communities and territories, 
through their own norms and processes, such 
as those legislated by the Resguardo Indígena 
Cañamomo Lomaprieta. 
Indeed, the Resguardo’s Protocol is recognized 
as one of the first such formal protocols to 
be developed by an Indigenous Authority in 
Colombia. Approved by the Chief and Coun-
cil on May 29, 2012, this Protocol is a “living 
document” enshrined in Resolution 048, which 
“establishes and regulates the Resguardo Indí-
gena Cañamomo Lomaprieta’s Protocols on 
free, prior and informed consultation and free, 
prior and informed consent (Riosucio and Supía 
Caldas)”.135 While providing a brief overview of 
the Protocol’s contents, and in particular how 
it defines and addresses FPIC in the context of 
armed conflict, the chapter underscores that 
FPIC is part and parcel of a larger set of inex-
tricably related considerations, including around 
territory, self-government, culture, identity and 
autonomy, on which the Protocol also elaborates. 
The Resguardo’s Protocol spans some 28 pages 
and comprises 8 chapters. It is drafted as a ‘res-
olution’ or law that begins with a series of con-
siderations referring to and citing provisions 
from the national and international normative 
framework on consultation and FPIC, includ-
ing jurisprudence from Colombia’s Constitu-
tional Court and the Inter-American Court 
on Human Rights. The final paragraph of its 
preamble affirms the concept of gobierno propio 
(self-government) that underpins the Protocol. 
Importantly, as with all the Resguardo ‘reso-
lutions’, the opening paragraph of Resolution 
048’s preamble reaffirms the Cabildo. 
It goes on to list other rights related to culture, 
beliefs, customs, indigenous identity, territory, 
and to the collective property rights of resguardos 
and the relation of communities with their terri-
tories, stating that “this also implies, respect for 
our sacred sites, our full use and enjoyment of 
“as the maximum authority of the 
Resguardo exercising the legal powers 
conferred by the Law of Origin, the 
Higher Law, Law 89 of 1890 and 
the ‘constitutional block’ that refers to 
the rights of indigenous peoples, both 
individual and collective, especially 
the rights to autonomy (articles 
246 and 330 of the Constitution, 
ILO Convention 169, Law 89 of 
1890, Decrees 2164 of 1995 and 
1088 of 1993), relating to our 
own organizational and indigenous 
authorities systems, recognized as of 
public character by the Constitution.” 
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our lands, and the non-intervention of illegal 
armed groups in these” (emphasis added).136 
The resolution’s substantive provisions are 
grouped into 8 chapters. Chapter 1 covers 
concepts, definitions and principles underpin-
ning the process of consultation and FPIC, 
with articles on: territory; identity; autonomy; 
self-government (gobierno propio); self-deter-
mined development; sacred sites; heritage; free, 
prior informed consultation; and free, prior 
and informed consent, among others. Chapter 
2 presents the ‘reach’ or scope of the Protocol, 
such as legislative and administrative acts, and 
development projects. Importantly, this chapter 
spells out very clearly that the Protocol applies 
to administrative acts, including the issuing of 
mining concessions, mining titles and develop-
ment plans. Chapter 3 outlines procedures for 
undertaking consultation and FPIC. Chapter 4 
addresses the various agencies and participants 
of the process. Chapter 5 specifies the conditions 
under which a process of consultation and con-
sent will be deemed invalid. Chapters 6, 7 and 8 
outline procedures for consultation and consent 
processes for legislative acts, administrative acts, 
and development and infrastructure projects, 
respectively. 
In these chapters the Protocol addresses in detail 
the various types of consultation and consent pro-
cesses that might be undertaken, and how they 
should be conducted in accordance with the prin-
ciple of self-government. It defines consent as:
The Protocol then defines the principles of ‘free’, 
‘prior’, ‘informed’, ‘good faith’, and ‘appropriate 
proceedings’. The Protocol’s articulation of the 
‘free’ component of FPIC is of particular sig-
nificance in the context of lethal violence and 
armed conflict: 
 
Article 10: Free Prior and 
Informed Consent. 
It is a right of ethnic peoples 
intimately linked to the fundamen-
tal right of free, prior and informed 
consultation. It is what materializes 
and gives useful and pragmatic life 
to this right; you cannot understand 
consultation without consent. It is also 
the process by which the indigenous 
community or people makes a positive 
or negative decision regarding what 
is being consulted in the correspond-
ing phase. It must be free of pressure, 
before any actions by external 
stakeholders, and must involve 
widespread information for a good 
decision to be made137  
Article 11. The Principle of Free: 
When it is described as free, this 
means the process must be developed 
without pressure of any kind; without 
bribes or economic agreements with 
community members or community 
leaders, without blackmail or extortion, 
without political pressure or legal 
intimidation, without threats from 
the State or from companies or 
from irregular groups, without 
any coercion to the community and 
its leaders, without divisions within 
the communities generated by those 
interested in the project that is being 
consulted, without promises that 
motivate such division. Any violation 
of this principle will invalidate the 
process of consultation and prior, free 
and informed consent, and will be 
sufficient reason for the community and 
its authorities to cancel said process138  
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An innovative aspect of the Protocol—in addi-
tion to its technical and detailed nature as a 
component of a broader Resguardo-developed 
legal framework—is that it explicitly specifies 
that if any of its principles are not upheld, then 
the whole process will be invalidated and sub-
ject to cancellation by the Resguardo author-
ities. Even more striking is that the Protocol 
dedicates an entire chapter to restrictive condi-
tions that would invalidate a process of consul-
tation and FPIC. Among some of the reasons 
listed are when the direct or indirect impacts of 
a project, or even the very process of consultation, 
“generate or result in risks for the survival of 
the indigenous people of the Resguardo and the 
integrity of the territory” (Article 30); or when 
“it is identified that the project harms or may 
violate some of the fundamental rights of the 
population of the Resguardo or that may violate 
and put at risk human rights because it acti-
vates the actors of the armed conflict in the 
Resguardo’s territory and areas surrounding 
it” (Article 32) (emphasis added).139 This then 
is how the Resguardo is attempting to con-
trol the potential infiltration into consultation 
processes of the illegal armed actors that fuel 
Colombia’s armed conflict—by invoking its 
self-government power to call off and invalidate 
the consultation process, thereby immediately 
and explicitly denying consent for the proposed 
project, vitiating also any consent that may have 
been forthcoming under inappropriate condi-
tions.
THE FPIC PROTOCOL – 
ONLY ONE IN 
A MIX OF IMPORTANT 
TOOLS TOWARDS 
SELF-DETERMINATION
While the FPIC Protocol is a key piece of Res-
guardo legislation, it is only one important ele-
ment in a mix of other critical tools that support 
the Resguardo’s pursuit of self-determination. 
Firstly, it is one in a suite of laws that protects 
the Resguardo’s territory from unwanted devel-
opments. As discussed above, it needs to be seen 
alongside these parallel laws, for example, the 
resolution that declares the whole territory a 
no-go zone for medium and large-scale mining. 
The Protocol also needs to be considered in 
conjunction with plans, policies and meas-
ures adopted by the Resguardo authorities and 
communities in the pursuit of self-determined 
development. These include the Resguardo’s 
Plan de Vida, its Life Plan, that the Cabildo has 
established to guide decision-making in accord-
ance with the Resguardo’s aspirations for its ter-
ritory and people. Alongside this, the Cabildo 
has ongoing organizational strengthening and 
alliance-building efforts. These range from 
working towards more gender parity in terms of 
women’s representation in governance; to train-
ing on territorial and human rights; to building 
and reinforcing networks with other peoples 
and ethnic groups in Colombia (for example the 
Black Communities of the Palenke Alto Cauca) 
and more recently, with Indigenous peoples 
internationally (for example, the Wampis and 
Shipibo peoples of Peru). The Cabildo has also 
developed relations with a range of national 
and international actors, from NGOs, to aca-
demia, to foreign embassies in Colombia and 
UN bodies. It can draw on these relationships 
and alliances when unwanted developments or 
uninvited guests threaten the Resguardo ter-
ritory. Indeed, the Resguardo Cañamomo is 
© Resguardo Indígena de Cañamomo Lomaprieta
53
increasingly regarded as an example from which 
other peoples in Colombia can learn. Indig-
enous peoples have come to visit from as far 
away as Putumayo and Nariño to benefit from 
Cañamomo’s experience, while neighbouring 
resguardos also regard Cañamomo as a go-to for 
support in issues around territorial defence.
Perhaps one of the most important anchors 
for the Cabildo’s organizational efforts is the 
role which spirituality plays in guiding deci-
sion-making and ensuring community cohesion 
and strength. Spiritual ceremony underpins 
Cañamomo’s governance, and traditional heal-
ers play a key role in preparing spaces neces-
sary for good decision-making and community 
assemblies. The central role of the autonomous, 
unarmed Indigenous Guard (the Guardia) 
also needs to be highlighted as the key mech-
anism through which the Cabildo’s legislation 
and decision-making is upheld in practice. 
The Guardia are on the frontlines in terms of 
patrolling the Resguardo territory and identi-
fying any uninvited guests. In the current con-
text of increased violence against social leaders 
in post-Peace Accord Colombia, the Cabildo 
is focussing on strengthening this institution, 
growing its numbers, and encouraging partic-
ipation of women and youth.
The Cabildo regards legal action at the national 
and international level as critical in uphold-
ing its right to self-determination. It has won 
some precedent-setting decisions invoking the 
requirement to consult in order to obtain FPIC. 
For example, Decision T-698/11 of 2011 with 
regards to the construction of telecommunica-
tion towers that it opposed; and more recently, 
Decision T-530/16 of 2016, as touched on 
in the introduction. T-530/16 stopped short 
of meeting the Cabildo’s demand to declare 
concessions issued without its free, prior and 
informed consent to be null and void. How-
ever, the Decision did suspend the issuance of 
mining concessions until the Resguardo’s lands 
are delimited, demarcated and titled; with the 
Court ordering consultation for any exploration 
activities that take place following the delimi-
tation process by those who have titles over 
Resguardo lands. The Court also recognized the 
authority of the Cabildo to legislate in its terri-
tory, including permitting ancestral mining (in 
coordination with the state), and recognized the 
Resguardo’s FPIC Protocol as the mechanism to 
be used in consultation processes.
Finally, mobilizations and public protest are a 
powerful tool the Resguardo uses, sometimes 
in tandem with other strategies, or sometimes 
when all else fails. Taking to the streets is a key 
recourse used by Indigenous, Black, Campesino 
and other peoples across Colombia to pressure 
the Government to uphold their rights and to 
implement agreements. These then are some of 
the critical tools in the Cabildo’s toolbox that 
need to be considered alongside its FPIC Pro-
tocol in terms of upholding self-determination 
and autonomy.
CHALLENGES AND 
OPPORTUNITIES – 
USING THE 
FPIC PROTOCOL
Despite its content being pathbreaking in 
many respects, in practice there are multiple 
challenges involved in implementing the Res-
guardo’s FPIC Protocol. Compliance with the 
steps outlined in the Protocol for consultation 
processes aimed at obtaining their consent is of 
fundamental importance to protect the rights of 
the Resguardo communities. However, to date 
the value of the Resguardo’s Protocol in and of 
itself has been far more symbolic than opera-
tional. In other words, it has served the purpose 
of demonstrating to outsiders that the com-
munities are organized, are well aware of their 
international rights, and that they have their 
own self-government instruments. In many 
cases, this is all that is needed to make compa-
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nies think twice about maintaining or develop-
ing concessions that overlap with or affect the 
Resguardo’s ancestral territory. 
In the words of the president of the Resguardo’s 
ancestral mining association, ASOMICARS:
The Resguardo authorities also suspect that 
the perception that they are well organized 
and knowledgeable about international human 
rights law, and their invocation of their own 
FPIC law, may have led Canadian mining 
company Seafield to abandon its concession 
which overlapped Resguardo territory. Another 
ASOMICARS representative noted that the 
FPIC Protocol is a very important ‘weapon’ to 
stave off incursions by outsiders and to defend 
the Resguardo territory: “It is always in our 
minds, because it is a weapon that we have.” 
Importantly, aspects of the Protocol should 
not be triggered at all in the case of medium 
or large-scale mining interests, as these activi-
ties are prohibited in the Resguardo resolution 
declaring the entire territory off-limits to this 
type of mining.
Perhaps one of the greatest challenges in 
upholding FPIC for the Resguardo is state 
representatives’ lack of knowledge of the min-
imum standards for guaranteeing the respect of 
indigenous peoples’ rights. Indeed, Resguardo 
authorities are constantly at loggerheads with 
state representatives who have a very narrow 
interpretation of prior consultation. These rep-
resentatives often see consulta previa merely as a 
means of mitigating impacts from projects that 
will go ahead regardless of the impacts on indig-
enous peoples’ rights and the peoples’ position 
on those impacts, or their own developmental 
aspirations. These representatives consequently 
refrain from even referring to consent or only 
do so by equating it to a veto right without ref-
erence to its role in safeguarding other rights. 
As Carlos Eduardo Gómez Restrepo, one of the 
Resguardo’s former Chief Governors stated: 
Other state officials have no knowledge at all 
about rights to consultation, let alone con-
sent, and have at best inadequate and very 
partial awareness of the contents of ILO 
Convention 169. 
Nevertheless, state discourse around consulta 
previa has a powerful, ‘boxing in’ or colonizing 
effect on Indigenous leaders, and as a result it 
is a constant struggle to encourage leaders to 
embrace and use the minimum standard of 
“Multinationals have come here to 
ask for that right that the state gave 
them, to undertake exploration and 
exploitation. And when we speak 
to them about consultation and 
FPIC, they don’t go further; because 
they know that it’s the stone in their 
shoe that presses most in attempt-
ing to dabble with Indigenous and 
Afro-Descendant peoples.” 
“The state doesn’t value us as 
communities. They underestimate 
us. They speak about the “ABC 
of consultation” [the Ministry of 
Interior’s guidelines for consultation]. 
They come and they give us a little 
notebook and a pen, and they tell us 
that consultation is like this! They tell 
us—even the Director of Consulta 
Previa—that we don’t have veto 
rights! They underestimate us; they 
think that we don’t have the political 
possibilities to assert our rights.” 
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FPIC in their discourse. To counter this trend, 
the Resguardo leadership organizes periodic 
workshops on this international right as part of 
their ongoing organizational strengthening. A 
further challenge is that national allies are often 
also steeped in the language of consultation 
rather than consent, with an over-reliance on 
a narrow and antiquated interpretation of ILO 
Convention 169, rather than referring to or 
using international human rights instruments 
to supplement ILO 169, such as UNDRIP, 
CERD or jurisprudence at the Inter-American 
level. 
In the context of Colombia’s armed conflict, 
standing up for the right to self-determina-
tion and autonomy and insisting that FPIC be 
upheld is a risky proposition, often with lethal 
consequences. Indeed, all aspects of Indigenous 
governance in the Resguardo are severely con-
strained by the realities of armed conflict and 
violence. Meetings are cut short so people can 
get home before dark, as a measure to protect 
their lives. And out of fear that they may be 
killed, some have decided to leave or refrain 
from participating in indigenous organizations 
and meetings altogether. Indeed, selective assas-
sinations and massacres have taken the lives 
of several Resguardo leaders. Even in the post 
Peace Accord era, death threats and killings con-
tinue at an alarming rate. 
This violent reality has been recognized interna-
tionally and nationally. The Embera Chami are 
beneficiaries of on-going precautionary meas-
ures first issued in 2002 by the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, and currently 
5 leaders are also under the protection scheme 
of the National Protection Unit.140 Indeed, the 
reality of armed conflict is perhaps the most 
challenging of all factors for upholding Indige-
nous peoples rights in the Resguardo, including 
their right to FPIC. This is particularly the case 
when criminal armed actors side with compa-
nies and the state to pave the way for develop-
ments that counter Indigenous aspirations. In 
the words of former Chief Governor Héctor 
Jaime Vinasco: 
There is a pervasive absence throughout Colom-
bia of the necessary state apparatus to guarantee 
the respect for the collective rights of Indigenous 
and Afro-Descendant peoples. This absence is 
compounded by widespread corruption of state 
officials who facilitate the activities of criminal 
armed actors or other unwanted actors with 
interests in ancestral lands.141 This, together 
with the structural discrimination these peo-
ples face in terms of economic opportunities 
and livelihoods, challenges the feasibility of ever 
implementing consultations to obtain FPIC in 
a manner that is free from manipulation, undue 
pressure and violence. 
The factors constraining respect for indigenous 
peoples’ rights are not limited to Colombia 
alone. The resistance to FPIC by the states where 
companies are headquartered also poses a sig-
nificant challenge for communities when they 
“An important number of our 
people consider that being with the 
Indigenous organization puts their 
lives at risk. And it also becomes a 
problem within families, because 
families enter into panic and, 
ultimately, they don’t let you act in 
the same way… there is fear that at 
any moment they can come, kill you, 
disappear you… In large part the 
threats—at least mine—have been 
made by armed actors who share the 
ideology or the political thinking 
about the country’s development with 
certain companies, with certain actors 
in the territory.”
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seek corporate accountability and redress. In 
countries such as Canada, home to many of the 
extractive industry companies with interests in 
Colombia,142 this issue has been at the forefront 
of parliamentary discussions and campaigns by 
civil society. Following decades of lobbying con-
crete results are extremely limited. Two recent 
developments, while still far short of civil soci-
ety demands, may offer some improvements. In 
January 2018, the current Trudeau government 
announced the creation of an ombudsperson’s 
office with powers to investigate complaints and 
make binding recommendations.143 Another is 
the recently announced initiative that will see 
Canada’s domestic law harmonized with the 
UNDRIP, something which may have implica-
tions for its laws and policies pertaining to com-
panies operating overseas, if it gets implemented 
at all.144 At the international level there has been 
recognition of the independent responsibility of 
corporations to respect human rights, including 
the requirement for FPIC, though without any 
immediate legal implications. The intergovern-
mental discussions and draft treaty on business 
and human rights may offer some hope in the 
longer term, if this adequately addresses indig-
enous peoples’ rights. In the meantime, indige-
nous peoples’ own affirmation of, and insistence 
on, respect for their laws pertaining to FPIC 
and territorial governance will continue to be of 
paramount importance. 
Given this context, and looking towards the 
future, increased dissemination of the FPIC 
Protocol among Resguardo community mem-
bers and sustained efforts to ensure their use 
of existing Resguardo tools and legal frame-
works will be essential. The Resguardo Chief 
and Council are well aware of the contents and 
potential of their Protocol, having developed 
it together with the Resguardo’s advisors and 
legal team over a two-year period. A broader 
appreciation across the entire Resguardo com-
munity of the potential of this FPIC Protocol 
could serve to strengthen their capacity to pro-
tect against unwanted encroachment into the 
Resguardo territory and contribute significantly 
to strengthening the Resguardo’s organizations 
and self-government. Community workshops 
involving leaders, the Indigenous Guard and 
other community members addressing the 
contents of this instrument and how to make 
maximum usage of it in conjunction with 
other Resguardo regulation is essential in this 
regard. An insightful short video with a catchy 
song about consent has been developed by the 
Resguardo and could prove a useful means of 
increasing awareness of the Protocol in the 32 
communities, sparking discussion on its use and 
implementation. In addition to these internal 
challenges, the Resguardo also faces new exter-
nal threats. 
As mentioned earlier, the Duque government 
is seeking to diminish and undermine the con-
tent of the right to consultation. Yet it is also 
significantly pushing back gains made through 
the 2016 Santos Government-Revolution-
ary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) Peace 
Accords, where FPIC was a critical demand that 
had been upheld in the agreement’s inter-eth-
nic chapter. Indeed, the Duque Government 
has jeopardized the possibility of peace becom-
ing a reality at all in Colombia.  This is not 
only because of its failed negotiations with the 
National Liberation Army (ELN) - the second 
most influential armed actor involved in 
Colombia’s internal conflict. It is also due to the 
government’s failure to operationalize aspects of 
the 2016 Peace Accords, such as the transitional 
justice mechanisms, that would bring to jus-
tice actors who have committed crimes against 
humanity.
Faced with these enormous challenges, and 
the ongoing interest by outside actors in their 
gold riches, the Resguardo is developing strate-
gies to confront these realities together with its 
allies, in particular the Black Communities of 
the Palenke Alto Cauca. As one component of 
this rights assertion strategy, the Resguardo will 
join other organizations to highlight their issues 
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through international actions, including by 
engaging with international human rights bod-
ies, such as the Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination. In so doing they will seek 
greater international recognition of their locally 
developed FPIC Protocol and other regulatory 
instruments fundamental to ensure the imple-
mentation of internationally recognized rights.
OTHER EXPERIENCES 
IN COLOMBIA – 
BLACK COMMUNITIES 
OF NORTHERN CAUCA
While this chapter has examined in particu-
lar the Protocol of the Resguardo Cañamomo 
Lomaprieta, it is important to recognize and 
to highlight also the progress made by other 
organizations and communities. 
For example, the Black Communities of north-
ern Cauca have made a Herculean effort in 
defending their ancestral territories including 
through the development of their “Protocols for 
free prior and informed consultation and con-
sent of the Black Communities of the Northern 
Cauca”.  This consultation and FPIC Protocol 
has been key in consultations and negotiations 
around the operational management plan of a 
large-scale hydroelectric dam. The consultation, 
which took place decades after the dam was 
constructed, was a ‘post’ consultation, not ‘prior 
consultation’.146 Despite the flaws in the pro-
cess, the affected communities used the oppor-
tunity to develop their own FPIC tool, and to 
increase their organizational strength and rights 
awareness. This Protocol has since been adopted 
beyond the original municipalities and Black 
Community Councils where it was developed. 
It now extends to the 42 Community Councils 
that comprise northern Cauca, represented by 
the Palenke Alto Cauca-Proceso de Comuni-
dades Negras, and the Association of Commu-
nity Councils of Northern Cauca, ACONC.
This ‘living document’ consists of 24-pages 
with four main sections. The first section is a 
statement of the Protocol’s objective. The sec-
ond section outlines fundamental considera-
tions (principles, reach and key criteria). The 
third section describes procedures for consulta-
tion and FPIC processes (addressing the initial 
approach; consent to begin the consultation 
process; participants in the consultation pro-
cess; pre-consultation; internal consultation; 
identification of harmful impacts and rights 
affected; external consultation with third par-
ties; information sharing about the project, 
analysis and definition of strategies to address 
the harmful impacts on rights). And the fourth 
section outlines the procedures for declaring 
consent to begin a project, works, activity or 
legislative or administrative measures (agree-
ment-making phase; cross-cutting strategies; 
follow-upon implementation; advisors and pro-
cess accompaniment).
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The Protocol defines consent as:
Importantly, the Protocol enshrines the princi-
ple of consenting to be consulted:
• Consent to initiate the consultation pro-
cess is the result of internal analysis after the 
approach and presentation by external actors 
proposing to affect the Black People of north-
ern Cauca and its territory.
• Consenting to the consultation is defined based 
on the commitment by third parties to respect 
the principles and criteria of the Black People 
of northern Cauca established in this Protocol.
• If the presence of third parties or those pro-
posing to influence the life and territory of 
the Black People of northern Cauca is viable, 
that is to say, they comply with the principles 
and criteria set forth in this Protocol, a docu-
ment will be issued consenting to give a start 
to the process.
• Only with this consent will the process of 
consultation begin.
• If the presence of the actors promoting the 
project, work, activity or legislative or admin-
istrative measure is considered unfavourable 
or contrary to the rights of the Black Peo-
ple of northern Cauca, the executive of the 
Community Council and the authorities 
recognized by them will develop a resolution 
document in which the reasons are expressed 
for rejecting that the consultation take place, 
which will be presented to the Ministry of 
the Interior, the Directorate for Prior Consul-
tation and the Directorate for Ethnic Issues 
for Black, Afro-Colombian, Palenquera and 
Raizal Communities.148 
 
It is also explicit that the people can exercise 
the right to withhold consent, and that in such 
contexts they will issue their reasoning justify-
ing their decision to do so: 
The Protocol specifies how consent will be artic-
ulated and declared following consultation. This 
is primarily based on the peoples’ autonomous 
consideration of the type of impacts on their 
rights that a project could generate. Should 
consent be given, a declaration is made to ini-
tiate the negotiation stage. Implementation of 
Consent is a right of the Black 
People of Northern Cauca, and it is 
the purpose and end goal of consulta-
tion. The decision of the Community 
Councils is not exhausted in the 
consultation process—the Black 
People of Cauca will define its 
decisions autonomously and consent 
can be negative or positive with 
regards to the intervention of third 
parties in their territories that affect 
their social, cultural, economic and 
political life.
The cultural and environmen-
tal objection to projects, activities, 
administrative and legislative 
measures is a criterion to determine 
the consent, or not, of the interven-
tion of third parties.147
Internally, the Black People of 
northern Cauca will issue a mandate 
that justifies and illustrates the 
decision of NO consent to the project, 
activity, legislative or administrative 
measure that was considered.149 
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agreements are to be monitored through ‘mixed’ 
commissions that enable technical, cultural and 
political analysis. The Protocol also highlights the 
role of external advisors and technical support 
throughout the FPIC process, and implementa-
tion of agreements. As well as documentation of 
the process, organizational strengthening of the 
involved Community Councils is a cross-cutting 
strategy throughout the FPIC process. 
Aside from these process innovations—in par-
ticular the provisions clarifying the need for 
consent in order to initiate a consultation pro-
cess, and the fact that interested third parties will 
receive a copy of the Protocol upon approaching 
the Black Communities—its section outlining 
fundamental considerations and guiding princi-
ples are the foundation upon which the Protocol 
rests and from which it derives its power. The 
fundamental considerations the Protocol clearly 
lays include: who the traditional authorities are; 
what the territory is comprised of; the forms of 
self-government; the principles governing justice; 
and the ethno-development/Plan del Buen Vivir. 
Having established the underpinning norma-
tive framework, including self-government and 
national and international frameworks and juris-
prudence,150 1t outlines a series of guiding princi-
ples, beginning with the following considerations: 
These are powerful umbrella statements and 
guiding principles for a people living in an area 
that has been among the most affected by the 
violence of Colombia’s armed conflict. 
Community perspectives on the Protocol 
In the Palenke, development of the FPIC Pro-
tocol commenced in 2009 in the context of 
an inter-ethnic project between the Resguardo 
and the Palenke. As a living document it has 
continued to be expanded based on learnings 
and experience and is now being applied in 
the case of the Salvajina dam. Internal narra-
tive reports from the Palenke’s inter-ethnic 
project coordinator reveal how important the 
process of developing the Protocol has been. 
Communities have used the discussion space to 
think and even dream their territories into the 
future, with their instrument for consultation 
and consent spurring an articulation of what 
the good life, buen vivir, should look like. It 
has also been used for capacity strengthening 
on ethnic rights. The project coordinator also 
explained that the Protocol has primarily been 
used by two communities but the Palenke’s 
hope is that the Protocol will be adapted for all 
consejos communitarios (community councils) 
in the northern Cauca: 
The life and dignity of the 
Afro People of North Cauca is 
not negotiable; sacred places such 
as cemeteries, corridors of life such 
as water sources, hunting sites, old 
mothers, historical patrimonies, are 
not negotiable; The collective well-be-
ing and the common interest must 
always be above private and individ-
ual interests, and of the interventions 
that are made or intended to be made 
within the territory. 
So far, what has been advanced in 
terms of the Protocols is part of an 
exercise carried out in the municipal-
ities of Suárez and Buenos Aires. This 
is understandable because, due to its 
geostrategic location and the possession 
of water and gold resources, they have 
been targeted by extractive economic 
powers that through dispossession, 
selective assassinations, massacres and 
narco-paramilitary invasion have 
acted as a means to go about emptying 
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The Protocol has now been taken up by com-
munity councils in the municipalities of Puerto 
Tejada, Padilla, Caloto, Santander de Quili-
chao, Guachené, Miranda, Villa Rica, who have 
“adopted [the Protocol] as their own, declaring it a 
basic tool for addressing consultation processes”.152 
An important outcome of discussions involving 
these communities was that this Protocol will 
not only be used for projects or activities related 
to mining, but also in addressing legislative or 
administrative projects affecting Afro-Descend-
ant communities in northern Cauca. This Pro-
tocol is seen as the key mechanism for territorial 
defence, it is the means to exercise the rights 
“to continue being and existing in the territories.” 
Consolidating, strengthening and applying 
it as a means to safeguard territory has taken 
on increased urgency “in light of the multiple 
external threats, from national and multinational 
investments that intend to appropriate the natural 
resources of ancestral territories”.153
Consultation and FPIC Protocols are seen as 
a means for facilitating discussion within the 
community, increasing awareness of rights, and 
providing a tool to enable the assertion of com-
munity-based decisions. This is how one young 
Black activist woman underscored the impor-
tance of the FPIC Protocol:
The communities have also reflected on the 
challenges involved in developing their Proto-
col. One community member highlighted the 
danger of having small groups of more politi-
cally oriented leaders spurring the process, and 
the need to make process even more inclusive, 
particularly in Cauca: 
the territories systematically, for 
their ultimate possession. The hope 
[with the Protocols] is to spread 
the experience to all regions where 
there are ethnic communities, but 
the challenge is to be able to carry 
out their implementation in the 
concrete.151
engage the discussion. Because, as 
a community, many times, we are 
not aware of things that happen. 
Then, when we sit down, and the 
talks and workshops about these 
consultation Protocols are given 
to us, then we get an idea that we 
also have rights, and that is what 
many people do not know. So, 
that makes it easier for us to have 
the tools, both legal and spiritual 
tools, so that we ourselves can say 
‘this project does not enter our 
communities, this we will not let 
take place’.
I really see these Protocols as 
something very positive, because 
they are tools that help us to 
I think we have been failing in 
this, that it is us women and male 
leaders that have been developing 
these Protocols but not fully linked 
to the community. ... And I believe 
that, the derecho propio [our own 
law] implies that, that among 
ourselves we have to establish rules 
that we all build; we do not have 
to write them because, we know, 
we cannot fail them, for ethics, for 
love, for everything we feel. 
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From the perspective of the Cauca leaders who 
believe in the potential of the Protocol, there 
are nevertheless challenges, both from an inter-
nal and external perspective, in terms of imple-
menting it in practice. 
According to the analysis conducted by the 
Palenke’s inter-ethnic Project coordinator, pro-
gress has been made in Protocol development 
and outreach. Community members regard it 
as an important mechanism for safeguarding 
natural resources, territorial, cultural, economic 
and social rights in the context of external actors 
seeking to enter their territories. Challenges arise, 
however, in the context of projects that involve, or 
are championed by, community members them-
selves. In these cases, interested community rep-
resentatives present the Protocol as an obstacle to 
activities. Other members of the Palenke regard 
this anti-Protocol posture to be the product of 
‘bad faith’ strategies deployed by outside interests 
who use money to co-opt community members, 
who in turn resist internal regulations. In some 
cases, companies promote these strategies. In 
others, criminal groups are behind them, co-opt-
ing leaders “not only so they defend the operation 
of illegal and criminal operations; but also, so they 
go against the implementation and exercise of con-
sultation and consent.”.154 The effect is to increase 
the risk of threats against those who promote 
implementation of community Protocol princi-
ples. Community organization and unity is also 
weakened, as this anti-Protocol sentiment gener-
ates mistrust and inhibits communication, in so 
doing it undermines self-government and causes 
serious damage to the communities’ social fabric.
Even if the community FPIC Protocol, as 
evidenced by its implementation in the con-
text of the Salvajina dam, together with Law 
70 of 1993, which recognized the rights of 
Afro-Colombian communities, are considered 
“the highest successes in terms of normativity and 
recognition by the Colombian State,” there is 
an urgent need to continue awareness raising 
among community members:
The Palenke’s Project coordinator’s internal 
report also highlighted the significance of the 
community consultation and FPIC Protocol as 
a tool to achieve buen vivir, community aspira-
tions of living well: 
“because, as has been repeated in 
many occasions, our weakness is that 
not all people in the communities 
know about Law 70, consultation, 
and consent even less; some don’t even 
know that they live in a territory that 
has as its own administrative unit that 
is a considered as authority”.155
Quite simply, the good or bad so-called 
development (extractive economic 
development) has not brought any 
benefit to everyday life, or any satisfac-
tion to its landscape of misery. For this 
reason, the ‘why’ of the Protocol finds 
its answer in the desperate and almost 
agonizing call that the community 
makes to be able to guarantee the 
bare minimum for its existence. The 
‘for what?’ is nothing more than to 
resist the prognosis of disappearance. 
The Consultation and Consent 
Protocol is life, it is to enable 
life, and it is for life. It is, as one 
community member said “the 
magna carta of the community… 
it is the spirit of the community 
[‘el sentido de comunidad’],” built 
from the grassroots in meetings, 
conversation groups, gatherings 
and workshops.156 
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In short, while initially promoted by a small 
group of community leaders, the workshops 
to develop the community FPIC Protocol ini-
tiated wide-ranging discussions that, in and 
of themselves, contributed to organizational 
strengthening, and capacity building particu-
larly among youth. The hope is that these Pro-
tocols can play a pivotal role in preventing the 
territorial and cultural loss that is propelled by 
market forces, both legal and illegal, and the 
associated economic pressure experienced by 
communities. Preventing this is perhaps a tall 
order; but clearly in the eyes of the communi-
ties these Protocols offer a possibility that fuels 
hope. 
Following the negotiation of the Peace Accords 
between the Santos government and the FARC, 
community leaders are looking to the commu-
nity Protocol with even more urgency. In the 
words of Armando Caracas Carabalí, coordi-
nator of the Black Communities’ autonomous 
land stewards, known as the Guardia Cimar-
rona: “We know now that with ‘post-conflict’ 
will come an avalanche of projects and it is nec-
essary that we be prepared. For that we need to 
strengthen the internal regulations of our conse-
jos and disseminate the contents of our commu-
nity Protocol, as it will be a fundamental tool to 
defend our living space”.157 A core component 
of the Peace Accords negotiated between the 
Santos Government and the FARC-EP was 
the inter-ethnic chapter. It renders all activities 
implemented through the Peace Accord subject 
to free, prior and informed consent. However, 
in the current political context of the Duque 
government, the implementation of these 
agreements—not to mention the negotiation 
of further agreements with other groups impli-
cated in Colombia’s internal armed conflict, 
namely the ELN—very much hangs in the bal-
ance.
CLOSING REFLECTIONS 
AND KEY QUESTIONS
There is no doubt that the lethal context of 
violence in Colombia—and the types of illicit 
activities that affect self-determination and 
autonomy, alongside the threats from more 
apparently mainstream projects that may 
also be entangled with illicit economies and 
forces—push considerations around uphold-
ing free, prior and informed consent into an 
extremely complex landscape and lens of anal-
ysis. If it is already a challenge to uphold FPIC 
in areas where criminal armed actors do not 
pervade everyday life, this challenge becomes 
enormously magnified when the economy is 
controlled by illicit actors and their activities, 
particularly in resource-rich areas. The key ques-
tion in this context is whether the possibility 
of “free” prior and informed consent can take 
place at all. In the words of Black activist Mar-
lin Mancilla: “How are we going to undertake 
consultation in the middle of armed conflict, 
when for consultation you require transparency…
that it be free? When consultation takes place 
in the middle of an armed conflict, it will not 
be ‘free’” (emphasis added).
 
In this context Indigenous and Black peoples’ 
governance is not only severely undermined, 
leaders are actively being persecuted and killed 
for standing up for their rights. This reality is 
becoming even sharper following the Santos 
Government-FARC Peace Accords signed in 
November 2016, with reports indicating that 
in the first few months of 2019, a leader was 
killed every three days.158 Security concerns 
have intensified in the Resguardo, where threats 
are escalating against leaders, especially those 
involved in regulating the Resguardo’s gold. 
In the Palenke Alto Cauca, there has been an 
invasion of criminal armed actors. They are not 
only interested in the Palenke’s ancestral gold, 
but also in growing illicit crops, such as mari-
juana and coca; the gold and drug economies 
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are closely entangled as a means to launder 
the proceeds of narcotrafficking and channel 
it back into the formal economy. In this con-
text, the very hope of free, prior and informed 
consent –that it can enable life to continue 
for Indigenous and Black ancestral peoples 
and ensure the integrity of their territories– 
becomes a double-edged sword, as those fight-
ing to uphold this right are selectively deprived 
of their lives, through a systematic attempt to 
outlaw and eradicate Indigenous or Black law 
and practices. This situation is compounded by 
the perspective of foreign interests that Colom-
bia is now ‘post conflict’, with new plans for 
investments in mining, oil and gas, tourism and 
agribusiness creating ever more territorial pres-
sures. In the final analysis however, the knowl-
edge that FPIC is a minimum standard under 
international law generates hope for these 
communities, motivating them to continue to 
defend their lands and ways of life, following 
the footsteps of their ancestors and enabling 
possibilities for their future generations. In this 
context, multi-pronged approaches to uphold-
ing rights are needed, well beyond national law, 
whether enshrined in their own Protocols, or 
through international rights instruments.
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THE WAMPIS NATION’S FPIC PROTOCOL – A STATUTE 
BASED TOOL TO DEFEND AN INTEGRAL TERRITORY
By Tami Okamoto and Cathal Doyle
‘Territory is not only a vision, concept or idea, but a system of life’ 
Shapiom Noningo, Wampis Representative
‘The lawyers… interpret according to their interests, so we also 
have to be good interpreters of Convention 169. Picking up the 
spirit of it all. That is our experience.’ 
Shapiom Noningo, Wampis Representative
‘The lawyers… interpret according to their interests, so we also 
have to be good interpreters of Convention 169. Picking up the 
spirit of it all. That is our experience.’ 
Wrays Perez Ramirez, Wampis Representative 159
The consultation processes provided for by International Treaties 
are the consequence of the right to self-determination and the 
expression of mutual respect between the Peruvian State and the 
indigenous peoples and nations of Peru.
Wampis Statute Article 33
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INTRODUCTION
The Wampis territory is in the northern Peruvian 
Amazon, in the district of Rio Santiago, province 
of Condorcanqui, department of Amazonas and 
in the district of Morona, province of Datem 
del Marañón, department of Loreto. As with 
many other indigenous peoples in the Amazon, 
the Wampis have been faced with waves of State 
and private actors attempting to exploit natural 
resources located in their territories.
Logging, mining, oil, hydroelectric and infra-
structure projects are among the challenges 
they have faced or are currently facing. A half-
a-century old oil pipeline traverses the southern 
border of their territory and regularly causes oil 
spills. Illegal mining and logging have caused 
serious damage to their ecosystem and have 
impacted negatively on the social fabric of their 
communities. There is a constant threat of road 
construction and a plan exists, that is strongly 
opposed by the Wampis, to build a major 
hydroelectric project on the borders of their 
integral territory
 
Compounding these threats to their way of life, 
an oil concession was granted in their territory 
in 2006 without any consultation. The Wampis 
efforts to ensure due process protection of their 
rights through a good faith consultation process 
were frustrated by the Ministry of Energy and 
Mines and the Ministry of Culture. Both held 
that the right to consultation could not be exer-
cised, despite ILO Convention 169 having 
been in force in Peru since 1995, as the 2011 
Peruvian law on prior consultation came into 
force after the concession had been issued.
Faced with these challenges the Wampis adopted 
a two-tier approach. On the one hand, they 
decided to assert their right to autonomy and 
self-government. After years of preparation, on 
29 November 2015, they issued their Statute 
and declared the Wampis Nation’s Autonomous 
Territorial Government (GTAN-Wampis) - the 
first indigenous government to be established in 
Peru. The Wampis Statute, the equivalent of a 
nation-state’s Constitution, is a 38-page docu-
ment consisting of 94 provisions. It was approved 
by the Wampis nation on 29 November 2015. 
According to the Wampis, their Government, 
and the Statute which underpins it, ‘was born 
as a genuine collective and historic expression of 
the Wampis people, in the exercise of their right 
to autonomy, with the aim of achieving Tarimat 
Pujut (Buen Vivir/the good life)’.160
In parallel to their assertion of self-governance 
in 2014, the Wampis Government, together 
with their Awajun neighbours, took a legal 
challenge to the issuance of the concession for 
oil block 116 in their territory. On 28 March 
2017, the Court of First Instance found in their 
favour. The Court ordered the Government 
to consult with and obtain the free prior and 
informed consent (FPIC) of the Wampis and 
Awajun before any concessions were issued or 
activities commenced in their territory. 
The ruling, which invoked previous deci-
sions of the Constitutional Court and of 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(IACtHR), was significant for three reasons. 
Firstly, it held that the right to consultation 
existed since the entry into force of ILO Conven-
tion 169 and was independent of the enactment 
of the Peruvian law on prior consultation in 
2011. The Court therefore ordered the suspen-
sion of all exploitation and exploration licences 
in the area, as well as all oil and gas activities in 
the block. Secondly, it not only affirmed the right 
© Elena Campos-Cea / GTANW
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to consultation but, drawing on the Saramaka v 
Suriname decision of the IACtHR, it affirmed 
that the FPIC of the Wampis was required for 
any new contract. This affirmation of the require-
ment for FPIC is reinforced by the Wampis 
assertion of their autonomous territorial govern-
ment and their Statute.  Thirdly, it addressed the 
sequencing and the on-going nature of consulta-
tions and FPIC, clarifying that consultation and 
FPIC were required for both the contract and at 
the environmental impact assessment stage. 
The decision was challenged by the Minis-
try of Energy and Mines, PeruPetro (the 
State company responsible for promoting and 
negotiating contracts for oil exploration and 
exploitation) and the oil companies involved in 
Block 116. In August 2018, the Second Civil 
Court upheld the decision. The Wampis see 
this outcome as evidence that some judges have 
grasped the intent of ILO Convention 169 and 
are aligned with IHRL standards, despite the 
profound crisis in which the Peruvian justice 
system currently finds itself. 
The Government is now expected to apply its 
Consultation law in relation to Block 116. Based 
on flaws in the law’s regulation and negative expe-
riences of other indigenous peoples with Govern-
ment run consultation processes, the Wampis 
believe that such a consultation would not guar-
antee respect for their rights or enable them to 
give or withhold their FPIC. They consider the 
Court ruling as highlighting the legislative and 
regulatory changes that the Government needs 
to make to remedy deficiencies in this Consulta-
tion law and its implementation. 
They have therefore decided to take proac-
tive measures to protect their self-government 
and territorial right to give or withhold FPIC 
in accordance with their Statute. Internally, 
they have discussed various strategies, includ-
ing organizing their own self-consultation in 
advance of any consultation process initiated by 
the State. Having considered these various strat-
egies, including rejecting the notion of consul-
tations entirely, the Wampis Government and 
nation decided to develop their own consulta-
tion and FPIC Protocol, which they envisage 
as complementing their existing constitutional 
Statute and serving to reinforce their governance 
structure and their territorial integrity.
Before discussing what the Wampis plan to 
address in their Protocol, it is important to 
briefly contextualize its development in light 
of the deficiencies in the regulation and imple-
mentation of the Peruvian law on consultation. 
Another important contextual factor is the 
Wampis understanding of territory and govern-
ance. For the Wampis these concepts are intrin-
sically interrelated and indivisible, and together 
they underpin their autonomous initiative. An 
overview of the Wampis vision of territorial 
integrity and their governing structure is there-
fore provided. This is followed by an analysis of 
the role which their Statute plays as a frame-
work for the development of an FPIC Proto-
col and an outline of their initial approach to 
the development of a Wampis consultation and 
FPIC Protocol.
Map of the Integral Territory of the Wampis nation (gray 
overlay), two oil block concessions (darkgray overlay), and 
cross-cut on its southern border by a pipeline (dotted line) 
and a potential road (dashed line). Taken from Okamoto 
and GTANW (2019).                                                              
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THE PERUVIAN 
CONSULTATION 
LAW AND ITS 
IMPLEMENTATION
Since its enactment in 2011 the Peruvian Gov-
ernment has presented its law on prior con-
sultation to the international community as 
a model for how consultation should be con-
ducted. The law was aimed at giving effect to 
Peru’s obligations under ILO Convention 169 
and was drafted in a context of widespread 
social conflicts around extractive industry pro-
jects. The trigger for its enactment was a violent 
confrontation between indigenous community 
members and police near the Amazonian city 
of Bagua in 2009. This conflict, known as the 
‘Baguazo’, resulted in 33 deaths and left over 
200 injured. The tragic event arose in the con-
text of protests related to the absence of consul-
tation on decrees regulating extractive industry 
activities in the Amazon, and the unwillingness 
of the Peruvian State to address the concerns of 
indigenous peoples whose territorial rights were 
impacted. Shortly prior to the Bagua events, the 
then Peruvian President, Alan García, published 
defamatory statements in national media equat-
ing indigenous peoples (among them, people 
resisting oil exploitation) to dogs in a manger.
Following the Baguazo, a national coordina-
tion group on the development of Amazonian 
indigenous peoples was created. The group 
established several roundtables, one of which 
was mandated - with the participation of indig-
enous peoples - to develop a draft consultation 
law. The draft law was approved by Congress 
on 19 May 2010. However, at the end of the 
process on the insistence of the Executive, a 
provision was introduced in Article 15, without 
consulting indigenous peoples, stating that the 
Government will make the final decision if con-
sent is withheld. The law entered into force on 
7 September 2011. 
In 2011, a further consultative process was 
established to develop the law’s implementing 
regulations. Most of the indigenous groups par-
ticipating in the process withdrew when the gov-
ernment refused to incorporate their proposals 
on obtaining consent in accordance with inter-
national human rights law standards. The ensu-
ing implementing rules, issued in 2012, further 
restrict consultation timeframes and processes. 
These deficiencies have been compounded by 
poor implementation practices across a range of 
sectors, in particular in the oil, gas and mining 
sectors, that are inconsistent with the principles 
governing consultation processes.161
The flaws in these consultation processes arise 
for a range of issues.161 One of the primary fac-
tors is that they do not occur within an ade-
quate framework of recognition of rights by the 
State. Another related factor is the State’s failure 
to systematically tackle historical and contem-
porary structural discrimination against indig-
enous peoples. The legacy of historical slavery 
and denial of citizenship to indigenous peoples 
looms large. While the extreme abuses (such as 
mutilations, inhuman workload, physical and 
‘The purpose of consultation is to 
reach an agreement or consent’              
(Peruvian Law of Consultation, art. 3)
‘In the event that an agreement is not 
reached, it is up to the state entities 
to adopt all the necessary measures 
to guarantee the collective rights of 
indigenous or native peoples and 
the rights to life, integrity, and full 
development’       
(Peruvian Law of Consultation, art. 15)
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sexual violence) are no longer prevalent, the 
discriminatory societal attitudes underpinning 
them remain. This is reflected in the absence 
of adequate education and health services and 
infrastructure, the exclusion of indigenous peo-
ples from decision-making processes that have 
profound impacts on their way of life, and the 
on-going impacts of land dispossession, all of 
which existing law, policy and government 
practice fail to adequately address.163 
The traumatic experiences of Amazonian indig-
enous peoples as a result of colonial practices 
continued to manifest themselves during the 
19th and 20th Century and live on in the mem-
ory of these peoples. They are compounded by 
the on-going environmental harms and human 
rights violations arising from State or third-
party imposed activities in their territories. 
The relevance of these historical experiences 
and contemporary realities are ignored by the 
bureaucratic machinery of the State when con-
sulting with those peoples regarding projects 
with potentially profound impacts on their 
territories and ways of life. In addition, this 
bureaucratic State machinery is also blind to 
the complex relationships that exist between 
Amazonian peoples and its consultation pro-
cesses fail to cater to the diverse political, his-
torical and cultural realities of each distinct 
group. The State does not ask them how they 
wish to be consulted and ensure they have the 
necessary time and space to decide this among 
themselves, free from external pressure. Instead, 
it imposes a uniform process in which all the 
peoples are grouped together as if they were one 
homogeneous group. Rather than provide ave-
nues for resolving existing or potential tensions 
and reaching consensus between peoples and 
communities, the processes serve to foment and 
deepen differences, often leading to (at times 
violent) divisions and a lack of harmony in their 
daily coexistence. 
Another manifestation of this bureaucratic 
approach in Peruvian consultation processes is 
the absence of genuine intercultural dialogue. 
This is, in part, due to the lack of understanding 
of indigenous peoples’ rights, cultures and real-
ities in the government agencies responsible for 
facilitating consultation processes. Essentially, 
these institutions as they are currently com-
posed are incapable of genuine intercultural dia-
logue. Many staff lack exposure to and training 
on indigenous peoples’ rights, cultures and pro-
tocols. This leads to inappropriate approaches 
to engaging with indigenous peoples as well as 
a perceived lack of respect for their processes, 
authorities and worldviews. 
The State institutions of which these staff form 
a part, in particular those promoting extractive 
industry projects, are in many instances the very 
entities that are implicated in past - generally 
unremedied - violations of indigenous peoples’ 
rights. These institutions are largely oblivious 
to their discriminatory legacy and its continued 
manifestation in their approach to engagements 
with indigenous peoples. From their point of 
view, the fact that the State defines the rules of 
engagement and maintains the ultimate deci-
sion-making power on matters of profound, and 
even existential importance to those with whom 
it is engaging, is not an issue. At an institutional 
level this attitude is reflected in the subjugation 
of the Ministry of Culture, the governmental 
entity in charge of protecting indigenous rights, 
to the political whim and power of the Govern-
ment ministries that promote natural resource 
exploitation projects in indigenous territories. 
The prior consultation law and its implement-
ing rules - which include an eight-step consulta-
tion process - purport to provide for meaningful 
good faith consultations that are free, prior and 
informed as well as being aimed at obtaining 
consent and reaching agreements. However, 
they fail on all these criteria when critiqued 
from the perspective on international human 
rights law standards.
There is no consistency across sectors (e.g. oil 
and gas, mining, energy, agribusiness, tourism) 
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as to when consultations are to be conducted, 
and in no case are they actually conducted prior 
to the key decision-making stages where impacts 
on indigenous peoples’ rights can be prevented 
or mitigated. For this to happen, consultations 
would be necessary before the negotiation of 
contractual clauses or the issuance of conces-
sions and prior to the conduct of participatory, 
environmental, social and human rights impact 
assessments. 
At present, consultations in the mining sec-
tor only happen after impact assessments are 
conducted, while in the oil and gas sector 
they happen at the contracting stage, but are 
focused purely on the decree approving the 
contract and not on the contractual clauses 
themselves. Viewed from a rights-protec-
tion perspective, these processes are there-
fore largely rubber-stamping exercises. Their 
sequencing divorces consultation from key 
decision-making milestones, so that it can be 
considered neither meaningful nor prior. The 
failure to consult before decisions impacting on 
rights are made is incompatible with the notion 
of seeking FPIC under international law. 
Similarly, State run consultation processes are 
grossly deficient from the perspective of pro-
viding comprehensive information to the con-
cerned indigenous peoples on the potential 
impacts and benefits of proposed projects that 
would enable them to make fully informed 
decisions. Information is partial and piecemeal, 
provided too late for meaningful consideration 
by the communities and their authorities, and 
is biased toward reaching the outcome desired 
by the Government agencies promoting the pro-
ject. The very fact that State actors involved in 
the consultation process have an inadequate, and 
often discriminatory, understanding of indige-
nous peoples’ rights renders them incapable of 
informing those peoples of their rights. Rather 
than assist in balancing power asymmetries aris-
ing from imbalances in access to information, 
consultation processes exacerbate them. 
Another significant deficiency in the State’s 
consultation processes is the lack of weight 
accorded to indigenous knowledge. Instead of 
envisaging consultations as a two-way intercul-
tural dialogue, in which the State learns from 
indigenous peoples as much as indigenous peo-
ples learn from the State, consultation processes 
are construed as a one-way flow of - unfortu-
nately all too often limited, distorted and biased 
- information from the State to indigenous 
peoples. A clear example of where this issue 
arises is in the context of determining impact 
areas. In many cases, impacts on indigenous 
peoples territorial, self-governance and cultural 
rights can only be determined by, or at the very 
least in close cooperation with, the concerned 
peoples. However, faced with a one-way flow of 
information they are effectively excluded from 
meaningful participation in the assessment of 
the nature and extent of impacts.
Viewed from the perspective of a process that 
should place indigenous peoples in a position 
where they can make decisions that are “free” 
from coercion or undue influence, the State’s 
eight step process again fails rather dismally. 
Indigenous peoples are denied the time and 
space that they need to freely consider and 
deliberate over the various implications that a 
project may potentially have on their rights, 
way of life and future. Timeframes tend to be 
imposed upon them, as are locations in which 
they will be consulted. These fail to adequately 
address the realities of the peoples in question, 
limiting the possibility for community mem-
bers and leaders to participate fully and freely 
in consultation processes. They also impose 
restrictions on decision-making that are not in 
accordance with the people’s own practices and 
customs. 
Finally, the law and its implementing regu-
lations are clearly at odds with the notion of 
respect for indigenous peoples autonomous 
decision-making rights and the principle of 
obtaining consent for potentially significant 
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impacts on their rights. The fact that the law 
stipulates that the Government will take the 
final decision imposes significant constraints 
on indigenous peoples’ right to self-govern-
ance and self-determination. This declaration 
from the outset, that one party’s deliberations 
and decisions can be unilaterally dismissed 
by the others, is irreconcilable with the con-
cept of good faith consultations, negotiations 
and consent. In such a context, “agreements”, 
if they are reached, are imposed rather than 
entered into freely on the basis of consent. 
This approach leads to consultation processes 
that are divisive and insincere, geared towards 
realizing a pre-determined outcome, and that 
seek to minimize benefits and rights-protect-
ing measures. 
The disassociation of consent from peoples’ 
self-governance, territorial and cultural rights 
facilitates the inappropriate equation of FPIC 
to a ‘veto power’. It forecloses any analysis of 
why consent is required and what the profound 
and disproportionate implications of ignoring 
it are for the peoples concerned. This disin-
genuous approach further entrenches power 
asymmetries and dissociates consultation and 
consent seeking processes from the collective 
rights framework that they exist to safeguard. 
In order to tackle this power asymmetry and 
ground consultation and FPIC in the indige-
nous rights framework, indigenous peoples are 
asserting their own conceptions of territory and 
their own governance structures and demand-
ing that the State and other actors recognize 
and respect them. These demands are grounded 
in IHRL and are increasingly supported by 
judicial rulings. 
The Wampis nation is an emblematic example 
of this assertion of autonomy. An overview of 
their conception of territory and their govern-
ing structure offers some context as to how their 
Statute and Protocol will regulate consultation 
and FPIC in a culturally appropriate manner. 
THE WAMPIS VISION 
OF TERRITORIAL 
INTEGRITY
 
Territory is considered by the Wampis, and by 
many other Amazonian indigenous peoples, not 
simply as place, or as an abstract notion related 
to jurisdiction, but as the organizing basis of 
indigenous life. As the Wampis representative 
Shapiom Noningo (2017) explains ‘territory is 
not only a vision, concept or idea, but a system 
of life’ (cf. also Wrays Pérez, 2018). Wampis ter-
ritory, or Iña Wampísti Nunke, is defined in their 
governmental statutes as ‘integral and unified,’ 
comprising of ‘the total habitat [their] people 
have occupied and utilised ancestrally… and 
that [they] continue to use’ (Wampis Statute, 
art. 23). Wampis territory is intertwined with 
their identity, language, culture, and their own 
forms of governing their affairs (Wampis 2015, 
art. 2). As the Wampis say, ‘our people and those 
who comprise it are part of this territory and 
its components’ (Wampis Statute, art. 21). This 
‘concept of life rooted in territory’ is echoed in 
the deeds of their ancestors and in the knowl-
Constituency of the Wampis Nation’s Autonomous 
Territorial Government (GTANW) on November 2015 
in the Soledad community. Picture credits: GTANW and 
Elena Campos Cea                                                          
© Elena Campos-Cea / GTANW
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edge, wisdom and philosophies they have inher-
ited from them (Wampis Statute, art. 46k).164
The Wampis have asserted that this integral and 
unified vision of territory is the only concep-
tion of territory capable of guaranteeing their 
nation’s buen vivir (Wampis Statute, art. 23). 
Buen vivir, often translated as good living or liv-
ing well, is an indigenous concept that embod-
ies the well-being, way and quality of life of a 
people and is premised on their having control 
over their own future. According to the Wampis 
buen vivir comprises of ‘dignified subsistence, 
autonomous, self-determined and culturally 
appropriate development, food sovereignty and 
security of their families’. This, they hold, is 
necessary to allow them ‘to develop the social, 
economic, political and cultural relations that 
guarantee the protection and adequate manage-
ment of nature and the environment’ (Wampis 
Statute, art. 23). 
In essence, the Wampis Government exercises 
a form of ‘territorial governance’ where terri-
tory and governance co-exist, rendering the 
Wampis way of life and existence possible.165 
Territorial governance, as defined and currently 
implemented by the Wampis, is not temporal in 
nature. It is not merely the aspiration of a few 
indigenous leaders or even ‘the awakening of 
the current indigenous generation.’ Instead, for 
the Wampis, it is part of much larger socio-his-
torical processes. It embodies their endurance 
and their struggles to defend their territory. 
They trace these continuous struggles for sur-
vival from the time of the Inca Empire, through 
the colonial and republican periods, and up to 
the present day. 
The Wampis also recognise that their contempo-
rary governance structure emerged in response 
to a series of transformations in the interna-
tional legal, economic, cultural and political 
order. Fundamental, to the Wampis vision of 
an integral territory, and their strategy to realize 
it, is that they are not seeking state recognition 
or authorization in order to exercise territorial 
autonomy and self-governance. Instead, they 
hold these to be inherent rights which they 
exercise de facto as indigenous peoples.166 This 
de-facto exercise of self-governance is realized 
through their constitutionally (Wampis Statute) 
defined governance structure.
THE WAMPIS GOVERNING 
STRUCTURE
UUN IRUNIN
(MAXIMA 
AUTORIDAD)
105 Representantes
comunidades
• Cumple la function  
legisladores
• 5 Representantes de las 
Ccs. tituladas con anexos
• 2 de las Ccs. tituladas  
sin anexos
GOB. EJECUTIVO 
CENTRAL
Administrador 
del GTA
• Integrado por:  
PAMUK/PAMUKA 
AYATKE
• Consejo de Directores
GOB. DE CUENCA
Matsatkamu 
Iruntramu
(Maxima Autoridad)
• Adminstratores:  
waisram/waisrama atuke
• Delegados acreditados  
por cada Cc.
GOB. COMUNAL
Asamblea General
(Maxima Autoridad)
• Adminstratores:  
Junta directiva  
(limaru/Vice limaru)
• Comuneros inscritos  
en el Padron.
Basic governance structure and authorities of the Wampis Nation 
Autonomous Territorial Government (GTANW, 2019).                      
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The Wampis governance structure is hierar-
chical in nature. The Uun Iruntramu is the 
supreme decision-making body of the Wampis 
Government. It consists of an assembly that is 
composed of various Wampis members, called 
Irunin. In addition to the Uun Iruntramu, there 
are three other levels in the hierarchy. The first 
is the Central Government. This is responsible 
for the management and administration of the 
Wampis Government and is led by an elected 
Pamuk (president), a vice president, and several 
Atuuke (directors). 
The second element in the governance struc-
ture consists of governments of each of the two 
river basins. They are composed of a Matsat-
kamu Iruntramu (a river basin assembly) and 
Irutkamu Iruntramu (communal assemblies). 
The Matsatkamu Iruntramu has an elected Wais-
ram (chief ) and Waisrama Ayatke (vice-chief ). 
The Irutkamu Iruntramu have management 
boards composed of an Imaru, vice-Imaru, sec-
retary, treasurer and spokesperson. 
Under their traditional governance system, the 
warriors and visionaries took the lead in deci-
sion-making. However, for practical reasons, the 
Wampis have formalized this democratic vot-
ing system to address contemporary decisions. 
According to their current Statute regulations, 
a quorum for an Uun Iruntramu requires the 
presence of more than half of its members and 
decisions are taken by majority vote (Wampis 
Statute Art 51). 
The Uun Iruntramu holds ordinary sessions three 
times a year and when necessary extraordinary 
assemblies, all of which are announced by the 
Pamuk. If the Pamuk refuses to call a session, 
or the members of the Central Government 
are completely absent, the Uun Iruntramu can 
self-convene for assembly sessions. The Statute 
regulates membership, leadership, and election 
processes. The Irunin are elected in Wampis com-
munal assemblies and currently number 102 rep-
resentatives. To be eligible for election they must 
speak Wampis language and have been born in 
Wampis territory and live there. Their immedi-
ate re-election after a period of office in the Uun 
Iruntramu is not permitted, although re-election 
for a subsequent period is permitted. The Pamuk 
is elected by popular vote, as opposed to in com-
munal assemblies. The office is held for five years 
and the position must alternate between the 
two river basins, with the vice-president of the 
GTAN-Wampis always coming from the other 
river basin to that of the Pamuk.
WAMPIS STATUTE: 
A FRAMEWORK FOR 
DEVELOPMENT OF 
AN FPIC PROTOCOL
The Wampis governance system is central to 
the exercise of their collective rights, including 
their right to give or withhold their FPIC. Arti-
cle 12 of their Statute outlines their collective 
self-determination, autonomy, self-governance, 
territorial and cultural rights as a people and a 
nation. It includes their right to consultation 
and FPIC for all state initiatives that could 
directly affect those collective rights.
 
As mentioned above, the Wampis have decided 
to prioritise the elaboration of an FPIC Protocol 
during 2019. They envisage it as a mechanism 
through which they, as a nation, will regulate 
how they will exercise this right in accordance 
with the principles elaborated in their Statute. 
This section of the case study provides an over-
view of the relevant Statute provisions, grouped 
under seven topics.
© Elena Campos-Cea / GTANW
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FPIC as an exercise of Wampis’ 
own form of decision-making
The Wampis’ FPIC Protocol will serve two pri-
mary purposes. Firstly, it aims to increase aware-
ness and understanding of external actors - in 
particular the Peruvian State - of the Wampis 
decision-making process. Secondly, it will be 
a means to insist on respect for their process 
whenever an initiative that may affect their 
territory arises. Territorial control is collective 
right of the Wampis nation as a whole. They are 
opposed to consultation processes that could 
fragment their nation into atomized communi-
ties in the context of decisions on matters that 
impact on their integral territory. To avoid this, 
their Statute establishes that the Wampis Gov-
ernment exercises authority vis-à-vis the Peru-
vian State and represents the Wampis at the 
international level. Decision-making authority 
in relation to Wampis territorial sovereignty and 
integrity is therefore vested in their government 
and is not devolved to individual communi-
ties. By extension, the Wampis Government, as 
opposed to other indigenous organisations and/
or individual communities, is the entity that 
must be consulted in relation to all matters that 
affect the integrity of Wampis territory. It is also 
the entity that will provide or withhold FPIC 
on behalf of the Wampis nation following a 
decision-making process that they will develop 
and control themselves.
The involvement of the Uun Iruntramu (Cen-
tral Government) is therefore critical to the 
overarching methodology and principles that 
the Wampis have established for FPIC pro-
cesses. According to the Wampis Statute, the 
Uun Iruntramu is responsible to ‘authorise, 
approve, or disapprove covenants and contracts 
that they consider could potentially affect the 
collective rights of the Wampis nation’ (Wampis 
Statute, art. 50.2h). In extraordinary assem-
blies, the Matsatkamu Iruntramu (river basin 
government) is also responsible to ‘participate 
in prior and informed consultations on admin-
istrative and legislative measures or any plan, 
programme or project that could impact on or 
affect the collective rights of the Wampis nation 
in the river basin’ (Wampis Statute, art 62.2c). 
The Pamuk also plays a key role in FPIC pro-
cesses as he/she has the mandate to represent the 
Wampis nation, and ‘promote and coordinate 
mechanisms to ensure harmonious and demo-
cratic relationships’ with national, regional, and 
municipal governments (Wampis Statute, art. 
55.1g).
Prior consultation must comply 
with the provisions established in 
ILO Convention 169 …, in the 
[UNDRIP], in the jurisprudence of the 
Constitutional Court of Peru and in 
the jurisprudence of the [IACtHR], as 
well as in the national regulations that 
develop the adequate implementation 
of these principles and procedures. … 
consultations must be carried out in 
accordance with the forms determined 
by the consulted peoples and nations.
Wampis Statute, art. 33
No one may take advantage of 
communal autonomy to justify decisions 
which should be taken by the Wampis 
Nation as a whole, in accordance 
with ILO Convention 169, and in 
conformity with our own traditional 
and autonomous ways of resolving and 
making decisions, as defined in this 
Statute.
Wampis Statute, art. 34.1
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Private negotiations are forbidden during con-
sultation processes and decisions are ‘always [to] 
be taken within the territory, in public and in 
a manner agreed upon by the Territorial Gov-
ernment authorities together with the pertinent 
authorities of the State.’ Any decisions that are 
‘made outside the channels established’ by the 
Statute are deemed void (Wampis Statute, art. 
34.4).
The basis of FPIC in integral territory 
and its role in protecting it
Among the minimum criteria in the Wampis 
Statute governing consultations is the respect 
for the Wampis conception of their ‘territory 
as one’. The Statute elaborates on the Wampis’ 
particular relationship with territory and its 
centrality to their form of governance and over-
all well-being as a nation. This indivisibility of 
territory is of fundamental importance when 
contrasted with State or corporate identification 
of “affected areas” or “impact areas”. The latter 
fail to account for the full extent of impacts of 
projects when understood through the Wampis’ 
conception of one integral territory.
The interconnectedness of environmental 
impacts is reflected in the fact that contam-
ination frequently extends well beyond the 
borders of an oil block drawn on a map. The 
experience of Amazonian indigenous commu-
nities has been that animals, upon which they 
rely for their subsistence, are contaminated in 
one area and then roam throughout their terri-
tory (unrestricted by project boundaries) while 
downstream waterways that are the source of 
fish (and central to the protein intake of the 
indigenous peoples), as well as drinking and 
bathing water are also contaminated far from 
the project site. 167
 
The Wampis territory is also ‘one’ in terms of 
its social construction. For example, immigra-
tion of, primarily male, non-Wampis into any 
part of their territories has a potentially pro-
found impact on the communities’ social fabric 
and values. Similarly, if decisions were taken by 
individual communities the unity of the people 
is fractured and a context that is generative of 
division is created. From a cultural and spiritual 
perspective, the territory is also one, as damage 
to culturally significant areas in any part of the 
territory cause harm to the entire people. For 
these and other reasons, the need for FPIC at 
the level of the people or nation is implicit in 
the idea of one integral territory and is essen-
tial for its maintenance and protection into the 
future.
Determining procedure-oriented 
criteria for consultation processes
The Wampis Statute establishes a series of pro-
cedural criteria with which any consultation 
processes involving their people must comply. 
They include the need for adequate time and 
space to cater to their realities and processes. 
These processes are consistent with the organ-
isational and practical considerations of many 
Amazonian indigenous peoples around meet-
ings and decision-making. These peoples tend 
to take decisions only when they are physically 
together and after collectively and exhaustively 
‘The territory of the Wampis Nation 
is one. The official processes of prior 
consultation for initiatives related to 
the extractive hydrocarbons industries, 
energy or other large-scale projects 
directly affect the entire territory of 
the Wampis Nation and are a matter 
that must always be addressed by the 
Wampis Nation as a collective, this 
being the entity that determines the 
effects of an initiative and which 
bodies must participate in the process’
Wampis Statute, art. 34.1
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deliberating on issues. Everyone who wants to 
do so is provided with an opportunity to express 
their views in order to reach a consensus wher-
ever possible. Furthermore, like the Wampis 
territory which spans almost 1.4 million hec-
tares (equivalent in size to Wales), many Ama-
zonian indigenous territories are extensive. This 
means that significant preparation is needed 
for gatherings, as the logistics and resources to 
convene (sometimes week-long) meetings have 
their own unique complexities. A sufficiently 
long timeframe is crucial in these contexts, as 
community members may need to mobilise for 
days to get to the community where the meet-
ing is held, especially when this involves exten-
sive travel by river. It also has implications in 
terms of the time necessary to notify all com-
munity members and for the plan for such trips.
The Statute stipulates that information is to be 
provided sufficiently prior to any decision and 
must be ‘suited to the gravity of the decision’. 
This is deemed necessary so that the Wampis 
‘can receive adequate professional advice and 
a realistic assessment of possible impacts, dis-
advantages and advantages of each alternative’ 
(Wampis Statute, art. 34.2). Documents are 
to be translated into the Wampis language and 
consultation processes are to include transla-
tors that are recognized by the Wampis people 
(Wampis Statute, art. 3).168
The Statute defines ‘good faith’ in practical 
terms, stating that it implies the absence of 
‘usual practices of pressure, organisational divi-
sion, corrupting leaders, local consultations or 
confrontations’. Instead, it requires informa-
tion that ‘is sincere and responsible, so that the 
appropriate decisions can be made according 
to our interests as a people’ (Wampis Statute, 
art. 34.3). Processes that are improvised, lack 
transparency, or are executed under pressure, 
are deemed to be at odds with the Wampis cos-
movision, their liberty and their self-determi-
nation (Wampis Statute, art. 34.2). Moreover, 
the Wampis hold the State responsible for any 
harms caused to people or damages to the envi-
ronment arising from ‘misleading, partial, or 
inadequate information’ (Wampis Statute, art. 
34.3).
The Statute’s affirmation of the 
requirement for FPIC for protected areas
The Statute clarifies that FPIC is required for the 
declaration of protected areas within Wampis 
territory (including National Parks, National 
Reserves, Historic Sanctuaries, Conservation 
Areas, Communal Reserves, among others). 
This it affirms is consistent with international 
treaties and jurisprudence and Peruvian legis-
lation. Existing protected areas ‘maintain their 
status as traditional territory’, and the Wampis 
assert their pre-existing rights over these areas. 
The Statute affirms that these areas are the prop-
erty of the Wampis nation (in accordance with 
their right to ancestral and traditional occupa-
tion and use) and highlights that these areas 
have been conserved precisely because of their 
occupation by the Wampis since time immemo-
rial (Wampis Statute, art. 38).
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In the case of protected areas that were already 
created without their FPIC – such as Ichigkat 
Muja National Park, Tuntanain Communal 
Reserve, and Santiago-Comaina Reserve Zona 
- the Statute states that the Wampis do not 
renounce their traditional territorial rights and 
the Wampis Government maintains the right 
to evaluate different avenues available to them, 
including taking joint conservation actions 
together with the Peruvian State. If the legal sta-
tus of protected areas serves to weaken effective 
conservation, introduces threats to the preser-
vation of resources, or affects their traditional 
use by Wampis families, the nation ‘will reserve 
itself the right to manage their restitution’ in 
accordance with Article 28(1) of the UNDRIP 
(Wampis Statute, art. 38).
The Statute’s position on acts 
that violate the right to consultation
The Wampis Statute lists three scenarios that 
are considered to violate the right to consulta-
tion: the entry of companies or steps to facili-
tate their entry before the completion of formal 
consultation processes by the State; ‘clandestine 
or individual or separate deals’ with extractive 
companies or collaborators; or attempts to con-
duct prior or parallel consultation processes to 
the State initiated consultations.
Article 35 of the Statute unambiguously states 
that ‘no legal or illegal extractive company, 
whether mining, oil, gas, or other is allowed to 
enter the communities of the Wampis nation’s 
integral territory without a prior and informed 
formal consultation process carried out by the 
State, as provided for in ILO Convention 169 
and the present Statute’ (Wampis Statute, art. 
35). Any agreement or consent provided to 
companies through a separate process prior 
to the completion of the official consultation 
process between the State and their people is 
deemed ‘invalid and illicit’. 
This is reinforced by Article 36(3) which holds 
that such extractive companies or entrepreneurs 
will be declared persona non grata, banned from 
working in the territory and may be subject to 
criminal complaints. Article 36(1) of the Stat-
ute invokes article 18 of ILO Convention 169 
which prohibits unauthorized intrusion into 
their territories. It states that the belongings of 
any company that enters their territory, before a 
State initiated prior consultation is conducted, 
will be ‘pre-emptively immobilized to prevent 
their continued illegal circulation through the 
communities and they will be commanded to 
leave immediately’. It also states that such com-
panies will be subject to sanctions and fines in 
accordance with Article 149 of the State Con-
stitution. 
Article 36(2) makes ‘clandestine or individual 
or separate deals’ with companies or entre-
preneurs, and ‘collaborating in campaigns to 
facilitate their entry prior to formal consulta-
tion process with the State’, a crime against the 
Wampis people. The matter is even more serious 
if the deal is made by a leader who is a member 
of their governing bodies.
Article 37 of the Statute forewarns the Peruvian 
State of the Wampis intension to defend their 
rights in international venues if ever the State 
decides to undertake projects with potentially 
significant impacts in their territory without 
consultation and without having obtained their 
FPIC. Under the Statute, the Wampis Govern-
ment is tasked to seek reparations and restitu-
tion for any harm caused in accordance with 
international treaties protecting their people’s 
rights.
Rules governing sacred areas 
The Wampis Statute addresses the fundamental 
importance of sacred areas and their centrality 
to Wampis self-governance and their existence 
as a people. Among the areas listed are the 
Kampankias, Tuntanain and Winchikim Nain 
mountains, the latter also known as Ichigkat 
Muja in the Awajun language. Other sacred 
areas are included in the Wampis ethno-cultural 
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map and are also subject to the same protection 
(Wampis Statute, art. 39). These sacred areas are 
treated as the ‘cultural and spiritual patrimony’ 
of the Wampis nation. The Statute affirms that 
‘for no reason will [the Wampis nation] relin-
quish its control and administration’ over these 
areas or allow any non-consented impacts or 
interference (Wampis Statute, art. 39). 
Regulating engagement with companies 
following a consultation process
In cases where a legitimate prior consultation 
process leads to FPIC being granted to pro-
ceed with negotiations on a development pro-
ject or activity impacting on their territory, 
the Wampis Government will then enact reg-
ulations that determine the scope and limits of 
those negotiations to be held between them-
selves, the Peruvian State and any third parties 
that are involved. It is only following this stage 
that companies can dialogue with the Wampis. 
The Wampis regulation will also address the 
monitoring, compensation and benefit-sharing 
mechanisms that need to be established to facil-
itate and oversee these negotiations and their 
outcomes (Wampis Statute, art. 37).
These provisions of the Wampis Statute provide 
the contextual framework for the articulation 
of their FPIC Protocol. This was reinforced by 
the affirmation in 2017 by the Peruvian Courts 
of the requirement to obtain their FPIC to 
measures with potentially significant impacts, 
in accordance with the jurisprudence of the 
IACtHR. This ruling is regarded by the Wampis 
as being of fundamental importance to ensuring 
their territorial integrity and exercise their right 
to self-governance as established in their Stat-
ute. Their development of the FPIC Protocol 
is part of a process of reflection on the impli-
cations of this decision for future engagement 
with the State.
POTENTIAL 
CONTRIBUTION OF AN 
AUTONOMOUS FPIC 
PROTOCOL IN THE 
WAMPIS CONTEXT
The Wampis decision to 
develop an FPIC Protocol
The Wampis regard the Peruvian State’s 
attempts to circumvent the requirement to 
consult in good faith in order to obtain FPIC 
as a breach of its obligation to respect, protect 
and fulfil their rights. They insist that respect 
for Wampis territorial and governance rights 
implies that measures they deem to have signif-
icant impacts on those rights cannot proceed 
without their FPIC. In such cases, the State 
must respect the outcome of good faith con-
sultations, as to do otherwise would be incon-
sistent with its obligation to guarantee their 
fundamental rights. 
Because the State refuses to acknowledge this, 
and because it has thus far failed to implement 
good faith consultations based on genuine 
inter-cultural dialogue with Amazonian peo-
ples, the Wampis have rejected the application 
of the 2011 consultation law and its imple-
menting regulation in their territories. They see 
existing State-defined consultation timeframes 
and processes as overly restrictive, homoge-
nous and culturally inappropriate, constituting 
an infringement of their rights, rather than a 
mechanism to guarantee their realization.
Faced with this reality, initial discussions 
among the Wampis leaders considered outright 
rejection of any State initiated consultation 
process. Following the landmark Court deci-
sion in 2017 (upheld in 2018), and aware that 
they will inevitably face a State-initiated con-
sultation processes in the future, the Wampis 
decided that developing their own FPIC Pro-
tocol could constitute a more effective route 
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through which to guarantee the protection of 
their rights in accordance with their Statute.
Content of the Wampis FPIC Protocol
This FPIC Protocol will be grounded on pro-
visions of the Wampis Statute outlined above, 
the Court decision affirming their right to give 
or withhold FPIC to any project with poten-
tially significant impacts, and international 
law jurisprudence and standards. The Wampis 
regard the protocol development and imple-
mentation as an exercise of self-governance. It 
will embody their own form of thinking, be 
premised on their unique conception of the 
integral territory, and regulate if, how, when, 
and where consultations are to be held. It will 
also address the triggers for the requirement to 
obtain their FPIC and how, when and on what 
basis the Wampis will decide to grant or with-
hold their consent. 
Several elements of such a protocol, and the 
principles it will embody, already exist in the 
Wampis Statute. The development of the FPIC 
Protocol would provide a means to systematize 
these elements into an operational framework 
which forms the basis for engagement with the 
State in relation to proposed activities in or 
near their territories. It would serve to formal-
ize and elaborate on the principles and proce-
dures with which the Wampis require the State 
to comply in any consultation process that it 
seeks to initiate with them. 
The development of the protocol would also 
afford the Wampis an opportunity to engage 
their neighbours, the Awajun people, in jointly 
discussing how to make decisions in relation 
to projects or measures that affect both their 
peoples and territories. A formalized proto-
col would also help to ensure that the deci-
sion-making processes and powers of municipal 
governments, as well as regional and national 
government bodies, are exercised consistently 
with the core right of the Wampis Government 
to govern their integral territory.
The planned FPIC Protocol is one of several 
tools which the Wampis are developing in their 
efforts to strengthen their self-governance. 
Among the other tools are strategic policies 
addressing self-determined development, terri-
torial defence, and forest management, plans 
in relation to territorial zoning and regula-
tion of water and other natural resources, and 
instruments to address health, violence against 
women, culture, traditional knowledge, eco-
nomic opportunities and justice.
The protocol will be developed based on the 
practical experience of the Wampis with exter-
nally imposed development activities in their 
territories, as well as their historical experience 
of engagement with the State and other actors, 
and the lessons which they have learned from 
the experience of other indigenous peoples 
with consultation and consent seeking pro-
cesses. Based on this experience the Wampis 
have provisionally identified three principles 
that will be embedded in the protocol. 
The first principle relates to legitimization 
of the consultation process. The purpose of 
consultations with the objective of obtaining 
FPIC is to protect indigenous peoples’ rights. 
A basic prerequisite for a good faith consulta-
tion process is therefore that those rights are 
formally recognized in law in advance of the 
process commencing. This requirement relates 
to: a) territorial rights, including the right to 
have their integral territory recognized, rather 
than mere portions of that territory titled to 
individual communities; b) self-governance 
rights, including recognizing the Wampis Gov-
ernment and related governance structures as 
the legitimate interlocutors for the Wampis 
nation in the context of consultation processes; 
and c) cultural rights, including in relation to 
language, protection of sacred areas, forms of 
dialogue and knowledge, and internal modali-
ties of engagement between communities and 
peoples. 
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According to the Wampis, these rights, which 
are recognized in international law standards 
and jurisprudence, must now be formally rec-
ognized in national law. Rather than remaining 
at the level of political discourse, this rights 
recognition must be reflected in law and prac-
tice. This is a precondition for the Wampis to 
be able to engage in good faith consultations in 
relation to measures that impact on their rights 
and future. The FPIC Protocol will address this 
foundational issue of adequate rights recogni-
tion and respect as the basic pre-requisite for 
any efforts to obtain their consent to measures 
impacting on their rights.
The second principle underpinning the Wampis 
FPIC Protocol is good faith negotiation to reach 
mutually beneficial outcomes. The Wampis 
believe that there are certain activities in rela-
tion to which agreement can be reached with 
the State. Through the conduct of good faith 
consultation processes in order to obtain their 
FPIC, any impacts these activities may poten-
tially have would be assessed in conjunction 
with the Wampis. Consent would be forth-
coming provided those impacts were deemed 
acceptable by the Wampis and proportionate to 
the benefits envisaged. Such projects could, for 
example, potentially be in areas such as tourism 
or sustainable management of forest resources. 
They would be designed in conjunction with 
the Wampis in a manner that is consistent with 
their identity, their territorial vision and their 
future development plans and aspirations as a 
people. The implementation of these activities 
would involve the Wampis acting in partner-
ship with the State and other actors, resulting in 
benefits for all parties involved.
The third principle relates to the Wampis con-
ception of consent and when it is required. The 
protocol will establish what consent means for 
the Wampis. This will go beyond narrow con-
ceptions of consent as framed by the State, 
which divorce it from the self-government, 
territorial and cultural rights that underpin it. 
It is envisaged that the protocol will address 
both the procedural and substantive dimen-
sions of consent. The procedural dimensions 
would establish what is necessary for a culturally 
appropriate process through which rights-based 
informed consent can be sought and through 
which it would be freely granted or withheld by 
the Wampis. The substantive dimension would 
include an articulation of the foundational 
rights and principles which underpin the right 
of the Wampis to say “yes” or “no”, or “a condi-
tional yes”, to activities that are proposed by the 
State and which have a direct impact on their 
territory and rights. 
For the Wampis certain activities pose a threat 
to their existence as people. These potential 
impacts would alter their way of life to an 
extent that the Wampis are not prepared to 
accept. They are completely incompatible with 
their current way of life and with their self-de-
termined plans for how they wish to live and 
exist as a people in the future. In such cases, the 
Wampis would withhold their consent and pro-
vide the rights-based reasons upon which they 
have taken the decision to do so. The Wampis 
have yet to determine how their FPIC Proto-
col will regulate decision-making in relation to 
such scenarios. This will be decided as part of 
the internal consultation process that will be 
conducted to develop the protocol.
There are several possible approaches to address-
ing contexts in which FPIC is deemed by the 
Wampis to be a mandatory requirement under 
their Statute, international and national law. 
The Wampis could decide, for example, that a 
full-scale consultation process is unnecessary or 
inappropriate in certain contexts. In this sce-
nario, the FPIC Protocol could affirm that they 
will take a decision internally before a full-scale 
consultation process is initiated. That decision, 
along with the reasons underpinning it, could 
then be formally communicated to the State. 
Another approach would be for the protocol 
to specify that there are certain activities for 
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which the Wampis have pre-determined that 
they will always withhold consent, irrespective 
of any State initiated consultation process. Such 
scenarios could, for example, be in relation to 
hydroelectric projects that lead to the flooding 
of Wampis territory. The FPIC Protocol could 
lay out the rationale behind this collective deci-
sion taken by the Wampis people. The impacts, 
such as displacement and the profound threats 
to their way of life and their means of subsist-
ence, could be stipulated by the Wampis as 
grounds for withholding their consent prior to 
any such proposals in their territories.
The Wampis have already issued strong pro-
nouncements against a proposed hydroelectric 
project that would lead to flooding of their 
territory, arguing that the Government must 
guarantee their rights and protect their lives and 
livelihoods and therefore cannot proceed with 
the project. Similarly, they have seen that other 
Amazonian communities, such as those affected 
by Block 192, have not benefited from 50 years 
of oil exploitation in their territories. Instead, 
they have been left with serious environmental 
harms, which the State is unable to remediate, 
their communities have been divided, armed 
forces have been deployed in their territories, 
legal cases have been taken against their leaders, 
and community members have suffered extreme 
material and psychological hardship in their 
struggles to have their rights respected. Indeed, 
it was these realities and their own experiences 
led the Wampis to take the legal action in order 
to prevent the operation of the oil concession in 
Block 116 which the State had imposed in their 
territory without consultation or consent. 
CONCLUSION
For the Wampis, the development of an FPIC 
Protocol is part of their pursuit of self-deter-
mined development. For genuine FPIC to be 
given there must be development options from 
which the Wampis people can choose. To this 
end, the Wampis nation will seek to develop 
their own proposals for alternative development 
options to State proposed extractive industry 
or large-scale energy projects. This objective is 
part of a broader dialogue and strategy among 
Amazonian indigenous peoples to assert their 
autonomy and strengthen their capacity to be 
able to propose alternative development models 
to the State. 
The Peruvian Government has an obligation to 
cooperate with the Wampis and other indige-
nous peoples in the development of these alter-
natives. Under Article 2 of ILO Convention 
169 it is obliged to develop “with the participa-
tion of the peoples concerned, co-ordinated and 
systematic action to protect the rights of these 
peoples and to guarantee respect for their integ-
rity”, including though:
(b) promoting the full realisation of the 
social, economic and cultural rights of 
these peoples with respect for their social 
and cultural identity, their customs and 
traditions and their institutions;
(c) assisting the members of the peoples 
concerned to eliminate socio-economic 
gaps that may exist between indigenous 
and other members of the national com-
munity, in a manner compatible with their 
aspirations and ways of life.
By insisting on these three principles within an 
overarching framework of indigenous auton-
omy, territorial integrity and self-determined 
development, the Wampis envisage their FPIC 
Protocol as a means to exert greater pressure on 
the Peruvian State to guarantee genuine consul-
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tation and consent seeking processes in accord-
ance with customary law and the self-governance 
rights of indigenous peoples and thereby enable 
their self-determined development.
Underpinning the Wampis decision to develop 
their FPIC Protocol is a focus on the need to 
ensure that their people are united, that they 
are continuously enhancing their capacity for 
self-governance and that there is an increased 
awareness among community members of their 
inherent rights. If the Wampis are guaranteed 
the time, space and resources they require to 
develop their FPIC Protocol, the internal con-
sultative process involved in doing so would 
contribute to all there of these objectives. As 
an instrument of self-governance regulating 
engagement with third parties, the Wampis Pro-
tocol may also eventually offer a useful model 
for other Peruvian indigenous peoples who are 
taking steps to assert their right to autonomy, 
their conceptions of territory and their own 
autonomous territorial governments. 
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CONCLUSION - REFLECTION ON CONTRIBUTIONS 
OF FPIC PROTOCOLS TO RIGHTS REALIZATION
By Cathal Doyle
“If we don’t reach an agreement on how to consult, 
we won’t reach an agreement on the proposed project” 
Aurelio Chino Dahua, president of the Native Quechan Federation of Pastaza 
(Fediquep), Peru 169 
“What we want is that they leave us our own models of 
development and our autonomy to protect and realize them”
Luz Gladis Vila Pihue, President of the Founding Congress of the National 
Organization of Andean and Amazonian Indigenous Women of Peru (ONAMIAP)170  
“If a decision on anything that affects or concerns us as peoples 
has not gone through a form of decision-making we call our own, 
we cannot say we are indigenous peoples anymore. 
If we are not able to hold on to our traditions, we then 
cannot consider ourselves as indigenous peoples”
Virginia Maligaya, Mangyan Alangan Elder (Mindoro, Philippines)
INTRODUCTION 
Initial experiences with autonomous free 
prior and informed consent (FPIC) Protocols 
demonstrate their potential to contribute to 
tackling critical shortcomings in existing law, 
as well as State and corporate practice, around 
consultation and consent. They have acted as 
tools for resistance, challenging the absence 
of, or flaws in, consultation processes and 
establishing standards and procedures with 
which future consultation processes must 
comply. Their legitimacy in this regard has 
been recognized by national courts as well as 
local, national and international oversight and 
administrative bodies.
The autonomous development of these pro-
tocols has opened spaces for reflection and 
dialogue among and between indigenous 
 
 
peoples. These spaces are generally free from 
the external and internal pressures that inevita-
bly accompany consultation processes. This has 
allowed indigenous peoples to address how they 
wish to take decisions when confronted with 
powerful external actors seeking to operate in 
their territories, and has contributed to address-
ing the significant power imbalance that can 
occur between indigenous peoples and external 
actors proposing projects of economic interest 
to the State. It has provided them the time and 
freedom necessary to articulate what consulta-
tion and FPIC mean in their own terms. 
The importance which indigenous peoples 
attribute to protocols is central to assessing 
their contribution to rights realization. As out-
lined in the Colombia case study, members of 
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the Afro-Colombian Communities of northern 
Cauca regard their protocol as “the key mecha-
nism for territorial defence”, and as the means 
to exercise the right “to continue being and 
existing in the territories”. The very process of 
discussing the protocol and its development 
led to community members becoming aware of 
their rights, enabling them to build the “legal 
and spiritual tools” to defend their territories.
 
Several indigenous peoples also point to the sig-
nificance of simply being able to say “we have 
these rules” to external actors, be they States, 
illegal actors, armed groups or corporations. 
Their experiences suggest that this has altered 
the power dynamic between them and external 
actors, leading in some cases to a change in the 
latter’s behaviour and plans. This final chapter 
will explore the contribution FPIC protocols 
have made to rights realization, the challenges 
to their implementation and the potential 
opportunities they afford to all actors. It will 
conclude with recommendations to States, cor-
porations and international organizations.
EXISTING AND 
POTENTIAL 
CONTRIBUTIONS OF 
FPIC PROTOCOLS
The role of protocols in building unity and 
strengthening self-governance
A common reflection among indigenous peo-
ples who have developed FPIC protocols is that 
the experience has strengthened their self-gov-
ernance institutions and helped build unity 
within and across their communities and peo-
ples. Protocol development has also facilitated 
the resolution of pre-existing tensions between 
peoples or with other tribal or local communi-
ties - tensions that have often arisen due to the 
absence of good faith consultations on the part 
of the State in the past. For many indigenous 
peoples, the process of protocol development 
has also served to facilitate dialogue between 
elders and youth, helping to revitalize memory 
and recover and transmit ancestral knowledge, 
and has ensured that all members of commu-
nities - regardless of their age or gender - are 
involved in community decision-making pro-
cesses. 
Protocol development has also played an impor-
tant role in capacity building and empow-
erment of communities. As mechanisms to 
strengthen self-government they have helped to 
build cross community consensus on method-
ology and processes for internal dialogue and 
decision-making, as well as external consulta-
tion and engagement. External actors – NGOs, 
indigenous organizations and networks, state 
actors and international organizations – of the 
communities’ own choosing have supported 
protocol development. More importantly there 
has also been significant cross-learning between 
indigenous and tribal peoples who have devel-
oped similar protocols. 
FPIC protocol development has provided indig-
enous peoples with an opportunity to reflect 
on traditional approaches and rules governing 
internal decision-making and engagement with 
external actors, as well as rules regulating deci-
sion-making at the people or pan-people level. 
It has afforded them with an opportunity to 
strengthen, enhance, formalize or alter these 
approaches to cater to contemporary challenges 
and threats.
This has proven necessary as consultation pro-
cesses have invariably been accompanied by 
pressure from the State and corporations on 
communities to deliver the outcome these 
external actors desire. Conflict and division 
have ensued, often as a result of incentives 
offered to, or intimidation of, those wielding 
decision-making power within communities. 
The formalization of decision-making rules 
and structures when engaging with State gov-
ernment institutions, including local govern-
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ment, or other external actors has enabled some 
indigenous peoples to ensure greater internal 
accountability and reduce the potential for 
external actors to manipulate individual lead-
ers. Some indigenous peoples have also sought 
to address pressures that arise in the context of 
armed actors, be they State, corporate, paramil-
itary or rebel groups.
The existence of these protocols as formal pub-
lic instruments regulating State and corporate 
action has helped limit the potential for this 
type of undue influence. This has applied even 
in the context of repressive regimes or violent 
conflicts, as seen in Brazil and Colombia.  
The operation of these instruments has comple-
mented other self-government and territorial 
defence strategies. This includes the assertion of 
autonomous governments and integral territo-
ries, as in the case of the Wampis; the establish-
ment of environmental monitors or indigenous 
guards, as in the case of the Embera Chamí; 
engagement with international and regional 
mechanisms, as in the case of the Juruna; and 
alliance building and the enforcement of Court 
decisions requiring consultations to obtain 
FPIC, as described in all three case studies. 
Beyond these local contexts, FPIC protocols 
are generating significant interest among other 
indigenous peoples globally and are facilitat-
ing cross-learning, solidarity, and strengthen-
ing indigenous peoples’ collective voice and 
demands at national, regional and international 
levels. 
The role of protocols in addressing 
structural discrimination
Discrimination against indigenous peoples is 
structural in nature in all States in which they 
reside. They are systematically denied access to 
spaces where regulation is developed and policy 
agendas determined. This results in not only the 
exclusion of indigenous peoples’ voice and the 
denial of their participatory rights, it also means 
that government institutions remain ignorant 
of indigenous peoples’ realities and rights and 
are totally unequipped to engage in intercul-
tural dialogue with them based on respect and 
equality. 
It is, nevertheless, important to note that some 
government bodies, such as the Ministério 
Público Federal (MPF) in Brazil, and certain 
individual government officials in all the case 
study countries, have actively supported indig-
enous peoples in the realization of their rights, 
including through the promotion of FPIC and 
the development of FPIC protocols. These bod-
ies and individuals are to be commended for 
this important work and should be taken as role 
models for improved institutional relationships 
with indigenous peoples. 
Contextualizing the implementation 
of international standards
As with the indigenous rights framework, of 
which it forms a part, the contemporary norm 
of consultation and FPIC was affirmed in inter-
national instruments based on the demands 
made by indigenous representatives. The strug-
gle of indigenous peoples now is to ensure its 
meaningful implementation on the ground. 
Norm interpretation is always a dynamic pro-
cess realized at the point of implementation. 
To be meaningful it must be flexible to cater 
to the diverse realities of distinct peoples, and 
it should always seek to guarantee the collective 
and individual rights of the most vulnerable. 
FPIC protocols act as mechanisms for this 
translation of international norms into practice. 
They achieve this through concrete rules and 
procedures that guide implementation while 
infusing internationally recognized rights with 
culturally appropriate content. Their develop-
ment affords indigenous peoples with an oppor-
tunity to learn about, and reflect on, their rights 
under IHRL and corresponding State duties. In 
so doing, they can determine how national laws 
should be reconciled with their customary laws 
and their own interpretations of their rights.
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This issue of interpretation in FPIC protocols 
extends to the entire spectrum of rights - from 
the right to life, including its subsistence, exist-
ence and way of life dimensions, to the right 
to a healthy environment, with its spiritual and 
cultural dimensions, to the right to territory, 
with context specific conceptions of territory 
as integral and whole and sui generis models of 
territorial government, autonomy and devel-
opment. In some contexts, indigenous peoples 
have also used FPIC protocol development as 
a space in which to articulate and assert their 
historically ignored customary-law-based claims 
to rights over subsoil resources.
In this regard, FPIC protocols tackle the pre-
dominant tendency of States to monopolize the 
interpretation and implementation of IHRL 
instruments and jurisprudence pertaining to 
indigenous peoples’ rights, especially ILO Con-
vention 169 and the UNDRIP. Autonomous 
protocol development is helping to transform 
these instruments from State-centric ones, to 
instruments of autonomy and self-determina-
tion in accordance with their original object 
and purpose. They are repositioning indigenous 
peoples as empowered actors directing their 
own participation in decision-making pro-
cesses, rather than passive subjects the extent 
and nature of whose participation is determined 
by States. 
Protocols as a means to move beyond 
the veto/no veto argument
The rule of law implies that people and peoples 
have fundamental rights that must be respected 
and that public authorities have no coercive 
power beyond what the laws give them. To be 
legitimate, State actions impacting on indige-
nous territories must be within the confines of 
the law. This implies that they must be permis-
sible under national, international and indig-
enous customary law. Rather than recognize 
the role of FPIC in guaranteeing this, there is a 
tendency among States, corporations and even 
among some allies of indigenous peoples, to 
equate FPIC to a veto power and thereby chal-
lenge the duty to obtain indigenous peoples’ 
consent for activities that may have significant 
impacts on their rights. At times this position is 
grounded in an outdated interpretation of ILO 
Convention 169, that fails to consider indige-
nous peoples’ right to self-determination under 
contemporary IHRL standards and jurispru-
dence.
Self-determination and FPIC imply a system of 
legal plurality. As legal instruments grounded in 
distinct bodies of law – international, national 
and indigenous law - FPIC protocols serve to 
constrain State actions in indigenous territories. 
By articulating the rights-basis for indigenous 
peoples’ decision-making authority and the 
requirement to obtain their FPIC, they chal-
lenge approaches to indigenous rights that seek 
to reduce FPIC to merely a veto power. 
Rather than seeking a veto power for indige-
nous peoples, what FPIC protocols are doing is 
exposing and challenging the de-facto existing 
“veto power” of States and corporations over 
indigenous peoples’ self-determined decisions. 
These include their decisions on social, cultural 
and economic development and on the use of 
natural resources to guarantee their subsistence 
and survival as peoples. Protocols frequently 
ground FPIC decisions on the severity of the 
potential impacts as perceived and articulated 
by the concerned peoples themselves. They shift 
the focus of discussions away from an abstract 
“veto power”, to how indigenous peoples’ rights 
should be protected in practice. As such, they 
are a pragmatic and constructive response to 
the seemingly perpetual and often disingenuous 
questioning of whether, why and under what 
conditions a requirement for FPIC exists. 
Protocols and the role of Courts
The right to consultation and consent, while it 
is generally inadequately implemented, never-
theless remains a core instrument in indigenous 
peoples’ struggle for respect for their self-gov-
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ernance and territorial rights. Access to remedy, 
where adequate consultations are not held, is 
central to this. The rule of law requires that inde-
pendent judges protect rights and enforce lim-
its on state power. Throughout the world, but 
especially in Latin America, the right to petition 
national and regional courts to challenge flawed 
or inadequate consultation processes remains 
fundamental to indigenous peoples’ struggles. 
While many judges lack familiarity with the 
indigenous rights framework that underpins 
the requirement for consultation and FPIC, 
this is gradually changing; courts are increas-
ingly ordering projects to be suspended until 
prior consultations are held in accordance with 
international standards. 
This widespread judicialization of consultation 
is evidence of the immaturity of State institu-
tions and processes when it comes to respect-
ing and protecting indigenous peoples’ rights. 
While legal avenues are essential in such a con-
text, purely juridical approaches to consultation 
and consent are inadequate to ensure implemen-
tation of consultation and FPIC. Indigenous 
representatives have highlighted that rulings are 
not always culturally appropriate and often do 
not respond to the realities in which they live. 
In addition, taking legal challenges imposes 
huge burdens on communities and decisions 
are frequently not implemented in good faith.
Protocols have a potentially important role to 
play in addressing these challenges. They can 
educate the judiciary on how consultations 
should be conducted and FPIC sought in spe-
cific contexts. Courts can then articulate gen-
eral IHRL principles governing consultations 
and direct government institutions to the con-
cerned people’s FPIC protocols for specific rules 
and implementation guidance. Recent develop-
ments in jurisprudence in Brazil and Colombia, 
where Courts have instructed governments to 
consult and obtain FPIC in accordance with 
indigenous peoples’ protocols, are evidence 
of this synergy. Similarly, in the case of the 
Wampis, the Peruvian court’s affirmation of the 
requirement for FPIC was an important impe-
tus for the development of an FPIC protocol 
by the Wampis. The Wampis decided this was 
necessary to ensure that the ruling was imple-
mented in accordance with IHRL and their 
interpretation of their rights, and not an ill-in-
formed and arguable self-serving State interpre-
tation of those rights. 
Challenges to and opportunities for 
realizing the potential of FPIC protocols
FPIC Protocol development is a political pro-
cess which each indigenous people are free to 
initiate if they so choose. Their development is 
increasingly common in several jurisdictions. 
However, as the case studies demonstrate, sig-
nificant obstacles remain to be overcome if their 
full potential is to be realized. These obstacles 
arise as a result of the actions and inactions 
of State, corporate and other actors. Foremost 
among them is the lack of political will on the 
part of States to recognize indigenous peoples’ 
rights and to establish the necessary culturally 
appropriate legislative and policy frameworks 
to implement them. An example of this is the 
failure of States to recognize the implications 
of indigenous peoples’ right to autonomy. 
Most national governments remain unwilling 
to formally recognize indigenous peoples’ gov-
ernments, even when they have been formally 
constructed and publicly declared and seek to 
work constructively with them, as in the case of 
the Wampis in Peru. 
This lack of rights recognition is compounded 
by the limited capacity and a lack of intercul-
tural understanding in State institutions and 
the often invisible, but nevertheless enormous, 
influence extractive, energy and agribusiness 
corporations wield over decision-making pro-
cesses which impact on indigenous peoples’ 
rights. This power dynamic is reflected in the 
growing tendency of foreign, in particular 
Canadian, mining companies to take arbitra-
tion cases against States, such as Colombia and 
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Peru, under international investment agree-
ments in contexts where mining projects are 
suspended due to the lack of good faith con-
sultation and FPIC. A related issue is the role 
that home states of corporations, most notably 
Canada, in encouraging regressive provisions in 
mining regulation in countries such as Colom-
bia. At the same time, most home states fail to 
provide access to extraterritorial remedies for 
indigenous peoples impacted by the activities of 
their corporations. 
The presence and influence of armed state and 
corporate actors and illegal groups in indig-
enous territories, including non-state armed 
actors, drug traffickers, illegal miners and log-
gers, create contexts in which the very notion 
of “free” consultations and consent is an oxy-
moron. Historical harms and divisions, contexts 
of violence, conflict, corruption, and power ine-
qualities - often arising from externally imposed 
development activities - are further challenges 
to both the development and implementation 
of FPIC Protocols.
The development of a FPIC Protocol is no guar-
antee that external threats or internal challenges 
can be overcome. The resistance of national 
governments means that their effectiveness and 
long-term contribution will, in part, depend 
on how they are positioned politically before 
international organizations. The importance of 
this is already reflected in guidance emanating 
from IHRL mechanisms directing governments 
to recognize them as legitimate exercises of 
autonomy and self-determination. Therefore, 
while they are developed locally, the process 
of ensuring that national governments accord 
due respect to them will require mobilization of 
indigenous peoples at national and international 
levels. Permanent mobilization will also be nec-
essary at the local level to address internal chal-
lenges. As living documents, their enforcement 
requires constant awareness raising and support 
within communities to maintain their relevance 
and ensure the on-going capacity building that 
is needed to adapt to new challenges.
Indigenous peoples - from the Munduruku 
in Brazil to the Subanon in the Philippines - 
regard their FPIC protocols as manifestations 
of their collective wills and a means to pursue 
self-determined development. To date, however, 
FPIC Protocols have primarily benefited indig-
enous peoples by strengthening self-govern-
ment capacity and acting as tools of resistance 
in defence of their territories. With few excep-
tions, their potential as instruments to regulate 
good faith consultations and guarantee respect 
for indigenous peoples’ decisions is yet to be 
fully realized. One promising example of this is 
the case of the Wajãpi traditional community’s 
protocol in Brazil, where their protocol is acting 
as a basis for a constructive engagement with 
the government and reaching agreements in the 
context of agrarian reform measures near their 
territory.171 If this potential of FPIC protocols is 
realized, they offer significant benefits not only 
to indigenous peoples but also to States and 
other actors. 
From the perspective of States, FPIC protocols 
offer a resource efficient and effective manner 
to implement their duty to respect, protect 
and fulfil indigenous peoples’ rights. As instru-
ments that regulate relationships with the State 
based on rights, FPIC protocols can play a piv-
otal role in redirecting State interpretation and 
implementation of indigenous peoples’ rights. 
They provide an opportunity to build positive 
relationships with indigenous peoples and have 
proven to be an effective means of resolving 
existing conflict in or among indigenous com-
munities and of avoiding future conflict with 
the State. Depending on the context, some form 
of national level legislation or regulation may 
be required in order to compel state institutions 
to act in a coherent rights-protecting manner. 
FPIC protocols offer context specific instru-
ments with which this national legislation and 
policy can be aligned in order to cater to this 
diversity of indigenous peoples’ decision-mak-
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ing processes. In so doing, they avoid the impo-
sition of uniform solutions in a context where 
a diversity of approaches is required and offers 
the foundation for meaningful consultations 
that can facilitate a human rights-based model 
of sustainable development. 
This interface between FPIC protocols and 
national legislation and regulation is an impor-
tant issue that will have to be addressed on a 
case by case basis. In some contexts, protocols 
are serving to fill the void where national legis-
lation or regulation does not exist, as for exam-
ple is the case in Brazil.172 They also serve as 
protections in the context where States, again 
such as Brazil, are seeking to enact legislation 
regulating consultations, but are simultaneously 
taking retrogressive steps in relation to recog-
nition of indigenous peoples’ rights. In other 
cases, where legislation or regulation exists, but 
is incompatible with indigenous peoples’ rights 
under IHRL, protocol development can pro-
vide an impetus for the reform of such regula-
tion. This is what occurred with the Subanon 
in the Philippines. In yet other scenarios, such 
as in Colombia, respect for protocols may be 
insisted on by indigenous peoples and courts 
when the requirements of national decrees fall 
below IHRL standards. Protocols are also being 
developed in Peru where courts have affirmed 
the need for FPIC in accordance with IHRL 
standards but where this is not provided for 
under national legislation and regulation. The 
widespread absence of good faith consultation 
and consent in relation to legislation and reg-
ulations governing consultations is, in and off 
itself, a manifestation of the lack of good faith 
on the part of the State and renders FPIC Pro-
tocols all the more essential.
From the perspective of project proponents and 
investors, FPIC Protocols offer greater clarity 
and certainty in terms of rules of engagement 
and reduce long-term investment risk exposure. 
They also assist in the realization of corporate 
obligations and responsibilities in relation to 
respect for indigenous peoples’ rights. Where 
FPIC protocols exist, they should be central 
to corporate human rights due diligence and 
impact assessments. Respect for them is nec-
essary to prevent and mitigate any potential 
human rights abuses. They may also provide 
the basis for monitoring and auditing of FPIC 
processes by third parties, for agreement negoti-
ation and for addressing grievances. 
For international and regional organizations, 
FPIC Protocols can enhance their capacity to 
fulfil their obligations to promote and support 
the implementation of indigenous peoples’ 
rights by offering unique insights into each 
indigenous peoples’ interpretation of those 
rights. They offer these organizations an effec-
tive means of targeting technical and financial 
assistance to meet the needs of indigenous peo-
ples and provide them with guidance as to how 
indigenous peoples should be engaged in the 
context of any development projects that are 
being promoting. It also provides organizations, 
such as international or regional human rights 
bodies, that have oversight roles, with guidance 
as to how consultation and FPIC processes 
should be conducted. 
CONCLUSION
FPIC protocols are proving to be effective tools 
to address deficiencies in State understanding 
of, and willingness to implement, indigenous 
peoples’ rights. They have been developed in 
contexts where the concept of consultation has 
been distorted, giving rise to the paradoxical 
situation whereby consultation and FPIC has 
been transformed from a rights safeguard to a 
means to facilitate their denial. Perhaps the most 
damning demonstration of this is that three dec-
ades after the duty to consult in good faith was 
enshrined in ILO Convention 169, and despite 
claims by States to have implemented that duty, 
indigenous peoples repeatedly denounce the 
fact that there are no examples of its genuine 
implementation. State rejection of the need for 
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FPIC and insistence on maintaining control 
over the implementation of consultations is a 
manifestation of an unwillingness to alter exist-
ing power relations. By operationalizing emaci-
ated consultation processes, States are claiming 
to respect indigenous peoples’ rights in law 
while rendering them nugatory in practice. If 
indigenous peoples are not adequately involved 
in the development and operationalization of 
consultation processes, and those processes are 
not contextualized within their realities, they 
cannot fulfil their core function of protecting 
indigenous peoples’ rights. 
Protocols are part of the broader array of proac-
tive initiatives being taken by indigenous people 
to attempt to rectify this and encourage States 
to engage with them based on rights, equality 
and respect. Having been excluded from cen-
tres of power for centuries, and forced to be 
largely rule takers, indigenous peoples are now 
setting their own agendas and establishing the 
rules of engagement for external actors from 
within their own territories. The assertion of 
their right to give or withhold FPIC through 
their own processes, and on their own terms, is 
empowering indigenous peoples to defend their 
territories and strengthen self-governance. The 
role of FPIC protocols in helping to strengthen 
indigenous peoples’ unity and to reach internal 
agreement on decision-making processes has 
already been demonstrated in certain contexts.
For consultations to be developed and imple-
mented in a manner that is consistent with 
indigenous peoples’ rights FPIC protocols 
clarify that certain preconditions must be met. 
These include the empowerment of indigenous 
peoples and their representative structures; the 
end of stigmatization, threats, criminalization, 
and targeted acts of violence against indige-
nous leaders; the opportunity, time and space 
for indigenous peoples to consult internally 
in relation to their decision-making processes 
and their desired social, cultural and economic 
development; access to the necessary technical 
and financial support; and guarantees that their 
land, cultural and self-government rights will be 
respected. These pre-conditions are embedded 
in FPIC protocols. Their continued develop-
ment and the continued insistence by indige-
nous peoples on State and corporate compliance 
with their provisions, may help ensure that these 
preconditions are eventually acknowledged and 
fulfilled.
Indigenous peoples have shown good faith in 
developing FPIC protocols. States now need to 
show good faith by respecting them. Until this 
happens, and the necessary preconditions are 
in place for rights-based consultations to take 
place, FPIC protocols will continue to act as 
tools for resistance, education and strengthening 
self-governance. Inevitably, they will be ignored 
in certain contexts and will require physical 
mobilizations, legal actions, political campaign-
ing and international oversight in order to insist 
on their implementation. If that happens, as it 
should, FPIC protocols will transition to being 
important instruments for building genuine 
rights-based relationships with States and any 
other actors seeking to engage with indigenous 
peoples.
 “Operationalization of FPIC is 
dependent on a genuine 
acknowledgment of the right of all 
indigenous peoples to define their own 
development paths. This necessitates 
respect for their rights to be informed 
and consulted, and to determine 
under what conditions investment and 
development projects are allowed to 
proceed within their territories. This 
includes the right to accept or reject a 
particular proposal.” 173
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RECOMMENDATIONS – REALIZING 
THE POTENTIAL OF FPIC PROTOCOLS
By Cathal Doyle
The Special Rapporteur ... noted the good practices and proactive 
approaches on the part of indigenous peoples to pursue the 
realization of their rights. These include the development of con-
sultation protocols incorporating the consultation and free, prior 
and informed consent procedures developed by the Wajãpi in 
Amapá and the Munduruku in Pará…
The Special Rapporteur recommends that the Government…
Acknowledge and support the proactive measures taken by 
indigenous peoples to realize their rights, including their right to 
self-determination. This includes observing and responding to con-
sultation and consent protocols developed by indigenous peoples in 
the context of the State duty to consult;
UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Mission to Brazil (2016)
Guidelines or models for seeking free, prior and informed consent 
that are developed by either States or private actors should not 
prevail over indigenous peoples’ own community protocols ….
The establishment of these protocols is an instrument of 
empowerment for indigenous peoples, closely linked to their rights 
to self-determination, participation and the development and 
maintenance of their own decision-making institutions…
States and the private sector should promote and respect 
indigenous peoples’ own protocols, as an essential means 
of preparing the State, third parties and indigenous peoples 
to enter into consultation and cooperation, and for the smooth 
running of the consultations…
Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Report on FPIC 2018 
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1. Acknowledge the self-determination-based right of indigenous peoples to define their 
own development paths and the associated duty to obtain FPIC for development activities 
in or near their territories that may have a significant impact on their enjoyment of their rights. 
Support them in the development of their own plans and priorities, free from external pressure.
2. Recognize and commit to respecting FPIC protocols as a pro-active exercise of the right 
to self-determination and as living self-government instruments that form an integral part 
of the law governing State and corporate actions in relation to indigenous peoples. Respect 
decisions affirmed in FPIC protocols in relation to no-go areas or activities that are prohibited 
by indigenous peoples as a result of their potentially profound impacts. 
3. Afford indigenous peoples the necessary time and space to formulate FPIC protocols and 
where requested provide technical and financial support for the development, dissemination 
and implementation of FPIC protocols. Refrain from holding consultations processes while 
FPIC protocols are being developed. 
4. Ensure training and capacity-strengthening on indigenous peoples’ rights as recognized 
under international human rights law (IHRL) for all state administrative and oversight 
bodies, including the judiciary and those bodies responsible for concession issuance and 
licencing, and guarantee coherence across these agencies in relation to respect for those rights. 
Strengthen and guarantee the independence of governmental agencies responsible for facilitat-
ing the implementation of indigenous peoples’ rights.
5. Recognize the need for intercultural interpretations of indigenous peoples’ rights under 
IHRL and the central role of indigenous peoples in determining culturally appropriate modal-
ities for the implementation of these rights and pre-conditions for their realization. This may 
be realized through written FPIC protocols. In no case should the absence of an FPIC proto-
col imply that the State does not have a duty to consult and obtain FPIC in accordance with 
indigenous peoples’ customs and practices.
6. Increase awareness of FPIC Protocols among indigenous peoples and other actors and 
encourage and facilitate the sharing of experiences between indigenous peoples in relation to 
the development and implementation of FPIC protocols.
7. Follow the guidance offered by UN bodies, such as the UN Expert Mechanism on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples, the UN Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples, as well 
as regional and national courts in relation to indigenous peoples’ rights and respecting FPIC 
protocols. 
FOR HOST STATES
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8. Conduct, in close cooperation with indigenous peoples, reviews of existing regulatory and 
policy framework governing activities affecting indigenous peoples, in order to ensure their 
consistency with IHRL standards and the concerned indigenous peoples’ perspective, needs and 
aspirations and their FPIC protocols where these exist. These activities include consultations, 
strategic planning, licensing, issuance of concessions, conduct of impact assessments, determi-
nation of mitigation measures and negotiation of benefit agreements. Any laws or regulation 
governing consultation and FPIC must be developed in close consultation with indigenous 
peoples.
9. Ensure that consultations are freely held in good faith by guaranteeing that there is no 
pressure on indigenous peoples as a result of military or armed actor presence. This implies 
establishing no-go zones if requested by indigenous peoples in cases where consultations can-
not be conducted ‘free’ of pressures from these actors. 
10. Suspend all activities conducted in or near indigenous peoples’ territories that were not 
subject to prior good faith consultations and consult with the peoples concerned in accord-
ance with their own protocols, written or otherwise, to determine culturally appropriate rights-
based remedies.
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1. Establish mandatory human rights due diligence legislation binding on corporations regis-
tered in their jurisdictions, including reference to applicable international law in the conduct 
of such due diligence, and explicitly require respect for indigenous peoples’ rights, including 
compliance with FPIC protocols where they have been developed. 
2. Ensure that international investment agreements are consistent with indigenous peoples’ 
right to give or withhold FPIC to investments in or near their territories that have potentially 
significant impacts on their rights. 
3. Enact extraterritorial legislation to hold their companies better to account for violations 
of indigenous peoples’ rights overseas and establish affordable, accessible and responsive fora 
where indigenous peoples can bring allegations of abuses and complaints, including in relation 
to consultation and FPIC. 
4. Support the development of improved multilateral standards for corporations, through 
UN and other multilateral standard-setting arenas, requiring respect for indigenous peoples’ 
rights, effective due diligence processes, and provision of prompt and effective remedy for 
harms.
  
 
FOR HOME STATES OF COMPANIES 
AND STATES SPONSORING INVESTMENT 
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FOR PROJECT PROPONENTS 
1. Develop a public policy commitment to respect international standards on indigenous 
peoples’ rights, including the right to consultation and FPIC under Article 32 of the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. This should a) Recognize and publicly 
acknowledge that seeking and granting or withholding FPIC is a process to be defined 
and managed by those indigenous peoples whose territories and futures are impacted by 
proposed projects, and avoid any manipulation, or complicity in the manipulation, of such 
processes. b) Acknowledge that FPIC protocols reduce long-term investment risk expo-
sure by offering procedural clarity and certainty and facilitating respect for human rights 
c) Encourage States and other corporate actors to respect FPIC protocol implementation. 
2. Respect FPIC protocols and follow their guidance, including in relation to areas such as: 
who is to be consulted; when, how, for how long and where consultations are to be held; how 
consultations are to be funded; what role is designated to corporations in the consultation pro-
cess; what pre-conditions must be meet for consultations to proceed; what role is accorded to 
indigenous peoples in impact assessments and in the determination of impact areas; the impor-
tance attributed to traditional knowledge; internal decision-making processes; and activities or 
measures that are forbidden. 
3. Ensure that FPIC protocols are fully addressed as part of: a) human rights due diligence 
and impact assessments, b) in the development of measures to prevent and mitigate any 
potential human rights abuses, c) in oversight and auditing of FPIC processes by third parties, 
d) in agreement negotiation, and e) in the context of addressing grievances. 
4. Avoid participation in consultation processes that are imposed on indigenous peoples and 
disengage from projects where there has not been good faith consultations that resulted in 
genuine FPIC. 
5. In cases where States do not recognize indigenous peoples’ rights and the duty to consult in 
order to obtain their FPIC, operate ‘as if ’ these international standards were recognized 
under national law and promote their recognition by States. If this is not possible, assume 
that consent has not been granted and withdraw from the project. 
6. Suspend projects that have proceeded without consultation and FPIC and, where requested by 
the concerned peoples, engage with them in accordance with their FPIC protocols.
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1. Develop a policy, or revise existing policies, that commits to only dealing with clients who 
respect indigenous peoples’ rights under IHRL, including the requirement to consult in 
order to obtain FPIC and recognize the clear benefits in terms of reduced financial risk in the 
adoption of FPIC protocols as a culturally appropriate means to implement this requirement.
2. Ensure that clients have policies in place which adhere to the principles of the UN Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, including the requirement for FPIC and adherence with 
FPIC protocols where these exist. 
3. Ensure that clients’ due diligence processes assess potential impacts on indigenous peoples 
through the conduct of participatory consent-based processes and that documented FPIC has 
been obtained for any licencing, concession issuance and project activities, in accordance with 
indigenous peoples’ FPIC protocols and IHRL.
4. Provide access to independent, transparent and credible complaint mechanisms to address 
cases where there are allegations of failure to consult in good faith in order to obtain FPIC.
 
 
FOR FINANCIERS 
AND INVESTORS
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1. Ensure that policies recognize the self-determination right of indigenous peoples to give 
or withhold FPIC. This should encompass their right to develop guidance in the form of 
FPIC protocols which guarantee that consultations in order to obtain FPIC are held in a 
culturally appropriate manner.
2. Provide technical and financial assistance to indigenous peoples to facilitate the 
development of FPIC protocols where requested by them to do so.
3. Complaint mechanisms should play an active role in the oversight or adjudication of 
consultation and FPIC processes where requested by indigenous peoples to do so, and 
a) ensure that consultation processes are consistent with the FPIC protocols, customs and 
practices of the concerned indigenous peoples; b) direct governments to recognize FPIC 
protocols as a legitimate exercise of autonomy that must be respected and supported as part of 
their duty to protect indigenous peoples’ human rights  c) ground the requirement to obtain 
FPIC in the broader indigenous rights framework from which it emerges and which it serves 
to safeguard.  
4. Develop binding requirements, including further guidance, for corporations acting in 
areas that may result in impacts on indigenous peoples’ rights. Such guidance should outline 
minimum requirements for human rights due diligence, impact assessments, and remedy 
provisions that are required under international law.
 
 
FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
(UN bodies, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), Bilateral Development Agencies)
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1. Where deemed appropriate by the concerned indigenous people, share experiences with 
other indigenous peoples of FPIC protocol development, including the rationale behind 
their development, the process through which they were developed and the contribution they 
have made to rights-realization, and their limitations and potential.
2. In light of customary law and practices and the challenges faced in relation to potential 
externally proposed development activities, examine the experiences of other indigenous 
peoples with FPIC Protocol development and implementation to assess their potential for 
strengthening structures and processes to be better equipped to deal with external agents. 
3. Consider framing FPIC protocols within the broader question of self-determined 
development a) as living documents that are components of broader governance strategies 
with a process in place for their revision whenever deemed necessary by your communities 
or when faced with unforeseen circumstances and b) by insisting on your right to determine 
you own development path in advance of any consultations and doing so in advance of, or in 
parallel, with internal discussions in relation to the content of FPIC Protocols.  
4. Make use of FPIC protocol development to become familiar with your rights under IHRL 
and to develop your peoples’ own interpretation of those rights and to use them as a platform 
for articulating demands to the State and other actors.
5. Consider and, where deemed appropriate, document as part of FPIC protocol development 
topics such as: a) pre-conditions for the conduct of FPIC processes, including in relation 
to rights recognition and addressing legacy issues; b) principles and rights underpinning 
FPIC processes; c) the role of internal and external actors in FPIC processes, including who is 
to be consulted, who is to participate and how; e) the role of your peoples and communities 
in impact assessments and development of baseline data; f ) activities in relation to which you 
are willing or not willing to be consulted; g) community decision-making processes and h) 
measures that vitiate consultation processes and consent. 
6. Decide if FPIC protocols should be used in place of, or in conjunction with, national 
regulation and assess what the implications of this are for the development of legislation and 
policy. 
7. Collaborate with other indigenous peoples to amplify the collective impact of FPIC 
protocols at the national and international levels. 
8. Insist that as rights-based self-governance tools, FPIC protocols should serve as educational 
instruments for all actors seeking to engage with indigenous peoples or overseeing the 
realization of their rights, including the judiciary and other State actors who have responsibil-
ities to facilitate the realization of indigenous peoples’ rights.
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1. The protocols from these 20 countries are availa-
ble in the project protocol database which will be 
made publicly accessible in a subsequent stage of the 
project. For further information contact the report 
editors.
2. In December 2018, two of the authors partici-
pated in a workshop organized by the OHCHR 
in Colombia addressing autonomous FPIC proto-
cols in the Latin American region. In March 2019 
a workshop was organized by the Columbia Centre 
for Sustainable Investment and Middlesex Univer-
sity School of Law which addressed the role of FPIC 
protocols and involved indigenous representatives 
and support organizations from involved in the 
Peruvian and Brazilian case study, as well as repre-
sentatives from other Latin American and African 
countries.
3. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights 
of indigenous peoples - International investment 
agreements, including bilateral investment treaties 
and investment chapters of free trade agreements 
(2016) UN Doc A/HRC/33/42. 
4. Protocolo de Consulta dos Povos do Território Indí-
gena do Xingu, Associação Terra Indígena Xingu 
(Sao Paulo, 2017) (henceforth Xingu Protocol). 
5. Xingu Protocol (supra fn 4) p17. The Xingu proto-
col points to the mainstream media’s misrepresenta-
tion of their views, which inaccurately held that 
they had approved a road that was in built in their 
territories without any consultation. 
6. Kaliña and Lokono Peoples v Suriname (2015) 
(Merits, Reparations and Costs) Inter-American 
Court for Human Rights (Ser. C) No. 309. 
7. See Doyle C. and J. Cariño (2013) Making Free, 
Prior & Informed Consent a Reality, Indige-
nous Peoples and the Extractive Sector (PIPLinks, 
ECCR, Middlesex University London) for an over-
view of some Canadian cases (henceforth Doyle and 
Cariño).
8. Doyle and Cariño (supra fn 7). 
9. IBIS (2013) Guidelines for Implementing the Right 
of Indigenous Peoples to Free, Prior and Informed 
Consent (Copenhagen, 2013) (henceforth IBIS 
FPIC Guidelines), Xingu Protocol (supra fn 4).
10. Wampis Statute (2015) Estatuto del Gobierno 
Territorial Autónomo de la Nación Wampis. 
En memoria de nuestros ancestros y por nues-
tro derecho a la libre determinación como 
pueblo y nación. Available at http://nacion-
wampis.com/autonomia-en-accion/#estatuto.      
 
 
11. Resolution No. 048 Por Medio de la cual se esta-
blecen y reglamentan los protocolos propios de 
consulta previa, libre, e informada y de consen-
timiento, previo libre e informado del Resguardo 
Indígena de Canamomo Lomaprieta, Riosucio y 
Supia Caldas. 29 de Mayo de 2012 (henceforth 
Resguardo Protocol) Article 30 See also Herrera, F. 
and A. Felipe Garcia (2012) Estrategias y Mecan-
ismos de Protección de Pueblos Indígenas Frente 
a Proyectos Mineros y Energéticos: La Experien-
cia del Resguardo Indígena Cañamomo Lomapri-
eta (Riosucio, Resguardo Indigena de Canamomo y 
Lomoprieta) (henceforth Herrera and Garcia).  
  
12. Clavero, B. (2005) Tratados con otros Pueblos y 
Derechos de otras Gentes en la Constitución de 
Estados por América (Madrid, Centro de Estudio 
Políticos y Constitucionales), Doyle, C. (2014) 
Indigenous Peoples, Title to Territory, Rights 
and Resources: The Transformative Role of Free 
Prior and Informed Consent (London: Rout-
ledge); WILLIAMS, R. A. Jr, (1999) Linking Arms 
Together: American Indian Treaty Visions of Law 
and Peace, 1600-1800 (London, New York: Rout-
ledge); Brownlie, I., (1992) Treaties and Indige-
nous Peoples, The Robb Lectures (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford).
13.  IBIS FPIC Guidelines (supra fn 9); An example is 
the Xinha people in Guatemala who regard consul-
tation and consent as an ancestral right. They see 
it as a means of maintaining equilibrium in their 
communities and of involving people of all ages, 
genders and beliefs in decision-making. Based on 
their interpretation of their right to consultation 
they conducted their own internal intercultural 
consultation process through which they decided to 
declare their territory free of mining. Presentation of 
Xinha people Cartagena Columbia (2018). 
14. Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug (KI) First Nation 
protocol: A Set of Protocols for the Kitchenuh-
maykoosib Inninuwug (June 5, 2011) (henceforth 
Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug (KI) Protocol).
15. Taku River Tlingit First Nation Mining Policy, 
March 2007.
16.  See Doyle and Cariño (supra fn 7) addressing 
Lutsel K’e Dene First Nation (LKDFN) experience. 
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Initial experiences with autonomous free prior and 
informed consent (FPIC)  protocols demonstrate 
their potential contribution to tackling critical 
shortcomings in existing law, as well as State and 
corporate practice, around consultation and con-
sent. Case studies contained in this book  -  from 
the Wampis (Peru), the Juruna (Brazil) and the 
Embera Chami (Colombia) - show that FPIC pro-
tocols can act as tools for resistance, challenging 
inadequate or absent consultation processes and 
establishing standards and procedures with which 
future consultation processes must comply. 
 
Through reviewing global experiences with proto-
col development, and reflecting on the lessons from 
the three case studies, this book concludes that the 
autonomous development of such protocols can 
open spaces for reflection and dialogue among and 
between indigenous peoples. These spaces can be 
highly empowering and contribute to the creation 
and maintenance of unity and self-governance 
among indigenous peoples. They facilitate the devel-
opment of tools and strategies that allow indigenous 
peoples to challenge structural discrimination and 
pursue the implementation of international stand-
ards in their lived experiences.
The book also highlights the many challenges 
facing indigenous peoples in both the development 
and continued use of such protocols. It points to 
the legal, political and social conditions that can 
facilitate their emergence and highlights the need 
for States, corporations and international organi-
zations to respect their contents and support their 
implementation. 
“What we want is that they leave us 
our own model of development and our 
autonomy to protect and realize this”
Luz Gladis Vila Pihue, 
Founder and former President of the Founding 
Congress of the National Organization of Andean 
and Amazonian Indigenous Women of Peru 
(ONAMIAP)
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